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Early Start: Preschool Politics in the United States
In the United States, preschool education is characterized by the 
dominance of a variegated private sector and patchy, uncoordinated 
oversight of the public sector. As this is unusual compared to systems  
in other Western industrialized nations, how did such an arrangement 
develop? Tracing the history of the American debate over preschool 
education, Andrew Karch argues that the current state of decentraliza- 
tion and fragmentation is the consequence of a chain of reactions and 
counterreactions to policy decisions dating from the late 1960s and early 
1970s, when preschool advocates did not achieve their vision for a 
comprehensive national program but did manage to foster initiatives at 
both the state and the national level. Over time, beneficiaries of these 
initiatives and officials with jurisdiction over preschool education have 
become ardent defenders of the status quo. Today, advocates of greater 
government involvement must take on a diverse and entrenched set of 
constituencies resistant to policy change.
This study proves the value of a developmental approach that treats 
social policymaking as a long- term causal chain. In his close analysis of  
the politics of preschool education, Karch demonstrates how to apply the 
concepts of policy feedback, critical junctures, and venue shopping to  
the study of social policy.
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During my first semester in graduate school, I took a course on educa-
tion policy and a course on the politics of the welfare state. These courses 
piqued my interest in early childhood education and the potential in-
sight it offered into the politics of social policy in the United States. Sur-
prised by how little the courses overlapped, I set that interest aside. That 
turned out to be a temporary decision. As state lawmakers, national of-
ficials, and (eventually) political scientists devoted considerable atten-
tion to preschool education in the early 2000s, I decided to embark on a 
project investigating the political origins of early childhood policy in the 
United States.
Many individuals provided helpful comments and suggestions at vari-
ous stages of the project. This book evolved out of several conference pa-
pers, chapter drafts, and presentations, and I would like to thank Jal Mehta, 
Elizabeth Rigby, Shanna Rose, Ken Wong, Marty West, Sandy Schneider, 
Jim Guthrie, Jill Clark, Stephanie Rubin, Dick Winters, Nancy Martorano 
Miller, Scott Abernathy, and seminar participants at the University of 
Texas at Austin and Southern Methodist University for their valuable 
feedback. I would also like to thank Barbara Beatty, Jane Gingrich, and 
Maris Vinovskis, all of whom graciously read the entire manuscript and 
provided constructive suggestions that enhanced its historical and theo-
retical richness. I am also grateful to the many reference librarians who 
helped me navigate the archival materials on which I relied: Jennie A. 
Levine at the University of Maryland, Jim Lavisher at the National Library 
of Medicine, Alan Walker at the National Archives, Katie Senft at the New 
York University Archives, Kathy Christie at the Education Commission of 
the States, Steve Nielsen at the Minnesota Historical Society, and Carolyn 
Hanneman at the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center. 
This project would not have come to fruition without the generous guid-
ance, support, and encouragement I received from everyone mentioned 
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here, though, of course, none of them should be held responsible for any 
shortcomings that remain in the final product.
Several institutions provided support that made this project possible. I 
wish to thank the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Minne-
sota, and the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center for 
providing research funds. I am also grateful for my ongoing association 
with the University of Michigan Press. Melody Herr provided a perfect 
combination of enthusiasm and extraordinary patience at every stage of 
the publishing process, and Susan Cronin provided useful assistance as I 
worked on the final manuscript. I would also like to acknowledge permis-
sion to use material that appeared in two previously published articles: 
“Policy Feedback and Preschool Funding in the American States,” Policy 
Studies Journal 38, no. 2 (May 2010): 217– 34; and “Venue Shopping, Policy 
Feedback, and American Preschool Education,” Journal of Policy History 
21, no. 1 (2009): 38– 60.
My family remains the most important source of support in my life. 
When I began this project, my wife, Kaori, and I were newly married and 
learning to appreciate our new surroundings in Austin. As I finally write 
these acknowledgments, a few years and one major change of climate later, 
we have our own personal stake in early childhood policy. With the arrival 
of our daughter, Dahlia, and our son, Jonah, our lives have changed in 
ways that we never could have imagined. We sleep less (sometimes much 
less) but smile and laugh more than ever, as we watch our wonderful pre-
schoolers figure out the ways of the world. It is a trade- off we would make 
again and again without hesitation. This book is dedicated to Dahlia and 
Jonah. Their arrival did not facilitate its completion, but it did serve as a 
reminder of why I think the issues it addresses are so significant.
Introduction: The Preschool Puzzle
On April 1, 1968, the U.S. commissioner of education, Harold Howe II, was 
supposed to address the annual meeting of the Department of Elementary 
School Principals of the National Education Association in Houston, 
Texas. When his presence was required at an appropriations hearing in 
Washington, Howe was unable to make the trip. Instead, his speech was 
read to the principals. It contained a bold prediction: “I would predict that 
by the year 2000 most children in the United States will be attending regu-
lar public school starting at the age of four.”1
Two elements of the commissioner’s prediction are noteworthy. First, 
he foresaw a society in which preschool attendance for four- year- old chil-
dren would be nearly universal. This element of his prediction was bold, 
because only 15.7 percent of three- and four- year- olds in the United States 
were enrolled in school in 1968.2 Second, Howe envisaged a preschool sys-
tem that would be an extension of the government- operated system of 
elementary and secondary education. Preschool would be publicly pro-
vided. This element of the prediction was also bold in 1968, when private 
nursery school enrollment outnumbered public enrollment by more than 
a two- to- one margin. Of the 816,000 children enrolled in nursery school 
that year, 554,000 (68 percent) attended a private school.3 Undaunted by 
these statistics, Howe nonetheless envisioned a universal, publicly pro-
vided system of preschool education.
In the late 1960s, many individuals shared Howe’s enthusiastic support 
of preschool education but were more pessimistic about its prospects. 
Representative Albert Quie (R- MN), a leading congressional expert on 
education policy, worried about the future. In a memorandum to mem-
bers of the House Republican Task Force on Education, which he chaired, 
Quie observed, “Preschool education has not come of age in America, and 
unless several major problems are recognized and effectively counter-
acted, it may well die an infant.”4 The congressman argued that such issues 
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as teacher training, parental roles, and educational effectiveness might 
lead to disillusionment.
More than four decades later, the specifics of both officials’ predictions 
remain unfulfilled. As Howe predicted, preschool attendance increased 
substantially between 1968 and 2000, from 15.7 percent of all three- and 
four- year- olds in 1968 to 52.1 percent in 2000.5 Enrollment expanded 
nearly fivefold among three- year- olds, and the enrollment rate of four- 
year- olds rose from 23 percent in 1968 to 65 percent in 2000 (Bainbridge 
et al. 2005, 730). By the turn of the twenty- first century, preschool enroll-
ment had become an increasingly common part of early childhood in the 
United States. The universal, government- administered preschool system 
that the commissioner envisaged, however, did not exist. Contemporary 
American preschool policy consists of a fragmented amalgamation of pro-
grams and services that are funded and delivered in different ways in the 
public and private sectors. This complicated system remains bedeviled by 
many of the issues that Quie raised. Debates over teacher training, paren-
tal roles, and the effectiveness of preschool programs are as divisive today 
as they were during the late 1960s. Yet these ongoing controversies have 
not caused preschool education to “die an infant.” Both enrollment in and 
public spending on preschool programs increased dramatically in the 
early 2000s.6
Policymakers, advocates, providers, and citizens continue to advance 
competing visions of the appropriate governmental role in early child-
hood policy. Some parties favor increased public investment, while others 
advocate general deference to parental autonomy and the private sector. 
This debate has never been resolved, and the contemporary preschool sys-
tem has been described as an “uneven patchwork of public and private 
programs” (Barnett and Hustedt 2003, 60). Its fragmentation has repeat-
edly frustrated supporters of a more comprehensive and unified approach. 
A recent report concludes, “While nearly every level of government and 
sector of society has a stake in improving early care and learning, the re-
sponsibilities are so fragmented that no single actor holds enough of the 
levers for change to get it done.”7 This book attempts to isolate the political 
sources of the current system and its fragmentation.
Implicit in Howe’s speech and Quie’s memorandum is the notion that 
the late 1960s and early 1970s represented a key moment for preschool in 
the United States. Even though the two officials did not accurately predict 
the future, they correctly recognized that the decisions their contempo-
raries made would have enduring consequences. Indeed, the structure 
and politics of contemporary American preschool education can be traced 
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to the early 1970s. At that time, multiple efforts to create a national frame-
work for the universal provision of preschool services fell short, but sev-
eral smaller programs at the national and state levels were created or ex-
panded. The beneficiaries of those programs became ardent defenders of 
the status quo. Their mobilization prevented officials from adopting a 
more coherent approach to preschool service delivery and contributed to 
the fragmentation that is a defining feature of the present system.
Contemporary American Preschool Education
This book emphasizes a specific subset of programs that often fall under 
the broader heading of early childhood care and education. Preschools 
include “programs offered under public and private education auspices or 
providing compensatory education under special legislation” (Kamerman 
and Gatenio 2003, 1– 2).8 The key attribute of these programs is their edu-
cational emphasis. Regardless of whether it is called a prekindergarten, a 
nursery school, or something else, the main focus of a preschool is prepar-
ing children for their enrollment in kindergarten and elementary school.9 
Preschools in the United States typically serve children who are three or 
four years old. They may be either half- day or full- day, public or private; 
and they may operate year- round or cover the conventional academic 
year. The line between preschool and other forms of child care is often 
blurred, and this book emphasizes governmental policies toward educa-
tional programs at the expense of center- based child care or family child 
care approaches that are often described as custodial.10
Most contemporary assessments of American preschool education 
emphasize its complexity. In the absence of a comprehensive national pol-
icy, one scholar describes early childhood programs as a “mishmash of 
financing mechanisms and funding streams” (Fuller 2007, 285). Another 
calls preschool “education’s version of the Wild West” (Kirp 2007, 25). 
Many observers agree that the contemporary preschool system is not re-
ally a coherent system at all, and some scholars have inferred that its de-
velopment has been “unsystematic [and] chaotic” (Kagan and Neuman 
2003, 60).
Preschool education in the United States differs from that of other 
countries along two main dimensions. First, the private sector plays a 
prominent role in preschool service provision. The Current Population 
Survey (CPS) has tracked nursery school enrollment in the United States 
since 1964. Using these data, figure 1 illustrates how private nursery school 
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enrollment exceeded enrollment in government programs for most of the 
late twentieth century. Spending patterns also illustrate the importance of 
the private sector. Whereas parents’ fees cover between 10 and 30 percent 
of the costs of early care and education in most European countries, with 
governments paying the remaining costs, parents are responsible for 
roughly 60 percent of the costs in the United States (A. D. White 2005, 1).11 
In some other countries, preschool is the preserve of the public sector, 
with the private sector playing a circumscribed role. In the Czech Repub-
lic, for example, early education and care is “almost entirely a public ser-
vice” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2001, 
157). In the United States, by contrast, both the public sector and the pri-
vate sector are heavily involved in preschool education.
The distinction between the public and private sectors is important 
because the two sectors serve different constituencies in the United States. 
The programs administered by the national, state, and local governments 
are generally targeted initiatives that make services available to “disadvan-
taged” children. Public preschool programs mainly serve children from 
low- income families, children with learning disabilities, and children in 
areas with limited private- sector preschool availability. These compensa-
tory programs, the most famous of which is Head Start, are an attempt to 
level the educational playing field and to promote equality of opportunity. 
Their chief objective is to prepare children for school, and this emphasis 
on “school readiness” has been a defining feature of preschool politics 
since the late 1980s.
Economically secure families are more likely to rely on the private sec-
tor for preschool services. As a result, some observers characterize early 
childhood policy in the United States as a “two- tiered” system stratified by 
class. Targeted government programs serve poor families and their chil-
dren, while the private market serves more- affluent families. The govern-
ment encourages well- off families to rely on the private sector by provid-
ing an income tax credit for child and dependent care. Initially established 
as a tax deduction in 1954, this tax expenditure historically has “mainly 
benefited middle- and upper- income families and spurred the growth of 
both voluntary and commercial services in the private sector” (Michel 
1999, 5). Supporters of this approach argue that it promotes parental au-
tonomy, allowing parents to choose a particular type of program or pro-
vider. Another justification for this tax expenditure is that it subsidizes 
third- party providers who furnish services that benefit society as a whole. 
In this case, the tax code underwrites private preschool (and child care) 
providers.
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The second dimension along which preschool education in the United 
States differs from that of other countries is its public- sector decentraliza-
tion. Government programs are administered at the national, state, and 
local levels. Dozens of national programs provide or support education 
and care for children under the age of five. They are administered by the 
Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, and other agencies. In addition, many programs exist at the state 
level. During the 2009– 10 academic year, forty states funded one or more 
prekindergarten initiatives (Barnett et al. 2010). One scholar characterizes 
this crowded landscape of governmental activity as a “hodgepodge of fed-
eral, state, and local funding streams and regulations” (Finn 2009, 27). 
This book focuses on national and state initiatives. Decentralization is a 
defining attribute of preschool education in the United States, whereas 
countries like France operate more- centralized systems.
The decentralization of preschool education allows subnational offi-
cials to design and administer programs that are consistent with the needs 
or preferences of their jurisdictions. As a result, preschool programs in the 
United States vary widely in their eligibility requirements, quality stan-
dards, resources, and other characteristics. The states have been an espe-
cially important locus of policymaking in the early 2000s, with enroll-
ment in and spending on public- sector programs rising considerably. 
During the 2005 legislative sessions, for example, officials in twenty- six 
states boosted preschool funding by a total of approximately six hundred 
Fig. 1. Nursery school enrollment, 1964– 2010. (Data from Current Population 
Survey.)
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million dollars. In some states, including Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, 
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, spending on preschool increased by at least 
30 percent.12 Although the economic recession that began in 2007 slowed 
the pace of change, the past two decades represent a period of significant 
state- level innovation in early childhood policy.
Many observers believe that this fragmented system produces undesir-
able outcomes. Reform advocates frequently describe the present patch-
work approach as both administratively burdensome and counterproduc-
tive. According to the National Education Association, it is “out- of- date, 
inconsistent, and represents a tragically missed opportunity to improve 
children’s chances for success later in school.”13 A coalition of educational 
associations argued that a lack of program coordination “often results in 
duplicate services, a convoluted number of programs and policies that are 
largely divorced not only from each other but also from the K– 12 system, 
and contradictory policies that ultimately are not in the best interest of 
taxpayers or children and their families.”14 Advocacy groups are not the 
only ones who worry about the negative impact of program fragmenta-
tion. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
described American preschool education as a “patchwork of services, reg-
ulations, and funding sources [that] leads to confusion, uneven quality, 
and inequality of access” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2001, 184).15 The structure of American preschool educa-
tion, in short, affects who gains access to programs and the quality of the 
services they receive.
In sum, preschool education in the contemporary United States is dis-
tinguished by its fragmentation. This complexity is a by- product of both 
its reliance on private- sector service providers and the decentralization of 
the government programs that do exist. The overlapping prerogatives of 
the private and public sectors and of national, state, and local govern-
ments result in an unusually complex system that many observers find 
problematic. During the late 1960s, neither Howe nor Quie foresaw the 
emergence of such complexity. How and why did preschool education in 
the United States take on its distinctive contemporary shape? That is the 
primary question that motivates this book.16 In other words, it offers a 
“political analysis” rather than a “policy analysis” of preschool education 
(Sroufe 1995). It does not assess the desirability of government involve-
ment in this policy sector. Nor does it evaluate the effectiveness of the 
contemporary preschool system (though it does investigate the political 
impact of such program evaluations when relevant). Instead, this book 
seeks to illuminate how political factors contributed to the distinctive fea-
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tures of the contemporary preschool system and what their impact reveals 
about the current prospects for significant reform.17
Such an endeavor seems especially important since so many actors 
agree that the status quo is undesirable. In light of this consensus, the sta-
bility of the fragmented system is somewhat puzzling.18 To explain its 
emergence and persistence, we must examine key policy decisions, the 
reactions they spawned, and the ways in which these decisions and reac-
tions created stakeholders whose mobilization constrained subsequent 
possibilities for change. Only by treating policymaking as an iterative pro-
cess that plays out over considerable periods of time is it possible to isolate 
the political origins of the contemporary American preschool system.
Policy Development and Preschool Education
The American preschool system was not put into place at a single moment 
in time by self- conscious politicians who believed that a combination of 
public- sector and private- sector programs was the most effective way to 
deliver services to young children. In order to explain the current system 
and its implications for future reform possibilities, it is necessary to treat 
policymaking as a long- term causal chain. In keeping with recent research 
on policy development (Pierson 2005; Hacker 2005), this book focuses on 
how early childhood policy unfolded over time. It argues that its contem-
porary fragmentation can be traced to the temporally distant events of the 
early 1970s. Three concepts help explain this long- term causal chain: criti-
cal junctures, venue shopping, and policy feedback.
Critical junctures are founding moments that fix into place basic po-
litical orientations and institutions. They are “periods of significant change 
that produce distinct legacies” (Mayes 2004, 5). Critical junctures estab-
lish the organizational logic of a social policy, and subsequent changes 
tend to be variations or extensions of that logic. They are important in and 
of themselves and because they have significant and long- lasting conse-
quences. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several forces placed preschool 
education on the national political agenda. The mothers of young children 
entered the workforce in large numbers, cognitive psychology research 
suggested that the early years were a critical period for child development, 
and the political environment was conducive to major expansions of gov-
ernment activity.
In 1971, Congress considered the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act. The bill would have provided wide- ranging educational, nutritional, 
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and health services to preschool- aged children. Both supporters and op-
ponents viewed it as a step toward the universal public provision of pre-
school services, precisely the kind of program envisioned by Howe in his 
April 1968 address. It marked a dramatic departure from the temporary 
targeted initiatives that characterized previous national government pro-
grams. The legislation passed both houses of Congress with bipartisan 
support, but President Richard Nixon vetoed the bill and denounced it in 
harsh terms, due in part to pressure from conservatives.
Existing scholarship correctly acknowledges the significance of Nixon’s 
veto but underestimates its short- and long- term consequences. The early 
1970s have been called “the high- water mark” in efforts to establish public 
responsibility for the education and care of young children (Beatty 1995, 
199), and the veto itself has been recognized as a “watershed” moment 
(Olmsted 1992, 5; E. Rose 2010, 9). The veto was not the final word on the 
issue, because the demographic, intellectual, and political forces that had 
placed preschool education on the national agenda remained in effect. The 
veto therefore spurred a series of reactions and counterreactions that af-
fected the subsequent evolution of American preschool education. The 
absence of a comprehensive national policy facilitated the growth of 
private- sector programs to meet growing demand for preschool services. 
Meanwhile, advocates of government intervention, frustrated by their 
prospects at the national level, turned to other institutional settings to 
pursue their goals. This dynamic is known as venue shopping.
Important public policy decisions are made in various institutional set-
tings in the United States. This decentralization gives policy advocates an 
incentive to focus on the arena in which they are most likely to be success-
ful. After losing a congressional battle, for example, reformers can turn to 
the executive branch or to the state or federal courts. They can shift their 
focus to another institutional setting because “there are no immutable rules 
that spell out which institutions in society must be charged with making 
decisions” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 31). Venue shopping has long 
been recognized as an important element of the policymaking process.
Preschool advocates engaged in venue shopping after the veto of the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act. The coalition of interest groups 
supporting the bill had been unable to achieve their most ambitious goals 
at the national level, so some members shifted their attention to the states. 
The states represented fertile terrain for their efforts, because many state 
officials felt the vetoed legislation privileged localities and community or-
ganizations at their expense. They introduced numerous measures to al-
low greater governmental intervention in the education and care of young 
The Preschool Puzzle | 9
children, and these measures bore substantial fruit. Several states estab-
lished offices of child development or preschool projects or commenced 
preschool activity in the early to mid- 1970s. In addition to this state- level 
innovation, preschool advocates refocused their congressional efforts and 
won several smaller victories at the national level. Head Start was placed 
on surer footing, and the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit was dra-
matically expanded.
The successful venue shopping that occurred during the 1970s had pro-
found long- term consequences. By succeeding in multiple venues, pre-
school advocates established the foundation for the fragmentation of the 
contemporary system. Their successes generated policy feedback. A key 
element of the developmental perspective, policy feedback is the notion 
that “policies with specific qualities can produce social effects that re-
inforce their own stability” (Pierson 2005, 37). The adoption of a public 
policy can facilitate the organization and empowerment of its beneficia-
ries, as these constituencies mobilize to protect it against attack and press 
for its extension. Policymakers who wish to alter the status quo often must 
overcome the opposition of groups that benefit from existing arrange-
ments. Their political power can constrain the options that future genera-
tions of officials possess, and it can make the retrenchment of existing 
policies difficult (Pierson 1993, 1996). Three groups played such a role in 
preschool politics: state and local government officials, Head Start sup-
porters, and private- sector preschool providers.
State and local officials generally value money and authority. When 
programs are established at the subnational level, officials with jurisdic-
tion over them may defend their authority against encroachment by their 
counterparts at the national level. They may be loath to cede policymaking 
authority to actors in another institutional venue. Several state and local 
preschool programs were created during the early- to mid- 1970s. They 
gave subnational officials a stake in this policy arena that they did not 
previously possess. When members of Congress later returned to the issue 
of preschool services, state and local officials appeared at congressional 
hearings to defend their prerogatives, urging Congress to provide more 
funding for existing state programs. They argued that the national govern-
ment’s role should consist of agenda setting and financial support, that it 
should strengthen and not supplant state efforts. This form of policy feed-
back shifted the terms of the political debate and constrained reformers’ 
options. It proved difficult for congressional reformers to overcome the 
opposition of the policymakers empowered by existing arrangements.
In terms of its political impact, Head Start is the most important pre-
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school program at the national level. It is a targeted program through 
which the national government distributes grants to local community or-
ganizations to provide health, nutrition, and other social services to disad-
vantaged children and their families while preparing the children for pri-
mary education.19 Head Start centers share a name, a mission, and a 
philosophy; receive training and technical assistance; and meet uniform 
performance standards. Established as part of the War on Poverty in 1965, 
Head Start maintained a tenuous existence during its early years. Support-
ers succeeded in placing the national program on surer footing in the 
1970s, and today it retains strong public support (Vinovskis 2005; Zigler 
and Muenchow 1992).
The existence of Head Start mobilized another set of stakeholders. 
Head Start prioritizes parental and community involvement. It views pa-
rental involvement as a way both to empower parents and to educate and 
counsel them. In terms of planning and program governance, the families 
who participate in Head Start are an “integral part of the decision- making 
process” (Grotberg 1981, 12). Head Start also provides parents with career 
development opportunities. Historically, most of its employment and 
training efforts have focused on careers in early childhood (Zigler and 
Muenchow 1992, chap. 5). As a result, Head Start parents are staunch de-
fenders of the program both because they value its educational and other 
services and because they are protecting their decision- making authority 
and their jobs.
The formation of the National Head Start Association (NHSA) in the 
early 1970s illustrates how public policies can lead to the organization of 
their beneficiaries. The organization viewed defending Head Start as its 
primary mission. Ironically, its formation contributed to a fissure within 
the early childhood policy community. The NHSA, like other Head Start 
supporters, has frequently called for additional public investment in pre-
school but tends to view new programs as a financial and existential threat. 
This competitive dynamic has affected preschool politics at both the na-
tional and the state level.
Finally, the importance of private- sector preschool providers is an out-
growth of the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. The tax credit dates 
to 1954, when the federal tax code was revised to allow a tax deduction for 
employment- related expenses for dependent care. Eligibility was initially 
limited to gainfully employed women, widowers, and legally separated or 
divorced men. The Revenue Act of 1971 made any individual maintaining 
a household eligible, raised the deduction limit, modified the legal defini-
tion of a dependent, and raised the income level at which the deduction 
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began to be phased out. These changes sought to provide tax relief to mid-
dle- and low- income taxpayers. Additional reforms in 1975 and 1976 nearly 
doubled the income limit for phasing out the deduction and replaced the 
deduction with a nonrefundable tax credit. It was believed that these re-
forms would benefit taxpayers in the lower brackets by expanding the tax 
credit’s reach to those who did not itemize deductions.20
The number of returns on which the Child and Dependent Care Tax 
Credit was claimed more than doubled between 1976 and 1988, and the 
aggregate amount of credit claimed rose even more sharply.21 In 2008, an 
average credit of $535 was claimed on 6.587 million returns.22 Credit claim-
ants are not the only source of policy feedback. The tax credit is politically 
significant because it facilitated the growth of early childhood services in 
the private sector. These private- sector programs met the needs of many 
middle- and upper- income families, making those groups less likely to 
demand further governmental action (Morgan 2006; E. Rose 2010). Even 
more important, the service providers themselves emerged as key stake-
holders and active participants in preschool politics.23 Providers “grew 
into a constituency to be reckoned with when questions about public 
funding for young children moved onto federal and state agendas” (E. 
Rose 2010, 224). They often lobbied Congress and state legislatures to pro-
tect their interests. Most public programs therefore incorporate private- 
sector providers for both logistical and political reasons. As a result, recent 
reforms tend to preserve, rather than mitigate, the fragmentation of the 
contemporary preschool system.
In sum, the main argument of this book is that the contemporary 
structure of preschool education in the United States can be traced to de-
velopments in the early 1970s. A critical juncture occurred in 1971, when 
Nixon vetoed legislation that would have provided a permanent frame-
work for the universal provision of preschool services. The absence of a 
comprehensive national policy, in combination with revisions in the fed-
eral tax code, contributed to the growth of the private sector. Meanwhile, 
supporters of increased public investment, largely stymied at the national 
level, engaged in venue shopping in disparate institutional settings. Their 
successes at the state level and their ability to put national programs like 
Head Start on more- secure political footing had important long- term po-
litical consequences, because the constituencies who benefited from these 
arrangements subsequently mobilized to defend the status quo. Lobbying 
by state officials, Head Start supporters, and third- party providers in the 
private sector made it more difficult for the national government to adopt 
a more unified approach to the provision of preschool services. Subse-
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quent political discussions therefore occurred on a different political ter-
rain than had the discussions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In short, 
the venue shopping that occurred after a critical juncture generated policy 
feedback that both contributed to the contemporary fragmentation of 
American preschool education and constrained reformers’ options as they 
sought major policy change.
Plan of This Book
In recent years, many scholars have noted the unusual blend of public and 
private social benefits that characterizes social policymaking in the United 
States (Gottschalk 2000; Hacker 2002; Howard 2007). Indeed, the private 
sector plays an essential role in preschool education. Moreover, the tar-
geted and residual nature of existing public programs also resonates with 
conventional portrayals of the American welfare state (Michel 1999, 9). 
Scholars have advanced several explanations of American social policy, 
and chapter 1 of this book assesses their applicability to preschool educa-
tion. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of accounts based on po-
litical culture, interest group politics, and the institutional structure of the 
American political system. Each of these perspectives helps explain ele-
ments of preschool politics, yet none of them provides a complete and 
convincing account. They are largely static explanations that cannot cap-
ture the dynamism that characterizes this policy arena. Explaining the 
origins and contemporary complexity of American preschool education 
requires a developmental perspective that treats the making of public pol-
icy as a long- term causal chain. Chapter 1 describes the merits of the de-
velopmental approach and three of its central concepts. It argues that 
critical junctures, venue shopping, and policy feedback help account for 
the emergence and persistence of the contemporary preschool system.
In keeping with the developmental perspective, the remaining chap-
ters of this book proceed chronologically. Chapter 2 describes American 
early childhood policy prior to the late 1960s. These historical episodes 
represent the antecedent conditions against which the impact of a critical 
juncture must be assessed (Collier and Collier 1991). The emergency nurs-
ery schools of the New Deal, the wartime child care centers of the 1940s, 
and Head Start shared two key attributes. They were targeted and tempo-
rary (Beatty 1995; Lazerson 1972; Slobdin 1975). They neither promoted 
universal access to preschool services nor established the framework for a 
permanent national policy.24
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The Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 broke sharply with 
the past, because it attempted to create a permanent national framework 
for the universal provision of preschool services. Chapter 2 concludes by 
examining the demographic, intellectual, and political forces that placed 
this landmark proposal on the national agenda, and chapter 3 describes 
the remarkable political dynamics that surrounded it. After extensive de-
bate and negotiations, the bill received bipartisan congressional support 
only to be vetoed and denounced in very harsh language. The veto is a 
critical juncture because it provoked responses in alternate institutional 
venues that affected the subsequent evolution of American preschool evo-
lution.
When examining critical junctures, scholars must distinguish between 
their aftermath and their heritage (Collier and Collier 1991, 8). The after-
math of critical junctures refers to their immediate and short- term conse-
quences. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the aftermath of Nixon’s veto. The early 
and mid- 1970s included important developments both at the state level, 
the subject of chapter 4, and in Congress, the subject of chapter 5. State 
officials, due to prodding by preschool advocates and their own belief that 
the vetoed legislation privileged other actors at their expense, expanded 
their involvement in early childhood policy. Meanwhile, various initia-
tives faltered in Congress. Preschool advocates scored important victories 
by creating or defending more- limited governmental interventions, but 
these victories, in combination with the state activity described in chapter 
4, contributed to the dissolution of the coalition that had come together to 
support comprehensive change. They both fragmented public- sector ac-
tivity and gave disparate actors conflicting stakes in existing arrange-
ments.
The heritage of a critical juncture refers to its long- term consequences 
and the extent to which it affects temporally distant events. Chapters 6, 7, 
and 8 examine the heritage of Nixon’s veto. Chapter 6 examines the lim-
ited policy changes that occurred at both the national and state level dur-
ing the 1980s. Preschool advocates made little progress, in part because 
they were unable to coalesce into a unified force for reform. They agreed 
on the merits of additional public investment but disagreed on the form 
that it should take. Those who benefited from existing arrangements often 
viewed both comprehensive and incremental reforms as threats to their 
interests.
Over the last two decades, early childhood policy has received substan-
tial attention from national and state policymakers. Chapter 7 describes 
the demographic, intellectual, and political factors that returned the topic 
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to the political agenda. It then turns to recent congressional discussions of 
preschool education and demonstrates how previous policy decisions 
constrained policymakers’ and reformers’ options. Congress held several 
hearings that suggest a general interest in preschool education but evince 
little interest in an expanded national government role. The hearings fo-
cused on program coordination and the perceived deficiencies of the frag-
mented status quo. They both invoked administrative concerns and high-
lighted the political challenges involved in altering existing arrangements. 
Despite bipartisan agreement on the need for reform, the past two decades 
have been a period of limited congressional innovation.
Chapter 8 assesses the long- term consequences of Nixon’s veto at the 
state level. In recent years, state officials have endorsed new preschool ini-
tiatives and expanded access to and increased spending on existing pro-
grams. This extensive state- level activity caused multiple scholars to iden-
tify the emergence of a preschool movement (Finn 2009; Fuller 2007, 5; 
Kirp 2007, 100). Chapter 8 combines secondary and case study evidence 
with a quantitative analysis of preschool funding decisions to illustrate 
how the existing slate of service providers affected early childhood policy-
making. The major state- level shifts of the late 1990s and early 2000s built 
on or combined existing public and private programs, an approach that 
was a logistical and political necessity.
The concluding chapter of this book draws two types of lessons. First, 
it reassesses the developmental approach to the study of American social 
policy. Foundational concepts of this approach, including critical junc-
tures, venue shopping, and policy feedback, help explain the fragmenta-
tion that characterizes the contemporary preschool system. The develop-
ments profiled in this book suggest that scholars should examine a wider 
range of programs and time periods in their efforts to develop generaliza-
tions about policymaking in the United States. They also suggest that 
scholars should devote more attention to the interactive relationship be-
tween episodes at the national and state level, to the role of subnational 
units as autonomous actors in a federal system, and to policy variation 
among the American states.
The second set of lessons with which this book concludes is more spec-
ulative. The past fifteen years have been a period of heightened interest in 
the education and care of young children. State and national officials have 
considered several different approaches to service delivery. Many states 
have acted, Congress has held multiple hearings on the issue, and some 
gubernatorial and presidential candidates have pledged to create volun-
tary prekindergarten programs for all four- year- olds. The evolution of 
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American preschool education, however, suggests that contemporary ad-
vocates of greater governmental involvement face significant hurdles. The 
prospects for a comprehensive and unified approach are not as bright as 
they were when Howe and Quie made their respective predictions in the 
late 1960s. A more diverse and entrenched set of constituencies now has a 
stake in preschool education, and accommodating them in pursuit of pol-
icy change will not be an easy task.
16
1 |  Early Childhood Policy and the American 
Welfare State
Scholars have long been captivated by the distinctive features of the Amer-
ican welfare state. One recent focus has been the pronounced role of the 
private sector in the pursuit of social policy objectives. The American wel-
fare state is a divided one in which many of the duties carried out by gov-
ernments elsewhere are left in the hands of the private sector.1 Various tax 
subsidies and regulations encourage private actors, such as employers, to 
provide benefits like health insurance and pensions (Hacker 2002, 7). As a 
result, the American economy is characterized by a “comparatively high 
level of private- sector spending upon health, education, and savings for 
old age” (R. Rose 1989, 113). The private sector plays a large role in early 
childhood policy. Of the 4,835,000 American children who attended nurs-
ery school in 2010, 2,059,000 (42.6 percent) were enrolled in private 
schools.2 Private enrollment outnumbered public enrollment for most of 
the late twentieth century. As late as 1999, the majority of children in nurs-
ery school attended private institutions.
Most public early childhood programs in the United States are targeted 
initiatives that serve children who are from low- income families or who 
are considered disadvantaged. Dozens of public programs at the national 
and state levels are compensatory rather than universal. The decentraliza-
tion of these government programs highlights the role of state govern-
ments as an important locus of decision making. State governments are 
“integral to almost all means- tested and some social insurance programs” 
(Howard 1999, 424), yet their impact is often overlooked. A complete un-
derstanding of American social policy necessitates attention to both 
private- sector activity and state politics. Conventional explanations of 
welfare state development offer limited insight into these two defining fea-
tures of contemporary early childhood policy. This chapter reviews their 
strengths and weaknesses before turning to the analytical advantages of a 
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developmental perspective that treats policymaking as a long- term causal 
chain. Critical junctures, venue shopping, and policy feedback help ex-
plain the current structure and politics of preschool education in the 
United States.
Conventional Explanations: Political Culture,  
Interest Groups, and Institutions
Education policy is difficult to categorize. Some scholars describe invest-
ments in education as developmental initiatives designed to spur eco-
nomic activity, noting that they rank among the best predictors of eco-
nomic growth and productivity (Peterson 1995, 65). Others focus on the 
distributive implications of education spending, arguing that “skills and 
education are at the core of the welfare state” (Iversen and Stephens 2008, 
602). Both arguments contain a grain of truth. Education spending is re-
lated to economic performance, but it is also a free public service that can 
have redistributive consequences.
The overlapping objectives of educational programs help explain why 
this policy sector has long fit uneasily into comparative scholarship on 
social policy. One pioneering study concluded that “education is special” 
and excluded it from its study of the welfare state (Wilensky 1975, 3). The 
status of education policy represents a particular challenge for scholars 
interested in the United States. The American welfare state has been called 
“underdeveloped” and “incomplete” (Orloff 1988, 37), yet the country 
 created the most comprehensive system of public schooling in the world 
(Tyack and Cuban 1995). This section reviews three prominent explana-
tions of welfare state development. While each of them offers insight into 
early childhood policy in the United States, none provides a complete and 
convincing account.
Political Culture
Cultural accounts attribute policy outcomes to societal values and beliefs 
about the operation and justification of government. Values like individu-
alism and an emphasis on private property and the free market cause 
Americans to place a greater emphasis on personal responsibility than on 
collective responsibility. Americans believe that hard work and personal 
effort are the keys to success. They view government as wasteful and inef-
ficient and as something that should be used in emergency situations only. 
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The distinctive structure of American social policy might therefore be at-
tributed to Americans’ core beliefs about the justification and operation of 
government. According to one cultural account, “[T]he state plays a more 
limited role in America than elsewhere because Americans, more than 
other people, want it to play a limited role” (King 1973, 418).
Values like individualism and limited government intervention seem 
especially resonant in the context of early childhood policy. They imply 
that child- rearing practices should remain the private province of parents, 
and they suggest that government involvement is appropriate only when 
families are in crisis. Indeed, opponents of public investment often cau-
tion against government encroachment on parental prerogatives and ar-
gue that parents’ educational choices should generally be free from either 
direct or indirect state interference (Cobb 1992; Gilles 1996). In the early 
1970s, for example, one critic of child development legislation asserted 
that “autonomy of decision making must be an essential part of any child 
care arrangement . . . because it is right and just that Americans control 
their own lives” (Rothman 1973, 42). The primary strength of cultural ac-
counts is their ability to account for these ubiquitous rhetorical claims.
The cultural explanation of American early childhood education is 
problematic for several reasons.3 Values like individualism and equality 
can be interpreted in different ways that are not necessarily consistent 
with one another (Verba and Orren 1985). The state is the major supplier 
of education in the United States, and one cultural account attributes this 
outcome to the triumph of equality over other cherished American values 
like limited government. Education was portrayed as the great equalizer, 
and the state only competed with private institutions in a very small way 
(King 1973, 420). Contemporary analyses of public opinion suggest that 
large majorities of Americans view education as a government responsi-
bility and favor greater spending on it (Howard 2007, 113). A comprehen-
sive system of public education represents a challenge for the cultural per-
spective.
In addition, the connection between broad ideals and concrete policy 
solutions is often tenuous. The outcome with which this book is concerned 
is a complex amalgamation of national, state, and local government pro-
grams supplemented by private- sector service providers. Furthermore, 
governmental initiatives like Head Start and state prekindergarten pro-
grams directly provide education and care for young children. Other pro-
grams, including the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, provide indi-
rect support to the private sector. The mechanism linking values like 
autonomy to this wide- ranging public- sector activity remains opaque.4 
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Political culture connotes deep and enduring beliefs about the proper role 
and scope of government. It is difficult to link those beliefs to concrete 
outcomes.
Another weakness of cultural accounts is their inability to explain pol-
icy change or its timing. The deep and enduring beliefs that make up a 
political culture are not susceptible to change. Cultural accounts are there-
fore “too holistic and essentialist to give us the explanatory leverage we 
need to account for variations in the fate of different social policies, or for 
changes over time in the fate of similar proposals” (Skocpol 1992, 17). They 
struggle to explain both the existence of an extensive public system of el-
ementary and secondary education and the complicated mixture of public 
and private programs that exist in preschool education. Values and beliefs 
provide limited analytical leverage over new directions in policymaking 
or the emergence of new issues on the political agenda.
Finally, political culture cannot explain the near passage of the Com-
prehensive Child Development Act of 1971, a foundational moment in 
American early childhood policy. Both supporters and opponents viewed 
the bill as a step toward the creation of a permanent national framework 
for the universal provision of preschool services, and it received bipartisan 
support in both houses of Congress before being vetoed by President 
Richard Nixon. The congressional endorsement suggests that deep- seated 
beliefs about the proper role of government are insufficient to account for 
outcomes in this policy arena. One historian explains, “That Congress 
could be convinced to accept legislation even hinting at altering many of 
the strongest and most fervently held values about the role of government 
and the family was remarkable” (McCathren 1981, 120). In sum, while sup-
porters and opponents of public investment frame their arguments in 
terms of equality and autonomy, respectively, the value content of their 
arguments cannot explain the fate of various proposals to expand the gov-
ernmental role in early childhood policy.
Interest Groups
Interest group activity may help explain the contemporary fragmentation 
of early childhood policy in the United States. Specifically, the respective 
political strength of advocates and opponents of governmental interven-
tion may account for the absence of a permanent national framework for 
the universal provision of preschool services.5 The nominal beneficiaries 
of early childhood programs are “children [who] don’t vote; thus, their 
political cause has always been weak” (Grubb 1987, 1). In 1975, Senator 
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Walter Mondale (D- MN) explained, “There is something about the poli-
tics of children we have yet to solve; maybe it’s very simple. A friend of 
mine, a very conservative one, once said, ‘You know, you should do more 
for old people and forget these kids, they can’t vote,’ and maybe that’s the 
answer.”6
Several observers describe the absence of a strong, cohesive children’s 
lobby as important. Jule Sugarman, who directed the Office of Child De-
velopment during the Nixon administration, explained, “I think the advo-
cates for children have never been organized in a way to sustain public 
pressure, and that is why children do get short- shrifted in this country.”7 
Longtime advocate Marian Wright Edelman concurred, “Kids have been 
outside the political process and they’ve not had the kind of systematic 
advocacy that’s required of any group in this country that’s going to have 
any chance of anything.”8 The interest groups that lobby on behalf of young 
children and their families tend to be small organizations that compete 
with one another, such as the liberal Children’s Defense Fund and the con-
servative Family Research Council.
A lack of unity among advocates of government intervention has exac-
erbated their political weakness. They have been described as a “divided 
constituency” (Michel 1999). For example, they have long disagreed about 
the appropriate content of early childhood programs. The split in the early 
twentieth century between educational and custodial programs has 
evolved into a conflict between the communities concerned with elemen-
tary school and early childhood education, over purposes, methods, and 
control (Grubb 1987). Constituencies who share the goal of expanding ac-
cess to preschool services often work at cross- purposes, taking different 
sides on proposals that attempt to serve this objective.
The coalition opposing government intervention, in contrast, has been 
more cohesive. The mid- 1970s marked the beginning of a conservative 
resurgence in American politics.9 Ambitious initiatives in early childhood 
policy offended economic and social conservatives, who derided them as 
an undesirable expansion of the public sector and governmental interfer-
ence in the family. Opponents viewed themselves as defending the pre-
rogatives of stay- at- home mothers and the general principle of parental 
choice in all matters of child rearing (Morgan 2006). Their grassroots mo-
bilization efforts sparked an avalanche of letters to Congress in the 1970s, 
and they continue to be active on matters of gender and family issues.
Interest group activity is an important part of preschool politics in the 
United States, but it is important not to overstate its significance as a causal 
factor. Even in the absence of a unified coalition, advocates of increased 
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public investment have achieved several important victories over the past 
four decades. National programs like Head Start and the Child and De-
pendent Care Tax Credit have grown significantly since the 1970s, and 
enrollment in and funding of state prekindergarten programs expanded 
dramatically in the 2000s. Much of this recent activity occurred at the 
state level.10 Interest group accounts struggle to explain why leading in-
novators in this policy arena include such conservative states as Georgia 
and Oklahoma.
Furthermore, congressional passage of the Comprehensive Child De-
velopment Act suggests that, despite their lack of unity, supporters of in-
creased public investment were sufficiently effective to move an ambitious 
piece of legislation through Congress. A coalition headed by Marian 
Wright Edelman was instrumental in drafting the proposal and formulat-
ing the legislative strategy that resulted in its passage. Although Nixon ve-
toed the bill, the content of the legislation and its passage represented a 
major break with the past. The veto predated the political mobilization of 
social conservatives. In fact, it contributed to their activation. It is there-
fore problematic to attribute the veto to interest group politics.
Interest groups affect the formation of public policy, but public policies 
also affect the positions that groups take and the strategies they employ. 
Supporters of increased public investment adjusted their interests, objec-
tives, and political strategies as mothers of young children entered the 
workforce, preschool attendance soared, and public policies addressed 
these trends. Reformers accommodated their institutional and policy con-
text, leading to shifting fault lines within the community concerned with 
early childhood education. The creation and expansion of various initia-
tives gave them distinct turf to defend. Supporters sometimes critiqued 
expansive proposals out of the concern that they would divert resources 
from their preferred program. Even limited government intervention in 
early childhood policy facilitated the organization and empowerment of 
constituencies with a stake in the status quo and fostered the fragmenta-
tion of the preschool coalition. As subsequent chapters of this book will 
demonstrate, this lack of unity among advocates is better characterized as 
an outgrowth of public policies than as their cause.
Institutions
Institutional accounts attribute policy outcomes to the constitutional 
structure that mediates societal demands. They focus on the extent to 
which this structure centralizes decision- making authority. The American 
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political system is noteworthy for its decentralization, which provides op-
ponents of policy initiatives with multiple opportunities to block them. 
Opponents can defeat proposals at any of these veto points, whereas sup-
porters must clear every hurdle if their proposal is to become law. In po-
litical systems with a large number of veto points, like the United States, 
the potential for policy change decreases (Tsebelis 1995). This institutional 
arrangement affords defenders of the status quo “a multiplicity of access 
points at which [they] can modify or exercise a veto over policy change” 
(Thomas 1975, 232). Due to their decentralizing impact, the core features 
of the American political system have been described as “inimical to wel-
fare state expansion” (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993, 721).11
Federalism, the balance of policymaking authority between the na-
tional government and the states, seems especially crucial in the context of 
education policy. Education periodically becomes a national issue, but 
“policy talk and policy action have taken place mostly at the state and local 
levels” (Tyack and Cuban 1995, 43). The vast majority of the cost of public 
education is paid out of state and local budgets, and local school boards 
and state departments of education exercise considerable discretion. One 
might trace the contemporary fragmentation of American early child-
hood policy to the decentralization of decision- making authority in the 
United States, placing special emphasis on federalism.12
The institutional perspective accounts convincingly for a foundational 
moment in early childhood policy. The near passage of the Comprehen-
sive Child Development Act illustrates the significance of the country’s 
constitutional structure. A presidential veto prevented the creation of a 
permanent national framework for the universal provision of preschool 
services, suggesting that the decentralization of decision- making author-
ity can stymie major policy change. Additional efforts to create a compre-
hensive national system were also defeated, and institutional accounts at-
tribute these repeated defeats to the existence of a large number of veto 
points.
Institutional accounts are incomplete, however. Institutions reveal lit-
tle about the preferences, identities, and resources of key political actors 
(Pierson 1995). Institutional accounts also struggle to explain policy 
change and its timing. The constitutional structure of the United States 
has been stable, but while some policy initiatives successfully navigated 
this institutional labyrinth, others did not. Institutional accounts struggle 
to explain this variation, because they shed limited light on the actual 
decision- making processes that determine policy outcomes.
Furthermore, the national government has been increasingly active in 
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education policymaking. National officials are “increasingly willing to 
suggest that [they] should have a significant role in decisions about im-
portant [education] matters” (Stout, Tallerico, and Scribner 1995, 14). Ac-
cording to one account, a “gradual process of nationalization occurred 
and transformed the politics of education from dominantly a local enter-
prise” (Cibulka 2001, 19).13 The No Child Left Behind Act, signed into law 
by President George W. Bush during his first term, represents “the most 
significant intrusion of federal power in the history of American educa-
tion” (Viteritti 2004, 80). Given this overall trend of increased national 
government involvement in education policymaking, the limited national 
movement in early childhood policy is all the more puzzling.
Policy Development and Preschool Politics
To isolate the origins of public policies, it is often necessary to “pay atten-
tion to processes that play out over considerable periods of time” (Pierson 
2005, 34). A developmental approach must be “particularly sensitive to the 
temporal sequencing of causal factors and to the combination of distinct 
causal processes that become conjoined at distinct periods” (Katznelson 
2003, 391). At a fundamental level, the main shortcoming of the three 
frameworks profiled in the preceding section is their inability to account 
for change over time. Cultural values are deep and enduring, multiple 
scholars describe long- standing dissension within the early childhood 
policy community (Michel 1999; Grubb 1987), and institutions are defined 
by their durability. Yet early childhood policy is a lively arena character-
ized by complicated social and political dynamics.
Forward- looking lawmakers did not establish the contemporary amal-
gamation of private- sector and public- sector preschool programs at a 
single moment. This complex and fragmented system evolved over time as 
various stakeholders reacted to shifting institutional terrain and to what 
had already transpired. The existing policy repertoire constrained the pos-
sibility of major shifts, serving as a “vital force shaping the alternatives 
perceived and the policies adopted” (Heclo 1974, 156). The durability of 
public policies can affect the likelihood of major change by altering the 
incentives and resources of political actors (Hacker 2002; Pierson 1993; R. 
Rose 1990). The contemporary fragmentation of early childhood policy is 
a by- product of the interactive relationship between politics and public 
policy, and accounts that do not take history into account overlook this 
crucial relationship.
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This book argues that three concepts— critical junctures, venue shop-
ping, and policy feedback— help explain the evolution of early childhood 
policy in the United States. These concepts provide a common analytical 
framework through which the historical complexities of social policy can 
be examined. By constructing and testing general claims about processes 
of long- term policy development, it becomes possible to develop a genu-
inely analytical history that is attentive to substantively and theoretically 
challenging questions of temporality and periodicity (Katznelson 2003, 
391).14 The developmental approach represents an especially important 
shift for the study of education policy, where existing research typically 
focuses on policy analysis. Policy analysis provides valuable insights about 
how programs function but, unfortunately, “leads one toward static snap-
shots of phenomena that are more accurately represented as being in mo-
tion” (Sroufe 1995, 79).
Critical Junctures
Critical junctures are “crucial period[s] of transition” (Collier and Collier 
1991, 29). They are important not only in and of themselves but also be-
cause they produce durable legacies. Embedded in this concept is the no-
tion that several institutional or policy options are feasible at a given mo-
ment but that any actions taken or decisions made at that time will 
profoundly affect subsequent developments. These crucial founding mo-
ments send institutions or public policies down particular developmental 
paths and constrain future possibilities. Critical junctures are “leading 
determinants of how programs and policymaking develop, with outcomes 
during a crucial transition establishing distinct pathways or trajectories of 
growth” (Mayes 2004, 18). They leave a lasting mark on the political land-
scape, one that constrains future reform possibilities.
Critical junctures provide an opening for institutional or policy change, 
but they do not determine the form that it will take. Only the more limited 
claim that a significant change occurred is embedded in the concept. Criti-
cal junctures “do not guarantee any particular institutional outcome” (Jones- 
Correa 2000– 2001, 567). The institutions or public policies that exist after a 
critical juncture differ from what preceded them. Thus the antecedent con-
ditions that precede a critical juncture represent the baseline against which 
its consequences must be assessed (Collier and Collier 1991, 30).
The notion that decisions made or actions taken at a particular mo-
ment have long- term consequences makes intuitive sense. The concept of 
critical junctures contributes to scholars’ understanding of policy or insti-
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tutional development by placing political developments “in historical con-
text and in terms of processes unfolding over time and in relation to each 
other, within a broader context in which developments in one realm im-
pinge on and shape developments in others” (Thelen 1999, 390). It empha-
sizes the importance of timing, sequencing, and the interaction of ongo-
ing processes in political life. The impact of interest group activity or 
political alignments, for example, may depend on the institutional context 
and on what has already transpired. Understanding these interactions be-
tween ongoing political processes is a prerequisite for any effort to explain 
long- term outcomes.
The significance of antecedent conditions and change may seem prob-
lematic for an account of early childhood policy that describes a presiden-
tial veto as a critical juncture. A veto, by definition, leaves the status quo 
intact. The concept of venue shopping, however, helps explain why the 
veto did not halt the movement to increase the governmental role in pre-
school services. Instead, it redirected that movement by spurring advo-
cates to seek more favorable institutional terrain for their policy goals. 
This venue shopping sparked reactions and counterreactions that shaped 
developments in this policy arena over the long term.
Venue Shopping
American political institutions diffuse power to a remarkable degree, and 
this decentralization is a double- edged sword. The dispersal of political 
authority provides multiple veto points for reform opponents, as institu-
tional accounts emphasize, but each of these settings is also a point of ac-
cess for reformers. Frustrated in one institutional venue, reformers can try 
to achieve their goals in another setting. In fact, the “many venues of 
American politics also allow new policy to find niches within which to 
flourish” (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1071). After losing a congressional 
battle, for example, advocates can turn to the executive branch, the federal 
courts, or state and local authorities. Decentralization can therefore lead 
to venue shopping, as advocates focus on the institutional setting in which 
they believe they are most likely to experience success.
Venue shopping implies that reformers can be strategic in pursuit of 
their goals. One study explains how “lobbyists themselves frequently 
speak of designing their advocacy strategies as if they were preparing for 
war, carefully selecting battlefields that play to their strengths at the ex-
pense of their enemies” (Holyoke 2003, 325). Such strategizing is possible 
because policy issues may be assigned to and decided in various institu-
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tional settings. Changes in venue can occur even when issues have tradi-
tionally been assigned to specific institutions. For example, the traditional 
preeminence of subnational governments in education policymaking has 
recently been challenged by such national legislation as the No Child Left 
Behind Act (Viteritti 2004; McDonnell 2005).
Reformers who engage in venue shopping do not need to know in ad-
vance how their proposals will be received. They may search for favorable 
venues in several arenas simultaneously, or they may search through a 
trial- and- error process. They may continue their searches where they find 
initial success, and they may abandon efforts where their ideas are rejected 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1048). Changes in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program in the 1960s and early 1970s illus-
trate how reformers can experience success by venue shopping after their 
initial efforts have been defeated. Those “seeking to make AFDC more 
nationally uniform, more generous, and more widely available turned to 
the courts because their efforts had repeatedly met with failure in Con-
gress” (Melnick 1994, 67). Their successes in the judicial system had pro-
found consequences for welfare policy. Those who lose a policy debate 
have an incentive to change or attempt to change the venue in which the 
relevant decisions are made.
Venue shopping implies that studies of policy development in the 
United States must look beyond congressional and presidential activity to 
understand the dynamics of policymaking. The recent attention paid to-
ward the role of the private sector in social provision is therefore a promis-
ing trend (Hacker 2002; Gottschalk 2000; Howard 1997). Other institu-
tional venues, such as subnational governments, have received less 
attention. Studies of American federalism typically portray it as an im-
pediment to the adoption of social policy (Robertson 1989; Hacker and 
Pierson 2002), but states and localities also represent an alternate institu-
tional venue in which important policy decisions are made.
Recent research suggests that federalism can create opportunities for 
major policy change. It allows politicians at one level to build on the ideas 
and actions of their counterparts at other levels, generating positive feed-
back by accelerating certain trends and creating a bandwagon effect. 
Manna (2006) describes a process of “borrowing strength” whereby policy 
entrepreneurs working at one level of government can affect the policy-
making agenda by leveraging the license and capacity that exist at another 
level. His compelling study of federalism and the national education pol-
icy agenda suggests that it is a mistake to view federalism solely as an ob-
stacle to policy change. This insight is especially important for scholars of 
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education policy, an arena in which “playing- field boundaries are in per-
petual motion, and political arenas are constantly shifting boundaries 
where governing powers between national, state and local units of govern-
ment are shared” (Scribner, Reyes, and Fusarelli 1995, 203). Early child-
hood policy exemplifies this dynamic, with a history that has taken place 
on several terrains in the public and private sectors (Michel 1999, 6).
The opportunities provided by American federalism help explain why 
it is appropriate to describe Nixon’s veto as a critical juncture. The veto 
provoked responses in alternate institutional venues that provided the 
framework within which early childhood policy subsequently evolved. 
Thwarted at the national level, at least in terms of their most ambitious 
goals, preschool advocates modified their congressional campaign and 
sought more- favorable institutional venues for their concerns. Their suc-
cesses, many of which occurred at the state level, had profound long- term 
consequences for the evolution of preschool education and the politics 
surrounding it.
Policy Feedback
Critical junctures are periods of change or transition that manifest lasting 
political legacies. Without this long- term impact, they would not be criti-
cal (Pierson 2000, 263). Existing research on critical junctures has been 
criticized, however, for inadequately specifying “the mechanisms that 
translate critical junctures into lasting political legacies” (Thelen 1999, 
388). Studies invoking this concept must explain what sustains the institu-
tional arrangements that emerge. Mechanisms of production link the 
critical juncture to its legacy, and mechanisms of reproduction perpetuate 
the ongoing institutional or political processes (Collier and Collier 1991, 
31). This book uses the concept of policy feedback to denote these mecha-
nisms of production and reproduction.
Public policy has traditionally been treated as the outcome of broader 
social and political processes. Under certain circumstances, however, this 
causal arrow is reversed. A policy’s emergence and continued existence 
can affect the possibilities for future policymaking by altering the social 
and political environment. Public policies affect the possibilities for future 
policymaking by shaping the identities, interests, and incentives of key 
social actors (Skocpol 1992). The existing policy repertoire can influence 
the goals of important constituencies. For example, it can alter their atti-
tudes toward governmental intervention and the form it should take 
(Gottschalk 2000; Morgan 2006).
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One significant form of policy feedback is the empowerment of social 
groups with a stake in the status quo. The adoption of a policy can facili-
tate the organization of its beneficiaries. They might mobilize to protect 
the policy against political attack and to press for its extension. The par-
ticipatory patterns of senior citizens in the United States are illustrative. 
Most interest groups representing the providers and recipients of govern-
ment services to the elderly were formed after the adoption of Social Secu-
rity, Medicare, and the Older Americans Act of 1965 (Walker 1991, 30). 
Several scholars detect a similar dynamic in health care policy, where 
stakeholder mobilization helped prevent the creation of national health 
insurance (Mayes 2004; Quadagno 2005). The establishment of new pro-
grams can restructure the long- term interests of politicians and interest 
groups (Hacker 2002; Pierson 1993).
The political clout of program beneficiaries can constrain the options 
that policymakers possess. Groups that reach a certain size are politically 
powerful, and elected officials who prefer another policy arrangement will 
feel pressure to accommodate them (Pierson 2004, 73). Reforms that do 
not mobilize a strong supporting coalition, in contrast, are not likely to 
have a long shelf life (Patashnik 2003, 2008). Furthermore, the fragmenta-
tion of political authority in the American political system provides cer-
tain advantages to groups hoping to preserve the status quo (Howard 
2007, 136). Indeed, a recent study of lobbying concludes that “one of the 
best single predictors of success in the lobbying game is . . . simply whether 
[the group] is attempting to protect the policy that is already in place” 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009, 6). Understanding who is invested in a specific 
policy and how that investment is sustained over time makes it possible to 
explain programmatic durability (Thelen 1999, 391).
Stakeholder mobilization is an important element of education policy-
making. Groups favored by the status quo often lobby successfully to pro-
tect their prerogatives, illustrating the potential impact of policy feedback. 
An early study of interest groups revealed that education associations pos-
sessed a “continuing interest in the administration of whatever programs 
are on the books” (Bailey 1975, 45). A more recent account concurs, de-
scribing the emergence of “an ‘education- industrial complex’ that fought 
hard to protect existing programs and to create new ones” (McGuinn 
2006, 34). Policy feedback is an important determinant of programmatic 
durability, as new educational programs “were likely to persist if they pro-
duced influential constituencies interested in seeing them continue”  (Tyack 
and Cuban 1995, 57; emphasis in original). Job generation contributes to 
persistence. Those employed by new education programs have a profound 
interest in their maintenance.
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Policy feedback suggests that successful venue shopping can have long- 
term consequences. Reformers’ success in a particular institutional setting 
may affect what is possible in other venues. Program beneficiaries may 
work to ensure that future decisions are also made in that venue, because 
shifting the locus of decision- making authority may introduce an element 
of uncertainty that puts their previous gains at risk. Groups that have been 
successful in court or at an executive agency may argue that subsequent 
decisions should be made in those institutional venues, and officials who 
favor an alternative policy arrangement may find their options constrained 
as a result.
In addition, government officials with jurisdiction over a program 
may work to preserve the status quo because it gives them an opportunity 
to cultivate the political loyalty of its beneficiaries. If a policy is perceived 
as successful, officials may engage in credit claiming, an effort to “gener-
ate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one is personally 
responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do 
something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable” (Mayhew 1974, 
52– 53). An electoral logic drives credit claiming, as those who believe that 
elected officials are responsible for positive outcomes will be more likely 
to support their reelection. Government officials with jurisdiction over an 
existing policy, especially if they are elected officials, may therefore resist 
attempts to move decision- making responsibility to actors in another in-
stitutional venue. Reformers therefore might face opposition from pro-
gram beneficiaries and from the policymakers empowered by existing 
arrangements.
Government officials may also work to preserve the status quo because 
they simply want to protect their bureaucratic turf. Such a dynamic may 
emerge regardless of whether the policy is viewed as successful. The exis-
tence of programs in a particular venue may therefore cause the “filling 
up” or the “preemption” of a policy space (Pierson 1995). Officials with 
jurisdiction over a program may fight attempts to alter the status quo. This 
dynamic differs from the one surrounding program beneficiaries. Pro-
gram beneficiaries, such as senior citizens defending Social Security 
(Campbell 2002, 2003), are constituencies to whom elected officials must 
respond if they wish to win reelection. Government officials may not al-
ways possess comparable electoral power, but American federalism gives 
state and local officials potential influence over their national counter-
parts. Members of Congress represent geographically defined districts, 
giving them an electoral incentive to take account of subnational officials’ 
preferences. Frayed relations can lead to charges that legislators have lost 
touch with their district or state. State officials might challenge the incum-
30 | Early Start
bent in a future election or retaliate during the decennial redrawing of 
district lines.
In his seminal essay on policy feedback, Paul Pierson (1993) explains 
how policy initiatives can affect government elites’ resources and incen-
tives. Most research in this tradition focuses on the notion of bureaucratic 
capacity and the conditions under which policies generate the specialized 
knowledge and managerial experience that facilitate government inter-
vention. The existing scholarly literature provides several compelling ex-
amples of elite- level feedback. It is often vague, however, about the precise 
factors that comprise bureaucratic capacity and the specific circumstances 
under which it will affect subsequent policymaking. As a result, Pierson 
(1993, 605) concludes that “work on this dimension of policy feedback 
clearly has a long way to go.”
One potentially constructive direction for research on elite- level policy 
feedback is to emphasize the lobbying activities in which government of-
ficials engage. American federalism is an especially propitious arena in 
which to investigate this dynamic, which begins to explain why successful 
venue shopping can have significant consequences for long- term policy 
development. When policies are adopted at the subnational level, officials 
with jurisdiction over existing programs may defend their authority 
against encroachment by their colleagues at the national level. Profes-
sional associations whose primary constituencies include governors, state 
legislators, and other officials are active participants in the national poli-
cymaking process (Cammisa 1995; Haider 1974). Like program beneficia-
ries, subnational officials may defend the status quo and lobby for existing 
policies to be maintained and expanded. They value money and authority, 
and they “have an interest in maintaining or increasing their authority 
over federally funded programs” (Cammisa 1995, 21). Their lobbying may 
limit the possibility of major policy change. The evidence presented in this 
book suggests that preschool education generated multiple forms of pol-
icy feedback. Existing policies have been defended by both their beneficia-
ries and the officials with jurisdiction over them.
Explaining Preschool Politics in the United States
Understanding how and why early childhood policy in the United States 
took on its current form requires a developmental approach that is sensi-
tive to processes that play out over considerable periods of time. Policy-
making should not be depicted as a final policy result or outcome. Instead, 
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it is best understood as an “unfolding historical process” (Patashnik 1997, 
432). This book argues that the contemporary fragmentation of American 
preschool education can be traced to temporally distant events. The venue 
shopping that occurred after a critical juncture generated policy feedback, 
and the subsequent mobilization of program beneficiaries and government 
officials constrained the options of future generations of policymakers.
The critical juncture occurred when efforts to establish a national child 
development program fell short in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The ab-
sence of a comprehensive national policy contributed to the emergence of 
private- sector service providers, and preschool advocates engaged in 
venue shopping. Their successes created and expanded a mélange of 
public- sector programs at the national, state, and local levels, and these 
programs generated substantial policy feedback despite their limited 
breadth. Program beneficiaries and government officials with a stake in 
the status quo mobilized to oppose changes that would affect their pre-
rogatives. When national lawmakers returned to the topic of preschool 
education in later years, they operated on more challenging political ter-
rain because the constituencies that benefited from existing programs 
fought major policy change. This dynamic resonates with a central insight 
of the developmental approach, namely, that once a policy or an institu-
tion is in place, actors adjust their strategies in ways that reflect and re-
inforce the logic of the existing system (Thelen 1999, 392).
The remaining chapters of this book use archival material and statisti-
cal data to examine the changing terrain of American preschool politics. 
They combine congressional testimony, speeches, media accounts, and 
other public documents with private memoranda, strategy papers, and 
letters that illuminate actors’ strategic calculations. The impact of federal-
ism and venue shopping means that the analysis examines national epi-
sodes, developments at the state level, and their interaction. National 
policymakers have debated the appropriate national government role in 
preschool service provision on several occasions. These recurrent debates 
provide analytical leverage over questions of constituency organization 
and empowerment that are crucial to the developmental perspective. 
Changes over time in the identities and positions of key actors would sug-
gest the impact of policy feedback, whereas stability along these dimen-
sions would suggest its absence. Similar debates have occurred at the state 
level. Developments in the states provide an opportunity to examine the 
changing resources and incentives of various stakeholders, including offi-
cials with jurisdiction over existing programs.
Investigating preschool education makes a broader contribution to the 
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study of social policy. It provides an opportunity to reassess the central 
claims of the policy development approach. Most existing scholarship fo-
cuses on “those prominent moments of contention and change about 
which so much is written” (Hacker 2005, 150). These studies emphasize 
certain eras like the 1930s and 1960s, key programs like Social Security and 
health care, and developments at the national level. Often embedded 
within these accounts, however, are general claims about the policymak-
ing process. It is only possible for scholars to evaluate these claims by ex-
tending the frame of analysis across time periods, policy arenas, and insti-
tutional venues. By examining the evolution of preschool education at 
multiple governmental levels from the late 1960s to the present, this book 
represents such an extension. In addition to shedding light on the dynam-
ics of a largely overlooked policy arena, it provides broader lessons about 
social policymaking.
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2 |  Historical Precedents and  
Forces for Change
Debates over the education and care of young children date back at least 
to the infant school movement of the early 1800s, and the contemporary 
rhetoric surrounding the issue resonates with the claims and counter-
claims of earlier eras. After a brief review of developments in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, this chapter examines three national 
government endeavors that preceded the critical juncture of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. These programs share two key characteristics. First, they 
were viewed as temporary initiatives to address emergency conditions. 
Second, they were targeted rather than universal. In sum, the national 
government provided services to specific subgroups in response to tem-
porary crises (Beatty 1995; Lazerson 1972; Slobdin 1975).
In the language of the analytical framework outlined in chapter 1, the 
historical episodes profiled in this chapter represent the “antecedent con-
ditions” that preceded a critical juncture (Collier and Collier 1991, 30). As 
such, they constitute the baseline against which its consequences must be 
assessed.1 The philosophy underlying the emergency nursery schools of 
the Great Depression, the wartime child care centers of the 1940s, and 
Head Start illustrates how the debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
with their emphasis on universal access and a permanent national govern-
ment presence, broke sharply with the past. The concluding section of this 
chapter describes how several demographic, intellectual, and political 
forces in the 1960s reshaped the debate over early childhood policy. The 
large- scale entry of women into the labor force, pathbreaking research in 
cognitive psychology, and a changing political environment altered soci-
etal attitudes toward early childhood and placed the topic on the national 
political agenda.
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Infant Schools, Day Nurseries, and Nursery Schools
In the early nineteenth century, the infant school movement was the focus 
of the debate over early childhood policy. This movement emphasized the 
education and care of young, poor children whose parents worked outside 
the home. Some supporters viewed the infant schools as a way to facilitate 
work among low- income parents. Others viewed character and religious 
education as infant schools’ primary benefit, arguing that low- income 
children “would benefit from both early character training and an educa-
tion in Christian dogma” (Cahan 1989, 6). A third group emphasized in-
fant schools’ potential developmental benefits, portraying them as a way 
to deliver child- centered enrichment programs that would prepare chil-
dren for elementary school (Cahan 1989, 8).
The infant school movement was short- lived. Shifting societal attitudes 
toward maternal roles in child rearing and a backlash against efforts to 
universalize the schools contributed to its demise. There were concerns 
about the cost of universalization and the fit between infant schools and 
the public school system. In addition, the movement violated societal 
norms that regarded childhood “as a discrete stage that had to be pro-
longed in order for children to develop properly under the watchful eyes 
of their mothers” (Michel 1999, 40). In the 1830s and thereafter, there was 
a revival of the notion that young children should be educated at home. 
Support for infant schools fell as Americans came to view the family as the 
“ideal agent of childhood socialization” (Cahan 1989, 11– 12). The infant 
school movement declined rapidly, and “by the mid- 19th century there 
was considerable hostility to the sending of three- or four- year- olds to any 
school” (Kaestle and Vinovskis 1978, S41).2
In the late nineteenth century, the rapid industrialization and urban-
ization of the United States and a massive influx of immigrants contrib-
uted to the rapid growth of day nurseries. Day nurseries were viewed as 
philanthropic work that would foster family preservation and absorb im-
migrant and poor families into the American mainstream by teaching val-
ues like cleanliness and patriotism (E. Rose 1999, 35). They emphasized 
health and hygiene and were a “child care service more custodial than 
educational or developmental” (Steinfels 1973, 52). Day nurseries provided 
minimal care, “for the simple reason that they lacked sufficient resources 
to be anything more elaborate” (Cahan 1989, 18). Established for working 
mothers who needed child care, day nurseries were usually open from 
seven in the morning to six at night.3
Despite their custodial orientation, day nurseries reflected societal am-
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bivalence toward maternal employment. Supporters, facing charges that 
the nurseries contributed to the breakdown of the American family, often 
invoked “the heroic figure of the struggling widow or deserted wife, who 
could not be blamed for working” (E. Rose 1999, 29). The preservation and 
maintenance of the home was adopted as a guiding principle, and some 
supporters argued that a day nursery would allow an impoverished mother 
“to keep her children near her, a better solution, it was argued, than insti-
tutionalization” (Steinfels 1973, 50). Day nurseries never became very pop-
ular, and the families that relied on them typically did so for short periods 
of time. Mothers found them unappealing because they carried the stigma 
of charity and generally offered rigid, institutional care (E. Rose 1999). 
Day nurseries “fell into increasing disrepute” after the turn of the twenti-
eth century (Cahan 1989, 21).
Nursery schools emerged in the 1910s and 1920s. They stressed educa-
tional development, and their organizers were convinced that “some defi-
nite educational plan is necessary before the age of five.”4 Supporters argued 
that nursery school enrollment provided valuable intellectual and health 
benefits (Bradbury 1936; Gesell 1924). They also believed that the school 
could contribute to better parenting. Even so, they remained sensitive to 
prevailing societal norms about the preeminence of the family. One sup-
porter insisted that the opportunities nursery schools provided should not 
come “at the expense of the family”: “The nursery school in its zeal to serve 
the immediate needs of the child should serve them in such a way that the 
responsibility of the home is sharpened, not dulled” (Gesell 1924, 19).
After the First World War ended, nursery schools were “the major em-
phasis in early childhood education” (Lazerson 1972, 48). Lacking the 
stigma of day nurseries, they enrolled a mostly affluent clientele and were 
viewed as “not a matter of charity, but of privilege” (E. Rose 1999, 100). The 
early 1920s were a period of growth. According to one estimate, “There 
were perhaps 3 nursery schools at the beginning of the decade and at least 
262 when it closed.”5 The science of child development was emerging, and 
nursery schools were viewed as laboratories for the study of “normal, ac-
tive, healthy young children.”6 Educators experimented with pedagogical 
methods and hoped to acquire “empirical information about what en-
vironment and educational procedures were best for young children” 
 (Beatty 1995, 133).7
Nursery school organizers hoped that their experiments would lead 
the schools to be incorporated into the public school system. Although 
the schools proliferated during the 1920s, organizers were unable to 
achieve their bolder goals. By the end of the decade, the movement seemed 
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to be losing momentum. Supporters’ hopes that nursery schools would be 
universalized went unfulfilled, due in part to concerns about the potential 
cost of a universal program. By the early 1930s, foundation support for 
nursery education was declining, and government support was virtually 
nonexistent. Private nursery schools generally shortened their hours, of-
fering half- day programs that suited the needs of their middle- and upper- 
class clientele. It took a national emergency to “reverse the retreat to priva-
tization of preschool education” (Beatty 1995, 168).
The Great Depression and Emergency Nursery Schools
The Great Depression spurred the national government to extend its role 
in early childhood policy, at least temporarily. Publicly funded emergency 
nursery schools emerged as one component of the New Deal and were 
portrayed as a temporary response to extraordinary economic conditions. 
One historian described the program as “a temporary measure whose first 
priority was to provide employment for teachers” (E. Rose 1999, 151). An-
other noted that it “intended first and foremost to function as an employ-
ment program” (Michel 1999, 120). The schools maintained the “twin 
goals of helping the economy and helping children, in that order” (Beatty 
1995, 177). Despite its limited duration and impact, the Depression- era 
program nevertheless marks an important chapter in the development of 
early childhood policy.
In October 1933, the director of the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis-
tration announced that federal work- relief funds and grants to state educa-
tional agencies would be used to fund emergency nursery schools. Spon-
sored by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the schools were 
controlled by state and local educational agencies. This bureaucratic ar-
rangement reflected the fact that “no one wanted [the schools] to be simply 
child- minding or babysitting centers” (Hymes 1979, 13).8 Economic objec-
tives trumped concerns about educational content, however. Government 
officials hoped to open as many nursery schools as possible, leading some 
nursery educators to worry about staff training and school quality.
The program grew rapidly during its early years. Supervisors were ap-
pointed in virtually every state, and the program received support from 
state educational, welfare, and health agencies. During its first four years 
of operation, approximately seventy- five thousand children between the 
ages of two and five attended approximately nineteen hundred nursery 
schools organized in forty- seven states and the District of Columbia.9 Pat-
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terns in New York State are illustrative. In 1932, one year before the estab-
lishment of the WPA program, there were thirty- four private nursery 
schools and no public nursery schools in the state. Four years later, there 
were “67 Federal nursery schools, four nursery schools publicly supported 
and a still further increase in private nursery schools over the 34 schools 
of 1932.”10 At its peak, according to one estimate, the WPA program en-
rolled approximately five hundred thousand children in nearly three thou-
sand schools nationwide (Beatty 1995, 184).11
While many early childhood educators hoped that the emergency 
nursery schools would become permanent, they recognized that the 
schools existed “primarily to provide employment for the women who 
worked at these child care centers.”12 The regulatory provisions of the 
WPA program reflect its aims as a jobs program. The Great Depression 
had forced many public schools to close their doors, causing massive lay-
offs. The staff for the nursery schools was drawn from this pool of unem-
ployed teachers and nurses, and 95 percent of the federal funds for the 
schools were earmarked for wages (E. Rose 1999, 145). These provisions 
suggest that the schools were only “a temporary expedient, a stopgap mea-
sure until teachers could return to the school system” (Rothman 1973, 19).
In a similar vein, economic hardship was a prerequisite for enrollment. 
Children were eligible if they were between the ages of two and five and if 
their families were receiving relief (Beatty 1995, 179).13 Federal regulations 
required that the nursery schools be free to the children of these needy 
and unemployed families (Hymes 1979, 15). In terms of both the teachers 
it employed and the children it enrolled, the emergency nursery schools 
targeted those in economic need.
While the program’s educational objectives were superseded by its eco-
nomic ones, the former did affect the operation of the emergency nursery 
schools. In June 1934, for example, each state commissioner of education 
was permitted to hire a trained nursery school specialist who did not have 
to be eligible for relief. More than one specialist could be hired if the num-
ber of nursery schools in the state warranted it (Hymes 1979, 17). Admin-
istrators consistently emphasized the educational benefits of the program. 
They also sought to identify it with the public schools in an effort to con-
vince local school districts to adopt nursery schools on a permanent basis 
(E. Rose 1999, 146). Their efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and 
the schools continued to be viewed as a jobs program.
By the 1940s, the size of the WPA program had started to decline. 
Based on the 1940 U.S. Census, one report estimated that 38,375 children 
were enrolled in the federally financed nursery schools.14 Another esti-
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mated that 1,661 WPA schools enrolled 46,101 children as of October 31, 
1942.15 Both estimates suggested that fewer schools and students were in-
volved in the program. As the economic crisis receded and the schools 
were threatened with extinction, however, a different emergency spurred 
the national government to extend its role in early childhood services.
The Second World War and the Lanham Act
The emergency nursery school program was discontinued in June 1943, 
yet the national government had already embarked on another foray into 
early childhood policy. This time, it resulted from the nation’s mobiliza-
tion for the Second World War. With many American men fighting over-
seas, the United States faced a labor shortage at home. Employing mothers 
of young children was viewed as something that should not be done until 
“all other sources of labor were exhausted and the employment of addi-
tional women was essential to the war effort.”16 The war effort soon neces-
sitated their employment, however. When mothers entered the workforce, 
most observers agreed that the government should provide adequate care 
for their children, and there was “no debate about the need for federally 
aided day care” (Slobdin 1975, 22). The exigencies of wartime produced a 
consensus. Like the emergency nursery schools that preceded them, the 
wartime child care centers were viewed as a targeted temporary response 
to a national crisis. They were part of “a ‘win- the- war,’ not a ‘save- the- 
child,’ program” (Cahan 1989, 37). One administrator explained, “From 
the standpoint of government and from the standpoint of the shipyards, 
we were effective if we enabled mothers to work in the yards.”17
Maternal employment was viewed as a necessary evil during the war-
time mobilization.18 Appearing before the Senate Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor in June 1943, Dr. William F. Montavon of the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference argued that “the national interest is served 
best when the mother and the child remain in the home together,” but he 
acknowledged that the war created a “temporary, abnormal condition” 
that necessitated large- scale female employment.19 Hundreds of thou-
sands of American men were serving overseas, creating a manpower 
shortage that, according to Senator Carl Hayden (D- AZ), made women 
“the only reservoir of workers in war industry.”20 The needs of the war ef-
fort superseded the conventional belief that mothers should care for their 
own children in their own homes.
As more mothers joined the workforce, the issue of day care rose to the 
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fore. Supporters of government intervention argued that day care would 
enable women to accept employment and would make them more pro-
ductive as workers. One advocate explained, “[T]he fact remains that 
many women will not consider employment until the community offers 
some program for the care of their children.”21 The Child Welfare League 
of America proclaimed more forcefully, “It is hardly American to leave a 
mother, too often poorly paid for her work, to shift for her child without 
some minimum guarantee of community service and some subsidy for 
the child’s care.”22 Some observers felt that coaxing women into the work-
force without providing day care would exact a terrible social cost in terms 
of disease, illiteracy, and juvenile delinquency. They also feared that 
women would be too preoccupied to perform their jobs effectively if their 
children received substandard care. Since the war was a national emer-
gency, many observers felt that the national government should fund the 
care mothers viewed as essential. Hayden said, “We are responsible for the 
war and the consequences of war and therefore Congress should contrib-
ute liberally toward meeting a problem that is a war problem.”23 In short, 
the war created emergency conditions that necessitated publicly funded 
day care.
The Federal Works Agency provided grants for day care under Title II 
of the Lanham Act. Section 202(c) enabled the Federal Works Agency to 
provide financial assistance to schools in areas affected by the war effort, 
and the care of children of employed mothers was regarded as a “proper 
extension of the school service.”24 Grants were limited to “war impacted 
areas” and required a finding that “an acute shortage of facilities or ser-
vices either exists or impends which would impede the war effort” and 
that those needs could not be met without national government assis-
tance, an “excessive” tax increase, or an “unusual or excessive” increase in 
the debt limit of the locality in question.25 Grant amounts were based on 
need, cost, and the availability of local revenues. It was estimated that “ap-
proximately two- thirds of total maintenance and operating costs of all 
Lanham child care projects [was] covered by Lanham funds.”26 The re-
mainder came from parental fees and other local contributions.
The first Lanham Act grants for purposes of day care were issued on 
August 31, 1942. The program expanded rapidly and reversed the declining 
enrollments that characterized the emergency nursery schools.27 By Feb-
ruary 1943, 260 units had been approved for Lanham Act grants in 28 
communities, providing for 9,600 children at a cost of $854,000. By June, 
2,685 units with a capacity of 138,410 had been approved in 369 communi-
ties at a cost of $8,988,000.28 Total enrollment also grew rapidly, from ap-
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proximately 43,000 children in September 1943 to 108,157 children in 2,995 
wartime centers by June 1944. At this later date, there were 1,700 nursery 
school units with an enrollment of 50,929 children.29 By July 1945, the 
units devoted to younger children enrolled 73,660 youngsters.30
Some of the most famous wartime child care centers were financed and 
administered by the private sector. Edgar Kaiser, owner of a shipbuilding 
operation in Oregon with twenty- five thousand employees, feared that the 
low salary schedule stipulated by the Lanham Act would cause child care 
centers to lose teachers to higher- paying jobs in the shipyards. He there-
fore adjusted salaries at his centers so that they were in keeping with the 
shipyard as a whole. As a result, they attracted skilled professionals from 
across the country. By June 1945, the staff consisted of five child nutrition-
ists, six group supervisors, ten nurses, one hundred professionally trained 
nursery school teachers, and two family consultants. The centers provided 
a wide range of services, and they were widely celebrated for their quality 
(Slobdin 1975).
Providing care for the young children of working mothers was viewed 
as a “grim, unsentimental necessity in a nation geared to the production of 
tanks and more tanks, bombs and more bombs, planes and more planes.”31 
Yet the Lanham Act program, like the emergency nursery schools that 
preceded it, raised advocates’ hopes for a permanent postwar program. 
They believed that high- quality programs like the Kaiser Child Service 
Centers demonstrated nursery schools’ positive impact on child develop-
ment. One observer argued that “nursery schools have demonstrated that 
they have a definite place in contributing to the wholesome development 
of young children.”32 As a result, the WPA and Lanham Act programs 
sparked a broader debate over early childhood policy.
The campaign to make nursery schools a permanent element of the 
educational system began during the war. In January 1940, the White 
House Conference on Children in a Democracy adopted a report that rec-
ommended, “School systems should provide nursery school, kindergar-
ten, or similar educational opportunities for children between the ages of 
3 and 6.”33 Supporters claimed, “The nursery school is not for problem 
children; it is for all children.”34 Despite their lobbying efforts, however, 
three proposals to extend the national government’s role in early child-
hood policy suffered defeat in Congress during the Second World War 
(Lazerson 1972, 51). In 1943, a particularly heated debate occurred over the 
War Area Child Care Act, also known as the Thomas Bill. Its demise, 
which is sometimes portrayed as a defeat for the effort to provide univer-
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sal access to preschool education, has been traced to infighting among 
children’s agencies and advocates and to objections from women in labor 
unions and from African American groups (Beatty 1995, 188; E. Rose 1999, 
169– 70).
Although the Thomas Bill and similar proposals made limited head-
way, the WPA and Lanham Act programs contributed to an attitudinal 
shift toward female employment and day care. The wartime centers were 
especially important. They presented themselves as a public service rather 
than a private charity and contributed to “the growing conviction that 
[child care] was educational and thus benefited children, not just their 
mothers” (E. Rose 1999, 177). Many observers speculated that demand for 
child care would continue into the postwar period. Indeed, when working 
mothers were surveyed about their postwar employment plans, many of 
them answered that, societal norms against female employment notwith-
standing, they planned to continue working. A survey of 2,778 working 
mothers in twenty- seven Ohio communities found that 47 percent of 
them planned to work indefinitely, 32 percent planned to work only for the 
duration of the war, 8 percent planned to work only for a short time, and 
13 percent were undecided. Fifty- seven percent of the respondents indi-
cated that they would need day care for their children after the war.35 A 
survey conducted in the Los Angeles area found that 63.5 percent of work-
ing mothers planned to continue working in the postwar period, 17.4 per-
cent of them did not plan to work, and 15.2 percent were undecided.36 In 
Detroit, a survey of 1,448 working mothers found that 54.5 percent planned 
to continue working, 37.6 percent did not plan to continue working, and 
6.8 percent were undecided.37 The surveys were few in number, a fact that 
nursery school advocates lamented,38 but they suggested that postwar de-
mand for child care services would remain high.
Several prominent national organizations supported continued public 
funding of child care services. In a May 1945 memorandum, the Child 
Welfare League of America argued that “the time has come for such plan-
ning in the federal government as will facilitate the development of day 
care of a quality consistent with American standards of child welfare.”39 
The president of the National Association for Nursery Education claimed 
that “generous federal aid will be needed” to close the gap between the 
need for nursery schools and their availability.40 At a meeting in 1946, the 
United Auto Workers of the Congress of Industrial Organizations pledged 
to “work to make nursery schools a permanent part of our school struc-
ture, free to all parents in the community wishing to avail themselves of 
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the opportunity.”41 Various organizations urged the federal government to 
provide permanent funds for early childhood services, and they contin-
ued their efforts after the war ended.42
Early Childhood Policy in the Immediate Postwar Period
As the Second World War drew to a close, President Harry S. Truman 
extended funding for the Lanham Act child care centers for six months. 
The subsequent termination of the program confirmed that national gov-
ernment support of child care centers had been a temporary response to 
emergency conditions.43 Washington State, New York State, and several 
counties and cities allocated funds to extend the lives of the centers, and 
local industries, service clubs, and lay organizations in other communities 
made similar financial commitments.44 Continued support from the na-
tional government, however, was not forthcoming. Representative Helen 
Gahagan Douglas (D- CA) introduced legislation during the Eightieth and 
Eighty- First Congresses that sought to “assist the States and Territories in 
providing more effective programs of public kindergarten or kindergarten 
and nursery- school education,”45 but neither proposal received serious 
consideration.
Early childhood advocates nonetheless viewed the late 1940s as a mo-
ment of opportunity. They felt that the WPA and Lanham Act programs 
had generated unprecedented publicity for early childhood policy. In 1947, 
one advocate claimed, “Interest in nursery and kindergarten education is 
at a high point. . . . Public attention is beginning to recognize these schools 
for young children as an essential for parents and as an economic asset in 
terms of the conservation of childhood.”46 The National Association for 
Nursery Education launched a publicity campaign whose goal was to “at-
tach amendments to state education laws which would make it possible 
for nursery education to be provided as part of the public educational sys-
tem.”47 It offered interested parties a fact sheet, magazine articles, radio 
scripts of fifteen- minute dramatic sketches, a film, and pictures of small 
children to assist their lobbying efforts.
During the immediate postwar period, advocates experienced their 
greatest success in California. The state legislature allocated a one- year 
appropriation of $3.5 million for the child care program in 1946. Without 
these funds, the centers established during the war would have had to 
close. The bill enabled the state to retain a large proportion of its child care 
centers and laid the foundation for its postwar child care program.48 Child 
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care advocates won annual and biannual child care appropriations until 
1957, when the program became a permanent part of the state budget. 
Their success has been attributed to a favorable political environment. A 
surplus existed in the state treasury, opponents never coalesced into an 
organized countermovement, and advocates cultivated an influential set 
of allies (Reese 1996). The California program remains the oldest continu-
ous state child care program in the country. Supporters struggled to 
achieve their goals in other states.
The Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth in 
1950 devoted some attention to nursery schools and kindergartens. At the 
time of the conference, states and municipalities funded only 10 percent of 
child care facilities across the country, and another 14 percent operated 
with funds from community chests. Commercial nursery schools consti-
tuted 43 percent of the total, and voluntary organizations, such as churches, 
philanthropies, and institutions of higher education, constituted another 
23 percent (Michel 1999, 177– 78). A conference report emphasized the 
“necessity for making nursery schools and kindergartens far more widely 
available, as well as for considerable flexibility in policies on age of admis-
sion.”49 Attendees adopted sixty- seven recommendations, including one 
stipulating “[t]hat as a desirable supplement to home life, nursery schools 
and kindergartens, provided they meet high professional standards, be in-
cluded as a part of public educational opportunity for children.”50
The overall landscape of early childhood programs changed very little 
during the 1950s.51 In 1960, preschool attendance remained uncommon, 
and most parents relied on private nonprofit and commercial sources. 
During the 1960– 61 academic year, only about 1 percent of the school dis-
tricts in the United States operated public nursery schools. There was 
some minor regional variation, but the overall “distribution throughout 
the country [was] relatively even, though extremely low.”52 The slow 
growth of public programs meant that most children who attended pre-
schools attended private nursery schools, and only about 6 percent of the 
first- grade children in public schools had attended either a public or a 
nonpublic nursery school.53 Given this limited reach, it is not surprising 
that the Golden Anniversary White House Conference on Children and 
Youth in 1960 reiterated the 1950 conference’s goal of expanding public 
programs. It called for the increased “provision of supplemental services 
for parents of preschool children, such as day care centers, nursery schools, 
kindergartens, and summer day camps.”54 Repeated calls for expanded 
public services did not have a major policy impact during the immediate 
postwar period.
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The most noteworthy policy change occurred in 1954, when the federal 
income tax code was revised to allow a tax deduction for specific 
employment- related dependent care expenses. The tax deduction allowed 
working adults (widows, widowers, divorced persons, or married moth-
ers) to deduct up to six hundred dollars a year for child care that enabled 
the taxpayer to work. The maximum deduction was available to individu-
als or couples earning less than forty- five hundred dollars per year. The tax 
deduction received broad support, but most members of Congress “made 
it clear that they did not condone maternal employment in general” (Mi-
chel 1999, 205). By allowing minimal expenditures and keeping the in-
come cap relatively low, Congress “gave a nod to the employment of low- 
income women while maintaining its distance from child care in general” 
(Lombardi 2003, 35).
The tax deduction represented a sea change in attitudes toward poor 
women. Whereas mothers’ pensions and Aid to Dependent Children sup-
ported them to remain at home with their children, the tax deduction 
underwrote the cost of child care to encourage them to join the work-
force.55 Despite its limited initial reach, the tax deduction “turned out to 
be the most significant breakthrough in child care policy of the 1950s” 
(Michel 1999, 209). In the 1970s, it was transformed into a tax credit, and 
its eligibility provisions were broadened considerably. The tax deduction 
played a significant role in the evolution of early childhood policy, but it 
differed sharply from the strategy of service provision that was embraced 
by the WPA and Lanham Act programs.
The War on Poverty and the Creation of Head Start
On March 16, 1964, the White House delivered a message to Congress that 
called for a “national war on poverty” and described several programs to 
assist low- income individuals and families. Its goal was “to allow [the 
poor] to develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to use 
ours, so that they can share, as others share, in the promise of this na-
tion.”56 With the creation of Head Start in 1965, early childhood education 
became a key component of the War on Poverty. It was viewed as a way to 
address the long- term disadvantages that accompanied growing up in 
poverty and to prepare disadvantaged children for elementary school. The 
launch of Head Start had much in common with the emergency nursery 
schools and Lanham Act centers. It was a targeted, temporary response to 
an emergency situation (Beatty 1995; Lazerson 1972; Slobdin 1975).57
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The creation of Head Start reflected growing interest in compensatory 
school programs. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Ford Founda-
tion funded early childhood initiatives at several experimental sites as part 
of its Great Cities School Improvement Program (Vinovskis 2005, 26). 
Changing views of child development, with their emphasis on the impor-
tance of the first five years of life, encouraged many to view compensatory 
schooling programs as a way to address the root causes of poverty. By the 
early 1960s, leading politicians like Robert F. Kennedy viewed preschool 
education as a “normal and desirable component of comprehensive efforts 
to improve deteriorating inner cities” (Vinovskis 2005, 30).
Early childhood policy received considerable attention from the John-
son administration. In August 1964, consultant Harry Levin issued a brief 
assessment of preschool programs, concluding that “schooling must start 
on a preschool basis and include a broad range of more intensive ser-
vices.”58 He predicted that the “present combination of circumstances . . . 
makes a large scale establishment of preschools inevitable.”59 Anticipating 
a landslide victory in the November election, President Johnson appointed 
several task forces to make legislative recommendations. His Task Force 
on Education assembled thirty- one papers, including two devoted specifi-
cally to preschool. It portrayed preschool as a resource for disadvantaged 
children, not as an opportunity that should be provided to all children 
(Vinovskis 2005, 54– 57). After the election, lawmakers transformed this 
interest in early childhood policy into concrete proposals.60
In a special message to Congress in early 1965, Johnson announced his 
intention to locate a preschool program within the Office of Economic 
Opportunity’s Community Action Program and called the initiative 
“Head Start” for the first time (Vinovskis 2005, 73). In February, the Head 
Start Planning Committee endorsed a comprehensive vision of child de-
velopment and reached an “unofficial consensus” that Head Start should 
begin as a small pilot program. It did not object, however, when the ad-
ministration decided to “proceed immediately with a nationwide Head 
Start program that would serve 100,000 children” (Zigler and Muenchow 
1992, 22).
The ambitious decision to launch Head Start as a nationwide program 
offered several advantages. The availability of unused funds from the 
Community Action Program (CAP) facilitated its rapid expansion. The 
cost of the nationwide launch actually “represented a solution— a worth-
while way to allocate the remainder of the unused CAP funds before the 
end of the fiscal year” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 25). Nationwide imple-
mentation was also politically beneficial. It “made the program highly vis-
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ible” and “created the grass- roots support— and a potential vote from ev-
ery congressional district— that would protect Head Start later on” (Zigler 
and Muenchow 1992, 28).
The main drawback of the nationwide launch was inconsistent quality 
among Head Start centers. Many centers lacked the resources they needed 
to achieve their objectives. For example, there was a shortage of qualified 
teachers with training and experience in early childhood education. In 
addition, local school districts worried that Head Start would impose a 
national curriculum, so program supporters were reluctant to mandate a 
specific educational approach (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 42). Head 
Start therefore allowed local communities to make many curricular 
choices, which fostered uneven program quality. Concerns about program 
quality led some critics to question whether Head Start would signifi-
cantly help disadvantaged children, but the program nonetheless enjoyed 
strong public and bipartisan support at its inception in the summer of 
1965.
A preschool panel at a White House conference in July is illustrative. 
The panel featured “an enthusiastic commitment to Head Start as a fresh 
breeze in American education” and “an all- pervading feeling that the mo-
mentum of Head Start should not be lost.”61 Head Start received especially 
effusive praise from consultant J. W. Getzels. Getzels wrote that Head Start 
“represents the awakening of the American conscience to the nation’s 
most serious problem, and we can take pride that a generation hence no 
one will be able to say as we are about a generation ago that although the 
problem was recognized nothing courageous to solve it was attempted.”62 
This support for Head Start was accompanied by a broader call for na-
tional government action, including a large- scale financial investment in 
early childhood programs. Panelists urged the president to support “a na-
tional commitment for a war on ignorance directed specifically at the pre-
school child.”63
At the conference, Representative Albert Quie (R- MN) announced his 
intention to offer an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act (ESEA) “to incorporate within the traditional school structure 
programs like Head Start for preschool children.”64 Other participants ob-
jected to Quie’s idea because they wanted the initiative to be affiliated with 
community action programs. When Quie offered his amendment to the 
ESEA, it provoked an extended debate on the House floor. Democrats 
complained that the proposal was too prescriptive and too narrowly fo-
cused on early childhood programs, whereas Quie and his Republican 
colleagues argued that the Democratic alternatives devoted insufficient at-
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tention to preschool and would not facilitate a close relationship between 
early childhood education and the public schools (Vinovskis 2005, 82– 85). 
The Republican congressman’s proposal nonetheless reflected the biparti-
san appeal of Head Start and preschool education. In a 1966 memoran-
dum, in fact, Republicans claimed credit for the idea behind Head Start 
and described it as “the most successful of the new poverty programs.”65
The enthusiasm surrounding the nationwide launch of Head Start 
caused some supporters to worry that “too much was being promised too 
soon” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 27). Head Start provided several social 
services, but it was eventually evaluated primarily along the dimension of 
cognitive gains. The notion that children’s intelligence could be affected by 
their environment led to speculation, much of it by program supporters, 
that Head Start would raise enrollees’ IQ scores. Supporters who worried 
about the overselling of the program argued that evaluations relying pri-
marily on cognitive gains were “unrealistic and unfair.”66 One observer 
explained “[T]hey tried taking kids for six weeks in the summer, giving 
them a razzmatazz program, and some injections, and a little feeding up, 
and then expecting to go back five years later and find that these children 
had I.Q.s that were twenty points higher than the ones who hadn’t been 
subjected to this. . . . What could be more patently ridiculous?”67 Cogni-
tive gains and IQ scores nevertheless continued to be the primary dimen-
sions along which Head Start was evaluated.
Early evaluations of Head Start led to setbacks for the program. A 
March 1967 report on the first summer and winter Head Start programs 
was inconclusive. It found that program attendees experienced significant 
gains in some contexts but not in others. Furthermore, follow- up studies 
suggested that just six months “after the end of the experience differences 
between Head Start and non- Head Start children had been reduced.”68 
This “fade- out” problem, which had been recognized as early as 1965,69 led 
to the launch of the Follow Through pilot program in June 1967. Follow 
Through attempted “to capitalize upon and supplement the gains children 
make in preschool experiences through continuing their participation in 
a program” of comprehensive social services.70
Head Start received a fundamental challenge in April 1969, when the 
Westinghouse Learning Corporation released its preliminary report on 
the long- term impact of Head Start enrollment. It focused on the attitudes 
and academic achievements of former Head Start enrollees in first, sec-
ond, and third grade and concluded, “Head Start children could not be 
said to be appreciably different from their peers in the elementary grades 
who did not attend Head Start in most aspects of cognitive and affective 
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development measured in this study.”71 Although the data in the report 
could be interpreted in several ways, the report was widely viewed as evi-
dence of Head Start’s limited effectiveness. One historian describes the 
Westinghouse report as “damning criticism . . . which suggested that the 
intellectual gains of preschool compensatory education evaporated after a 
few years in elementary school” (Cravens 1993, 257). The report placed 
Head Start supporters on the defensive, yet the program survived these 
initial difficulties due to its strong political constituency and widespread 
public support (E. Rose 2010, 29; Vinovskis 1999a, 74– 75).72 There were 
calls for the outright elimination of Head Start, but by 1969, the program 
“had become too popular among the public and politicians to be aban-
doned” (Vinovskis 2005, 143).
Supporters also defended Head Start against several efforts to transfer 
it to the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW). HEW secretary Robert Finch argued that the transfer 
would improve Head Start by facilitating greater program length and con-
tinuity and increased technical assistance and evaluation efforts.73 He sug-
gested that the transfer would benefit Head Start financially, allowing it to 
draw on departmental resources “without necessarily going up for a 
higher appropriation for Head Start as such.”74 He wanted to reassure 
Head Start supporters who feared that the program would get lost in a 
large department and that its community action component would evapo-
rate. In June, the Nixon administration announced that Head Start would 
be placed under the jurisdiction of the Office of Child Development, a 
special agency within HEW that was set apart from the Office of Educa-
tion (Vinovskis 2005, chap. 8).
Due to their long- term political impact, two features of Head Start de-
serve further attention. The first is the program’s comprehensive approach. 
The Head Start Planning Committee’s decision to endorse a comprehen-
sive program has been characterized as “one of its most important recom-
mendations” (Hymes 1979, 34). Head Start is premised on the assumption 
that child development is a “multifaceted process” involving children, 
their parents, other family members, and the community at large.75 In ad-
dition to its educational goals, it strives to improve physical health and 
nutritional outcomes. It is a child development program that attempts to 
“integrate all services needed by young children into a unified program to 
influence their total development.”76 The comprehensive nature of Head 
Start foreshadowed the debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s in which 
supporters of a permanent, national, universal early childhood program 
insisted that it should emulate the Head Start model.
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A second attribute of Head Start that had an important long- term po-
litical impact is its emphasis on parental involvement, which ultimately 
became a source of both controversy and political support (Zigler and 
Muenchow 1992). Active parental involvement was an “absolute require-
ment of an acceptable Head Start program,” and every grantee was re-
quired to establish a policy advisory committee with at least half of its 
membership made up of parents or parent representatives.77 A Head Start 
program manual published in September 1967 outlined four major kinds 
of parental participation: (1) participating in the process of making deci-
sions about the nature and operation of the program; (2) participating in 
the classroom as paid employees, volunteers, and observers; (3) welcom-
ing center staff into their homes for discussions of how parents can con-
tribute to child development in the home; and (4) participating in educa-
tional activities developed for and with help from the parents.78 Parental 
input on program operation and the possibility of paid employment had 
an especially profound long- term impact. Parents and families who have 
participated in Head Start have been heavily involved in its planning and 
governance and, as subsequent chapters of this book will show, have often 
defended these prerogatives.
Head Start’s generation of jobs for adults was a source of both national 
and local controversy in 1969. When the program was delegated to the 
Office of Child Development, HEW insisted that the transfer would lead 
to no job losses, and it emphasized its commitment “not only to the hiring 
of non- professionals in Head Start programs, but the development of ca-
reer ladders for them.”79 Around the same time, a controversy erupted 
over whether Minneapolis public schools administering Head Start pro-
grams were giving parents sufficient input in program decisions and pref-
erence for classroom positions. School system leaders argued that the 
“vast majority of Head Start aides” had always been Head Start parents or 
residents of poverty- area neighborhoods.80 Parental involvement in Head 
Start had long- term implications because it gave Head Start parents and 
their advocates a stake in the existing policy repertoire and caused them 
to resist proposed changes.
Demographic, Intellectual, and Political Forces for Change
Until the 1960s, the national government role in early childhood policy 
could be classified as a “series of crisis interventions” (Cahan 1989, 37) that 
reflected “a lack of comprehensive social policy and the formation of tem-
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porary policy in times of crisis” (Takanishi 1977, 158). Government inter-
vention was “reluctantly funded by the public and only in extraordinary 
historical times” (McGill- Franzen 1993, 175). As one observer explained in 
1946, “WPA had the tendency to make us think of nursery schools only as 
a means of employing teachers. Lanham Funds forced our thinking some-
what into a groove where we saw the nursery school only as a means of 
freeing mothers for work. These were not children’s purposes; they were 
‘secondary purposes’ which nursery schools can serve.”81 The programs of 
the 1930s and 1940s had been temporary targeted responses to national 
crises. Head Start was similar along those dimensions.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, government officials turned their at-
tention to programs serving a broader constituency, moving away from 
targeted programs and toward universal ones. The importance of this shift 
cannot be overstated in light of the precedent set in earlier decades. Sup-
porters had long argued that early childhood services should be available 
to all children. Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, did law-
makers seriously consider establishing a permanent national framework 
for the universal provision of educational, nutritional, and health services. 
Why did this shift occur?
In his influential model of the agenda- setting process, John Kingdon 
(1995, 165) argues that “policy windows” open only when a “problem is 
recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, 
a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential 
constraints are not severe.” The merger of these streams provides policy 
entrepreneurs with the opportunity to push their preferred policy solu-
tion. Kingdon’s model helps explain why the debate over early childhood 
policy shifted from an emphasis on targeted, temporary programs to the 
serious consideration of a permanent, universal program. A combination 
of demographic, intellectual, and political forces placed early childhood 
policy on the national political agenda and contributed to a decisive break 
with the past.
Demographic Change: Trends in Female Employment
Changing societal conditions can draw officials’ attention to new issues or 
cause them to revisit old ones. In the context of early childhood policy, the 
most crucial demographic shift was the transformation of the American 
workforce between the Second World War and 1969. During this period, 
mothers of young children entered the labor force in large numbers, and a 
debate ensued about whether and how the government should respond to 
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this change. Among mothers with children under age eighteen, rates of 
participation in the labor force increased from less than 10 percent in 1940 
to 30 percent in 1960 and about 40 percent in March 1969.82 The employ-
ment rate of married women with children under age six increased from 
less than 12 percent in 1950 to more than 30 percent in 1970 (E. Rose 1999, 
213). This trend has been called a “historic substitution [that] transformed 
the demographics of the twentieth- century American economy and af-
fected all classes” (Sealander 2003, 13). Many families could not rely on 
grandparents or other relatives to provide care for their young children, 
because “the traditional extended family structure [had] been fractured.”83 
As a result, many more American children were cared for outside their 
homes.
Scholars trace this demographic shift to various sources. Gornick and 
Meyers (2003, 28) attribute it to the Second World War, which caused a 
“temporary employment shock [that] set in motion irreversible changes in 
attitudes toward the employment of married women.” Others describe it 
as part of a larger economic and social transformation, as families headed 
by a breadwinner and a homemaker became less common. David Frum 
(2000, 68– 69) argues that the entry of women into the workforce was part 
of a larger trend toward “expressive work [that] was caused at least as 
much by new ideas about the meaning of work as by the need for more 
family income.” Economic necessity was another potential cause. Sup-
porters of government intervention often claimed that women entered the 
labor force in order to make ends meet. The Policy Council of the National 
Women’s Political Caucus, for example, attempted to legitimize govern-
mental support by arguing, “The vast majority of women work not by 
choice but because they must.”84
Regardless of its ultimate source, there is no disputing the political sig-
nificance of this demographic shift. The widespread participation of 
mothers of young children in the labor market fomented controversy 
about whether and how the government should respond. Supporters of 
government intervention pointed to demographic changes to justify pol-
icy change. In 1967, one advocate noted that other countries had taken 
action because “[they] are realists and they reason that if you take the 
mother away from the home and employ her, something must be done 
about the children who are left without supervision and without the love 
and attention that only a mother could give.”85 Congressional Republicans 
were especially struck by the fact that these trends in the labor market af-
fected many families in the lower- middle and middle income ranges. Ac-
cording to one staffer, “From the simple day- care question we very soon 
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spilled over into the whole area of child development.”86 This transition 
reflected broader intellectual changes.
Intellectual Change: Developments in Cognitive Psychology
The fact that the mothers of young children entered the workforce in un-
precedented numbers did not require a specific course of action. The split 
between day nurseries and nursery schools in the early twentieth century, 
for example, illustrates how one could adopt a custodial approach to early 
childhood and care or place a stronger emphasis on educational con-
tent.87 The debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasized educa-
tional programs and focused on the notion of child development. Sup-
porters often justified this focus by referring to an intellectual shift in 
cognitive psychology.
The mid- to late 1950s were “a transition point in American psychology 
in general, and in child psychology in particular.”88 Many psychologists 
rethought the process of cognitive development and characterized intelli-
gence as something affected by environmental forces. In doing so, they 
broke with the “Gesellian era, with its emphasis on maturation and the 
implicit notion of the fixed I.Q.”89 In short, many cognitive psychologists 
rejected the long- standing idea that intelligence was fixed at birth. They 
argued that early childhood experiences had profound implications for 
subsequent development. This paradigmatic shift led to “rapid growth in 
interest in early childhood education . . . by suggesting that certain kinds 
of experiences may affect the rate of early cognitive development” (Cahan 
1989, 48). It heightened the perceived importance of children’s experiences 
during the first five years of life.
Several psychologists contributed to this intellectual shift, but the work 
of J. McVicker Hunt and Benjamin Bloom was especially influential.90 De-
velopmental psychologist Sheldon H. White explained, “The papers by 
Bloom and Hunt must easily have been the most frequently cited publica-
tions in discussion of preschools.”91 Hunt and Bloom “produced some of 
the earliest and most effective arguments for early childhood education in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s” (Vinovskis 2005, 11). Advocates of increased 
investment in early childhood education often invoked their research.
Hunt’s Intelligence and Experience was published in 1961. Hunt argued 
that intelligence was modifiable and could be affected by environmental 
forces. He proposed that a “substantially higher adult level of intellectual 
capacity [can] be achieved by providing quality encounters with the envi-
ronment in the early years.”92 He emphasized the interaction between an 
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organism and its environment: “Much of the evidence reviewed in this 
work is concerned with showing that experience, and especially early ex-
perience, is of importance” (335). Hunt was optimistic about the potential 
long- term impact of early childhood experiences. Arguing that additional 
research might make it “feasible to raise the average level of intelligence as 
now measured by a substantial degree,” he speculated, “In order to be ex-
plicit, it is conceivable that this ‘substantial degree’ might be of the order 
of 30 points of I.Q.” (267). This optimistic speculation helps explain why 
Hunt’s book sparked such widespread interest in early childhood policy.
Published in 1964, Bloom’s Stability and Change in Human Character-
istics examined data from about one thousand longitudinal studies. It 
questioned the notion of a fixed IQ and described intelligence as a devel-
opmental concept. Bloom noted increased stability in intelligence mea-
surements with time and pointed out that about 50 percent of the varia-
tion in intelligence at age seventeen was accounted for by age four. This 
pattern, he concluded, “would suggest the very rapid growth of intelli-
gence in the early years and the possible great influence of the early envi-
ronment on this development” (68). He hypothesized that the impact of 
environmental factors and deprivation were most pronounced during the 
first few years of life. He concluded that “the increased ability to predict 
long- term consequences of environmental forces and developmental 
characteristics places new responsibilities on the home, the school, and 
the society” (231). He argued that these responsibilities must be met early 
in life, when it is easiest to bring about desirable changes. Bloom’s book 
was very influential. It “[threw] the spotlight on the tremendous impor-
tance of the early years of life, and [showed] how hard it was to bring 
about changes later in life. It added up to a strong plug for early childhood 
education” (Hymes 1979, 33).
Some psychologists and other scholars questioned whether appropri-
ate conclusions were being drawn from the research described in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. They worried that the potential benefits of early expe-
riences were being overstated. Scholars such as Edward Zigler felt that the 
“environmental mystique” was a valuable corrective to the Gesellian era 
but had been oversold and that “scientists and lay people alike were dis-
playing an almost magical faith in the power to increase mental capacity” 
(Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 13).93 Others focused on the lessons that edu-
cators and legislators drew from this research in cognitive psychology. 
One pair of critics complained, for example, that the advocates of early 
schooling “make unfortunate twin assumptions: that a child’s intelligence 
can be nurtured by organizing it, and that brightness means readiness for 
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school.”94 They argued that early schooling might be damaging over the 
long term if it occurred in a setting that failed to provide warmth and se-
curity, and they asserted that “one of a child’s primary needs in these for-
mative years is for an environment free of tasks that will tax his brain.”95
Despite these and other critiques, cognitive psychology research pro-
vided a scientific justification for increased interest in early childhood 
policy. Scholars like J. McVicker Hunt and Benjamin Bloom questioned 
the notion of fixed intelligence and emphasized the impact of the first five 
years of life on cognitive development. This intellectual transition was es-
pecially important because it provided a rationale for focusing on child 
development rather than on custodial child care. At around the same time, 
the political environment offered opportunities for elected officials to pro-
pose a major expansion of the national government’s role in this policy 
arena.
Political Change: The War on Poverty and the Shifting 
Contours of Education Policy
Several political developments raised the profile of early childhood policy 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period of social reform and national 
government activism. In a 1972 speech, S. P. Marland Jr., the U.S. commis-
sioner of education, described the 1960s as a time of “almost unparalleled 
idealism” during which Americans “turned our sense of social justice into 
massive federal funding and corresponding law.”96 The size and scope of 
national government activity expanded dramatically in this period, fueled 
by an activist president and, after the 1964 election, an overwhelmingly 
Democratic Congress. This activism reflected public opinion. James Stim-
son (1991, 64) argues that “the liberal winds of the 1960s were blowing in 
the latter part of the previous decade, a gradual run- up that was gone soon 
after it was generally recognized to be in place.” This bundle of domestic 
policy preferences meant that Americans were willing to countenance ma-
jor expansions of national government activity.
State and local government authorities had traditionally exercised con-
trol over educational programming. As late as 1959, one scholar wrote, 
“The desirability of local control of the public schools is an article of faith 
among most trained educators and many other Americans” (Eliot 1959, 
1032; emphasis in original). Local control was justified on several grounds. 
It allowed educational programs to be adapted to social and economic 
conditions and the unique needs of local communities. It permitted ex-
perimentation, which resonated with the popular portrayal of the states as 
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“laboratories of democracy.”97 Localities could try out new ideas, and if 
their experiments led to improved educational outcomes, they could be 
emulated elsewhere. Finally, local control encouraged political participa-
tion, serving as “an indispensable laboratory for training an intelligent 
and competent citizenry for larger civic affairs and more responsible posi-
tions” (Hales 1954, 7).
National government aid to the public schools had been debated in the 
1930s and 1940s, and both major party platforms endorsed it during the 
1948 presidential campaign (Vinovskis 2005, 13). Three interrelated issues, 
however, made it “impossible to shape a winning coalition in Congress” 
(Thomas 1983, 273). One issue was financial aid for parochial schools, 
which was seen as a deal breaker by those who viewed it as a violation of 
the separation of church and state. A second issue was financial aid for 
segregated public schools, especially after the landmark Brown decision in 
1954. The civil rights issue resonated especially strongly with policymakers 
from southern states. A third issue was the possibility that national gov-
ernment aid to the public schools would lead to “federal control” of educa-
tion policy. Fears of centralization and totalitarianism were especially im-
portant in the context of the Cold War. Multiple historians have described 
the issues as the “three R’s” of race, religion, and reds (Bailey and Mosher 
1968, 21; Thomas 1975, 3). Several education bills failed to clear these po-
litical hurdles. By the late 1950s, one of the “most distinctive attributes [of 
American politics was] the tenacity with which the United States, unlike 
most nations, had resisted a national education policy” (Graham 1984, 
xvii).
Observers disagreed about what the future held. The ongoing contro-
versy surrounding aid to parochial and segregated schools led one scholar 
to predict that “general federal aid is still far off ” (Eliot 1959, 1043). Another 
argued that “education appears to be on the threshold of an appreciable 
increase in federal control” (Hales 1954, 54). The period from 1960 through 
1964 laid the foundation for the passage of legislation. Supporters altered 
their legislative strategy by “thinking of education in terms of social welfare 
and economic growth and presenting the program in an omnibus bill and 
messages.”98 Francis Keppel, the U.S. commissioner of education from 1962 
to 1965, eventually developed a compromise that satisfied both the teachers 
unions and Catholic leaders, “finding a legislative formula that would per-
mit massive federal assistance of a kind that would at the same time 
strengthen state and local initiative” (Bailey and Mosher 1968, 35). These 
powerful constituencies recognized that an insistence on ideological purity 
would prevent them from receiving tangible benefits (Sundquist 1968, 
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206). As a result, the “customary fragmentation of the education lobby was 
displaced by a rare demonstration of unity.”99 The leadership of President 
Lyndon B. Johnson was crucial. Johnson “placed his substantial influence 
behind federal policies aimed at federal support of American education” 
(Bailey 1975, 36). A skilled legislative tactician, he “made education his 
highest domestic policy concern after civil rights” (Thomas 1983, 277).
Johnson signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act into law 
in 1965.100 A delicate balancing act was necessary for its passage, and the 
ESEA “was a closely woven tapestry of educational objectives and pro-
gram proposals that Congress could not greatly alter without a serious 
impairment of substance or political appeal” (Bailey and Mosher 1968, 
48). The core of the statute was Title I, which was devoted to the schooling 
of economically deprived children. Although Title I did not provide gen-
eral aid, “[w]ide geographical funds and a semblance of ‘general aid’ were 
ensured by counting all school age children in poverty, and by requiring 
that a school district only have three percent eligible children to qualify 
for a grant” (Bailey and Mosher 1968, 49). The ESEA expanded the na-
tional government’s role through several categorical programs, but its pas-
sage “was celebrated . . . as a historic breakthrough for general aid” (Gra-
ham 1984, 79). Historians and politicians described its passage in dramatic 
terms, focusing on its implications for federalism and education policy. 
They called the ESEA “a radical departure for the federal government” 
(McDonnell 2005, 36) and “a clean break with earlier models” (Bailey and 
Mosher 1968, 60). States and localities now shared control over education 
policy with the national government.
Passage of the ESEA fundamentally reshaped the debate over educa-
tion policy. Public attitudes toward the national government and its role 
“changed rather dramatically and rather fast.”101 In 1968, Representative 
John Brademas (D- IN) noted that “the politics of education in the United 
States has altered very sharply in the last several years.”102 The commis-
sioner of education described national education funding as one of “those 
formerly controversial issues that once threatened to topple the Republic 
but that now have gained widespread acceptance.”103 Historians used sim-
ilar language. By the late 1960s, there “was no longer serious debate over 
the propriety of a major federal role in education” (Thomas 1975, 34). Ac-
cording to one scholar, “The question would be, henceforth, not whether 
the national government should give aid but how much it should give, for 
what purposes— and with how much federal control” (Sundquist 1968, 
216; emphasis in original). Passage of the ESEA represented a major policy 
shift, altering the role of the national government in education policy.
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In sum, the 1960s were a period during which lawmakers expanded the 
scope of national government activity in education policy. Passage of the 
ESEA in 1965 was the culmination of a decades- long struggle over the is-
sue of education funding. The ESEA legitimatized national government 
involvement in a policy arena that had previously been dominated by 
states and localities. When advocates later pressed for the national and 
universal provision of early childhood services, the ESEA constituted a 
precedent on which they could build.
Summary: Forces for Change in Early Childhood Policy
A combination of demographic, intellectual, and political forces placed 
early childhood policy on the national political agenda in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Mothers with young children entered the labor force in 
unprecedented numbers, which meant that more American children were 
being cared for outside their homes. Research in cognitive psychology af-
fected parents’ and policymakers’ ideas about the type of care that was best 
for these children. By heightening the perceived importance of the first 
five years of life, this research suggested that any care young children re-
ceived outside their homes should have a prominent educational compo-
nent. Politically, the decade of the 1960s was an era of increased national 
governmental intervention. One of the legislative landmarks of this era 
was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which expanded the 
role of the national government in a policy arena that had previously been 
dominated by states and localities. This confluence of forces raised the 
profile of early childhood policy and caused lawmakers to debate the na-
tional government’s role in its provision.
Conclusion: Changing Attitudes toward  
Early Childhood Education
During the 1960s, a fundamental shift occurred in how politicians and the 
American public thought about early childhood policy. Historically, the 
national government had been limited to administering targeted policies 
under crisis conditions, but by the end of the decade, several organiza-
tions and politicians endorsed the creation of a universal national frame-
work. The National Education Association and the American Association 
of School Administrators argued that “the opportunity for early education 
at public expense should . . . be universal” for all children over the age of 
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four (Educational Policies Commission 1966, 5). Using governmental re-
sources to expand access to early childhood programs possessed biparti-
san appeal. Some Republicans acknowledged the cost of a universal pro-
gram but cited its potential long- term benefits: “The cost to institute such 
a program would be high, but would more than pay for itself by savings in 
law enforcement, manpower, job retraining, welfare payments and mental 
health services.”104 Perhaps the most important change of the decade was 
a shift in how Americans viewed the role of the national government. The 
idea that early childhood programs should be run by the national govern-
ment received significant public support. A July 1969 Gallup poll sug-
gested that “two- thirds of the American public favored the establishment 
of federally funded day care centers.”105 These results suggest a remarkable 
willingness to countenance governmental intervention in a realm that had 
traditionally been considered the private domain of the family.
In sum, the 1960s were a period of dramatic change in the politics of 
early childhood. By 1965, “[t]he number and diversity of compensatory 
preschool projects [were] growing so rapidly that it [was] hazardous to say 
anything about the nature of the program with risk of oversimplifying and 
being out of date almost at once.”106 In an April 1968 speech, Harold Howe 
II, the commissioner of education, predicted, “If I read the signals cor-
rectly, this whole area of early education will be a major emphasis for the 
next several decades.”107 Howe would soon be proven correct, as the con-
fluence of several demographic, intellectual, and political forces led to the 
introduction of many major legislative proposals, foremost among them 
the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971.
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3 |  A Watershed Episode: The Comprehensive 
Child Development Act
Interest in early childhood policy remained high after the inauguration of 
President Richard Nixon, thanks in part to the widespread attention Head 
Start received. A March 1969 memo to the Advisory Committee on Head 
Start argued that the program helped produce “an unprecedented amount 
of national interest in the importance of early childhood development.”1 
Some accounts in the popular press touched on similar themes. An article 
in Business Week explained, “The concept of widespread day care for pre-
school children, developed during the Johnson years, is generating more 
interest and enthusiasm during the Nixon Administration than ever be-
fore.”2 In Congress, the central debate surrounded the appropriate role of 
the national government in this policy sector.
As the congressional debate crystallized, it shifted in two directions 
that had important long- term consequences. The first shift was the wide-
spread embrace of a comprehensive approach to child development. Pro-
grams for young children were viewed as part of a multifaceted effort to 
improve children’s overall well- being. Head Start epitomized this more 
encompassing approach. It offered educational, nutritional, and other ser-
vices and sought to reach children, parents, and the larger community. 
The April 1969 creation of the Office of Child Development within the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare also reflected this shift. 
HEW secretary Robert Finch alluded to this new way of thinking as he 
announced the creation of the new office: “Today, our nation’s schools and 
child care programs are in the process of changing toward a more compre-
hensive approach to the physical, social and intellectual development of 
children and their families.”3
The second shift represented an even sharper break with the past. 
Whereas previous governmental initiatives were targeted and crisis- 
oriented, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a turn toward universal 
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programs. By April 1967, the National Education Association (NEA) had 
proposed universal schooling beginning at age four, a recommendation 
that one observer attributed to Head Start and early childhood research.4 
In a March 1971 statement, the Research and Policy Committee of the 
Committee for Economic Development endorsed a “massive effort to es-
tablish both public and private preschool educational programs.”5 The 
turn toward universal programs “represented an abrupt departure from 
previous government policy” (E. Rose 2010, 43), and it reshaped the poli-
tics of early childhood policy.
The combined impact of these two shifts took some observers by sur-
prise. One explained, “As I reflect on the past decade, I also am struck by 
the fact that I never thought in the early ’60s there would be a nationwide 
program, a nationwide emphasis on the needs of young children.”6 Per-
haps the most remarkable development of all was the 1971 passage of the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act, which both supporters and op-
ponents viewed as a step toward a permanent national framework for the 
universal provision of preschool services. Even though Congress proved 
unable to override a presidential veto, its passage was noteworthy. After a 
brief overview of the policymaking context of the late 1960s and the legis-
lative and executive branch activity that preceded the passage of this land-
mark bill, this chapter describes the politics of the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act. The significance of this critical juncture cannot be 
overstated. The veto sparked a series of reactions and counterreactions 
that help explain the fragmentation and decentralization of early child-
hood policy in the contemporary United States.
A Changing Context
The late 1960s were a time of considerable ferment in early childhood pol-
icy. Passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act facilitated 
some of this activity. In fiscal year 1967, over $1 million in Title I funds 
were expended for services for prekindergarten and kindergarten chil-
dren.7 Title III of the ESEA authorized spending on supplementary educa-
tional centers and services, and in the same fiscal year, there were sixty- 
one projects serving an estimated forty thousand preschool children at a 
cost of $3.1 million.8 These funding levels rose rapidly in the late 1960s. In 
fiscal year 1969, the Office of Education spent approximately $50 million 
in Title I funds and $12 million in Title III funds. It also spent about $30 
million on the Follow Through program that supplemented Head Start, 
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and it issued $100,000 in grants to state education agencies for early child-
hood education projects. The agency’s total allocation for early childhood 
education in fiscal year 1969 was approximately $115 million.9
The national government also allocated funds to several day care pro-
grams. By September 1969, three major programs existed within HEW. 
Head Start funds could be used for day care, state welfare departments 
could receive grants- in- aid for child welfare services including day care 
services, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) funds 
could be used for day care under certain conditions. The Department of 
Labor usually included day care funds as part of its manpower training 
grants, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
provided matching funds (on the basis of two- thirds to one- third) for the 
construction of neighborhood centers that usually included day care.10 
Multiple task forces and panels on child development provide further evi-
dence of heightened national government interest in early childhood pol-
icy. The Federal Panel on Early Childhood was created in 1968 “as a first 
step to improve and expand all early childhood programs financed by fed-
eral funds.”11
The income tax deduction for child care expenses, which had been es-
tablished in 1954, remained in effect. As of May 1970, it permitted a deduc-
tion of up to six hundred dollars for the care of one child and up to nine 
hundred dollars for the care of two or more children under age thirteen so 
long as the care enabled a working woman or another specified person to 
be gainfully employed. These limits applied to all widows, widowers, and 
separated and divorced persons, regardless of income. To claim the de-
duction, a married woman or a husband whose wife was incapacitated 
had to file a joint return with the spouse. The deduction would be reduced 
by one dollar for each dollar of the combined adjusted gross income ex-
ceeding six thousand dollars.12
State and local government activity also occurred. More states and lo-
calities supported kindergarten programming or made kindergarten at-
tendance compulsory rather than voluntary. Before the late 1960s, kinder-
garten had generally been viewed as “advanced nursery school” or as the 
“stepchild of the elementary school”;13 it was not well integrated into the 
public school system. Things changed significantly and rapidly. A fall 1968 
survey of sixty- four communities found that 69.8 percent of the children 
who were eligible to attend kindergarten were doing so, with 58.1 percent 
enrolled in public kindergartens.14 A report on the survey attributed these 
changes to Head Start, which, the authors claimed, made kindergarten 
“more respectable and more fundable.”15
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Despite this government activity, the supply of early childhood ser-
vices paled in comparison to the demand for them. A March 1969 Library 
of Congress report noted that the aforementioned government programs 
would meet only a small proportion of this demand because they focused 
on low- income families. It concluded, “As far as the non- needy general 
public is concerned, there are at present no federal programs or proposals 
which could be expected to provide it with day care facilities and services 
on any significant scale.”16 Over the next decade, this claim would fre-
quently appear in debates over government involvement. Supporters of 
increased national government involvement argued that the needs of the 
American family were not being met.
The late 1960s and early 1970s also witnessed growing interest in early 
childhood programs among private nonprofit and for- profit organiza-
tions. A May 1970 report by the Department of Labor summarized several 
innovative programs created by corporations, labor unions, women’s 
groups, and others. It noted, “The widespread shortage of day care has 
brought many businessmen into the field. Numerous companies are set-
ting up chains of day care centers under the franchise system.”17 In Octo-
ber 1970, Business Week profiled the growth of the private sector and con-
cluded, “The future may hold a billion- dollar bonanza for the fledgling 
industry.”18 Two former educators described this development as a “hus-
tle” and questioned the ability of profit- making corporations to provide 
high- quality care.19 They noted that private- sector programs tended to be 
expensive and custodial, and they argued that those with an educational 
component tended to neglect thinking processes and social develop-
ment.20
During the late 1960s, in sum, the general contours of early childhood 
policy were changing. Young children were increasingly being cared for 
outside their homes, and more public funds were being spent on pre-
school, kindergarten, and day care. These governmental efforts, even 
when combined with those of nonprofit and for- profit organizations who 
entered the day care market, seemed incapable of meeting the growing 
demand for early childhood programs. In the words of the executive di-
rector of the National Committee for the Day Care of Children, “This 
relatively slow rate of growth bears absolutely no relation to the nation’s 
need for more day care facilities.”21 Many observers concluded that the 
national government should try to fill the growing gap between supply 
and demand. Both the Nixon administration and Congress took action in 
the late 1960s.
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Precursors to the Comprehensive Child Development Act 
of 1971
On October 20, 1968, just weeks before he was elected president, Richard 
Nixon gave a radio address in which he argued that the national govern-
ment had a vital role to play in education policy. He pledged to “maintain 
our national commitment to preschool education, expanding as necessary 
such programs as Head Start and Follow Through.”22 Nixon attempted to 
make good on this pledge upon taking office. A year later, the administra-
tion claimed it had taken five “significant actions” on early childhood 
policy. The first was rhetorical, a presidential “commitment to assure that 
every child would have adequate developmental opportunities in the first 
five years of life.”23 The second significant action was the creation of the 
Office of Child Development. Developmental psychologist Urie Bronfen-
brenner hailed this action as a major step forward because it reflected “a 
broad- gauged and realistic grasp of the critical importance to the nation 
of a far- reaching, coordinated, comprehensive approach to child develop-
ment.”24 The third significant action occurred in July 1969, when the ad-
ministration sent a representative to testify on the Headstart Child Devel-
opment Act. This bill was one of several early childhood measures 
introduced during the Ninety- First Congress.
The final two actions illustrated the administration’s belief that day 
care was inextricably linked to welfare reform. President Nixon’s welfare 
reform proposal, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), was listed as the fourth 
significant action. It included a major day care authorization whose goal 
was to allow previously unemployed welfare recipients to work. The ad-
ministration insisted that the authorized care “would be developmental 
and comprehensive in nature.”25 FAP’s existence and demise would influ-
ence the debate over the Comprehensive Child Development Act. The De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare encouraged wider use of 
AFDC funds for day care, which was the fifth significant action listed in 
the memo. The national government provided three dollars for every state 
dollar spent on the “development and operation of day care programs for 
the children of welfare recipients who were participating in work and 
training programs, and also for the children in families which are former 
or potential recipients of public welfare.”26 HEW also promoted coordi-
nated early childhood planning and action through the Community Co-
ordinated Child Care (4- C) program. The 4- C program was “a structure of 
community organizations brought together to coordinate, plan and mobi-
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lize all of that community’s resources for children.”27 This effort had at-
tracted the interest of several states and about one hundred communities 
by October 1969.28
Day care and child development were also prominent topics at the 
White House Conference on Children and Youth in 1970. In a 1973 inter-
view, the presidential appointee who directed the conference noted that 
the administration did not have a “great commitment” to these issues and 
that “it would have been embarrassing not to have one.”29 The conference 
nonetheless illustrated the continued interest in early childhood policy. Its 
forum on developmental child care included a task force on delivery ser-
vices that said programs should be “universally available at parental op-
tion, offering a diversity of choices.”30 It also emphasized programs that 
were developmental, rather than custodial, in nature. One participant ex-
plained, “Day care must be . . . more than baby- sitting. It must build on 
what we know about child growth and development, about the develop-
mental tasks of children. It is education, health, nutrition, socialization, 
and more.”31 Conference delegates were asked to rank sixteen issues, and 
“comprehensive family- oriented child development programs” including 
“health services, day care and early childhood education” ranked first in a 
weighted average of the 1,912 ballots cast.32 The president of the Day Care 
and Child Development Council of America called day care “the star of 
the conference show”33 and argued that the success of the developmental 
day care forum meant that “we have now the potential of becoming a na-
tional force.”34
Several early childhood measures were introduced by Democrats and 
Republicans during the Ninety- First Congress. Representative Patsy T. 
Mink (D- HI) reintroduced the Preschool Centers Supplementary Educa-
tion Act.35 The bill provided funds for day care centers to expand, up-
grade, supplement, and increase the educational content of their pro-
grams. Mink called her bill “an extension of the Head Start opportunity to 
children not now eligible for it, though nonetheless needful of it.”36 She 
also joined forces with Representatives John Brademas (D- IN) and Ogden 
Reid (R- NY) to sponsor the Comprehensive Preschool Education and 
Child Day Care Act of 1969, which attempted to open up “comprehensive 
programs of child development . . . to all children, not just the disadvan-
taged.”37 In the Senate, Walter Mondale (D- MN) and twenty- one Demo-
cratic cosponsors introduced similar legislation, the Headstart Child De-
velopment Act of 1969. While similar in their focus on universal access to 
comprehensive services, the House and Senate bills offered contrasting 
approaches to the question of service delivery.38
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Jule Sugarman, the acting director of the Office of Child Development, 
urged the Nixon administration to respond to this congressional activity. 
In June 1969, he wrote, “Our objective should be to develop legislation 
which makes possible financial support to public agencies or private agen-
cies with a long- term commitment to providing children’s services.”39 Sug-
arman argued that such a proposal should give priority to communities 
who were seeking to coordinate their preschool and day care programs 
and to programs serving the disadvantaged. In October, he argued that the 
president was losing control of the issue to Congress and that it was 
“highly desirable for the president to regain the initiative by proposing a 
comprehensive early childhood bill.”40 He even described the possible pa-
rameters and authorization levels of a presidential initiative.
Sugarman was something of a freelancer within the administration. He 
did “a great deal of negotiating with [Congress] without checking out 
what was considered appropriate by the administration.”41 The direct ne-
gotiations led others in the administration to conclude that he was “work-
ing with [Congress] a good deal more closely than is considered appropri-
ate for a bureaucrat in the executive branch of the opposite party to do.”42 
In December 1969, Sugarman testified before a House subcommittee on 
the Preschool Education and Child Day Care Act of 1969. He had been 
sent “with instruction to say little, very little, about this bill and to appear 
somewhat negative, which under orders he did do. But that was simply 
stalling around.”43 Despite Sugarman’s efforts and increasing congressio-
nal momentum behind early childhood legislation, the administration’s 
position on these initiatives remained ambiguous.
Lacking a clear signal from their nominal party leader, congressional 
Republicans offered their own early childhood legislation. Representative 
Ogden Reid and Senator Charles Goodell (R- NY) introduced the Federal- 
State Education Act of 1969. Developed by New York governor Nelson 
Rockefeller, it provided “substantial block grants to each of the states for 
use at the preschool, elementary, secondary, vocational, junior college, 
higher and adult education levels.”44 States could spend as much as 55 per-
cent of their grant monies on early childhood programs.
Congressional Republicans also worked on early childhood legislation 
that modified the bill that their Democratic House colleagues had devel-
oped. Before introducing legislation in the spring of 1970, they met with 
several different members of the Nixon administration in an attempt to 
generate support. The meetings did not lead anywhere, and it became 
“gradually and increasingly evident . . . that there wasn’t going to be very 
much action,” due to the administration’s “previous commitment to wel-
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fare reform.”45 Undaunted by a lack of presidential support, congressional 
Republicans introduced the bill. A subcommittee held hearings on it and 
reported it to the full committee. Nothing further was done, but Republi-
cans were optimistic about what the future held for early childhood legis-
lation. One participant explained, “We went away feeling rather good that 
we had aired the subject. We had complete, full, legislative hearings on it, 
built a real framework, a real foundation for action in the beginning of the 
92nd Congress. We’d come in, we’d be all ready, everybody would be all 
steamed up.”46 Subsequent developments demonstrated that several dis-
tinct constituencies were indeed “all steamed up” but that the real legisla-
tive battle was only about to begin.
The Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971
When the Ninety- Second Congress convened in 1971, advocates of an ex-
panded national government role in early childhood policy were optimis-
tic about their prospects.47 In an April 1971 speech, Senator Mondale, who 
had been appointed chairman of the newly created Subcommittee on 
Children and Youth of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in 
February, stated, “The prospects have improved for expanded government 
support of early childhood efforts. We will have some kind of legislation 
shortly, and along with it more money.”48 Mondale’s prediction matched 
the feeling of congressional Republicans who felt that legislative action 
was imminent. The debate over early childhood legislation proved more 
controversial than Mondale and others anticipated, however, and advo-
cates’ inability to clear all of the necessary legislative hurdles would have 
profound long- term implications.
The Child Development Coalition and Its Proposal
On January 15, 1971, Senator Mondale sent a letter to Marian Wright Edel-
man of the Washington Research Project. Noting congressional interest in 
child development and the organization’s expertise, he wrote, “I would 
welcome your judgments on the essential components of such legislation, 
and would also like to ask your assistance in bringing together the ideas 
and opinions of similar groups who would make useful inputs at this stage 
in the development of a national program.”49 The organization was very 
receptive to this request. The bills debated during the preceding Congress 
caused some labor and civil rights groups to fear that “a very successful, 
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community- based Head Start program [would be turned] over to state 
government, with inadequate standards and inadequate funding and with 
a tremendous risk of losing parent and community involvement.”50 Edel-
man and others felt that the most effective response would be to convene 
a broad coalition of groups with an interest in children. The coalition 
would debate the main issues, make its policy decisions, draw up legisla-
tion, and ask members of Congress to introduce the bill.
The Washington Research Project called a meeting and invited repre-
sentatives from the “liberal day- care establishment,” labor groups, wom-
en’s groups, and civil rights groups.51 They were pleasantly surprised by 
the positive response they received. Diverse constituencies attended the 
meeting for distinct reasons. According to Edelman, “The women were 
there, in part, for their children, but in part because they wanted to have 
options. Labor was there for the political reasons of needing to help its 
constituency who had child care problems. The civil rights movement was 
there because it had a stake in these Head Start programs in the South.”52 
The National Welfare Rights Organization, whose interest grew out of the 
day care provisions of President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, joined 
the coalition.53 The American Federation of Teachers and the NEA also 
participated, even though “there was a real emphasis away from early 
childhood education programs in the public schools.”54 The National As-
sociation for the Education of Young Children was an active coalition 
member, while some other early childhood groups were not actively in-
volved.55 Though the coalition was criticized as only involving “the usual 
people who anybody normally would expect to speak up for [child devel-
opment legislation],”56 it successfully brought together diverse constituen-
cies who shared an interest in early childhood policy.57
The coalition worked for months before agreeing on a proposal. It pri-
oritized developmental child care, socioeconomic diversity, parent- 
controlled programs, a substantial investment of new money, and local 
flexibility and control.58 The group brought its proposal to Senator Mon-
dale and Representative Brademas and asked them to introduce it in bi-
partisan fashion. Mondale was receptive and “basically introduced the bill 
the way the coalition felt it should be enacted.”59 Brademas, hoping to gar-
ner Republican support and bowing to the political realities of the House, 
made several changes. The House version of the bill provided for less par-
ent participation and lower authorizations than the Senate version. The 
House version was also silent on the “very crucial question [of] whether 
states or localities would be responsible for the administration of the pro-
gram.”60 It provided that only localities with populations in excess of 
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“blank” would be eligible to do so. No figure was filled in when the bill was 
introduced.61 Despite their differences, both versions of the legislation re-
flected the main goals of Edelman’s coalition.
The proposal called for a comprehensive approach to child develop-
ment that incorporated educational, nutritional, health, and remedial ser-
vices.62 This feature of the proposal reflected the intellectual shifts de-
scribed in chapter 2 of this book. Supporters explained that a custodial 
approach to day care would not serve children’s interests. Mondale argued, 
“The one non- negotiable criterion is that these early childhood programs 
enhance the child’s development rather than simply enabling the mother 
to work.”63 This focus also implied, however, that the coalition and its sup-
porters did not favor a purely educational program. In the context of Head 
Start, Representative Albert Quie (R- MN), a key congressional player in 
early childhood policy, had referred to the danger of “permitting the pub-
lic school educational establishment to place undue emphasis on the edu-
cational aspects and so little on the other aspects of training [children].”64 
Similarly, the coalition believed that only multifaceted early intervention 
programs would have lasting effects. They used Head Start as their model 
and called for “health services, nutrition services, educational services of 
some undefined kind but some educational help, and whatever else kind 
of help that family needed.”65
Socioeconomic diversity represented the second key element of the 
legislation. Neither the Senate nor the House version made comprehen-
sive services available to all children, but both versions laid the foundation 
for a universal program. The original Senate language stated that pro-
grams “should be available as a matter of right to all children regardless of 
economic, social and family background.”66 Mondale said that he hoped 
to “build on the successful experience of Head Start and deliver educa-
tional, health, and nutritional day care services to all children.”67 In the 
words of one opponent of the bill, “The time frame for making the pro-
gram universal was never clearly set forth, but the intention of universality 
was clear.”68 Creating the framework for a universal program was “perhaps 
[the] most revolutionary” element of the proposal (Zigler and Muenchow 
1992, 123).
The universal approach was justified on both policy and political 
grounds. In policy terms, supporters pointed to the potential educational 
benefits of economically integrated programs. In an April speech, Mon-
dale quoted Dr. Edward Zigler, director of the Office of Child Develop-
ment: “The middle- class child does have a number of attributes that the 
poor child could profitably model. By the same token we often find in 
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poor children particular strengths and characteristics worthy of emula-
tion by the middle class child.”69 Brademas referred to the famous Cole-
man Report to make a similar point about the ability of young children 
from distinctive backgrounds to learn from one another. He argued that 
“poor children develop much more rapidly, at least in cognitive terms, 
when they participate in programs with children of middle income back-
grounds than when segregated by family income.”70 As Congress debated 
the legislation, the National Organization for Women described the eth-
nic and socioeconomic integration as critical and concluded, “We cannot 
support programs that further separate the poor from the rest of the pop-
ulation.”71 Civil rights leaders made a similar point in a letter to President 
Nixon, claiming, “By bringing together children of different racial, social, 
and economic backgrounds, the program would provide them with an 
invaluable opportunity to grow up knowing each other as individuals.”72
In addition to lauding the policy impact of a universal program, sup-
porters described it as a political strategy. In the United States, antipoverty 
policies targeted on the poor alone “have not been politically sustainable, 
and they have stigmatized and demeaned the poor” (Skocpol 1991, 414). 
Coalition members alluded to this history in pressing for a universal pro-
gram. One explained, “We don’t have a very good history in this country 
of programs that are available only to the poor. The history of successful 
social programs has been programs that are universally available.”73 Ac-
cording to Marian Wright Edelman, the legislation consciously sought to 
include “middle- class folk” to avoid being called a “poor people’s pro-
gram.”74 Coalition leaders worried that “poor people’s programs were not 
going to be able to command the constituencies that were needed for 
long- term survival.”75 The debate over universality influenced the rhetoric 
that proponents used to justify the legislation, as they emphasized its ben-
efits for all children. It also led to a heated debate about the income level 
at which eligibility should be set. Eligibility levels became a key point of 
contention between congressional leaders and the Nixon administration.
Parent- controlled programs represented a third component of the co-
alition proposal. Conceding that social scientists would offer competing 
interpretations of the child development literature, Edelman claimed, 
“What we do know will make a difference . . . is that families have to be 
involved with children if there’s going to be any long- range effect. . . . There 
is just a limit to what government can do.”76 As a result, she felt that “the 
key decision- making power should rest with parents and families.”77 Pa-
rental involvement would serve two objectives. First, it would lead to bet-
ter outcomes for children, as the education they received and the other 
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lessons they learned would be reinforced in the home. According to devel-
opmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, “If [early intervention] pro-
grams are to have lasting effects they must concentrate not only on the 
child himself, but equally, if not more, on the environment in which he 
lives, especially the members of his family.”78 Second, parental involve-
ment would aid community empowerment, a primary objective of the 
Community Action Program. Many coalition members had been involved 
in that program.
The legislation also called for a substantial investment of new money in 
early childhood programs. Edelman argued that a strong financial com-
mitment from the national government was necessary to reach children 
and families who would not otherwise have access to the kind of help that 
they needed.79 The House version set a lower authorization level than did 
the Senate version, but the cost of the program over the short and long 
term was a key issue. Civil rights leaders argued, “We do not know exactly 
what the program will cost in the years ahead. We do know, however, that 
the cost of not having a program is already too high.”80 Some supporters 
portrayed government spending on early childhood programs as an in-
vestment that would pay for itself over the long term.
Others argued that the financial impact of the legislation would not be 
that large. Brademas, for example, pointed out that it required the creation 
of a child development council and the approval of a comprehensive child 
development plan. These requirements, he argued, would limit financial 
outlays over the short term.81 Despite various attempts to downplay the 
cost issue, some opponents possessed “a very real fear that it’s going to cost 
too much.”82 For a Republican administration that wanted to reform wel-
fare and cut program costs, the potential price tag of the legislation seemed 
“horrendous.”83
The last major component of the proposal was local flexibility and 
control. Indeed, the issue of program administration provoked consider-
able controversy. Some members of the coalition, especially civil rights 
groups, rejected any legislation that granted state governments a promi-
nent role. Their views grew out of their experiences in southern states, 
especially in Mississippi. The state of Mississippi declined to apply for 
Head Start funds in 1965, leading a group of private, public, and church 
organizations to form the Child Development Group of Mississippi 
(CDGM). After CDGM’s first year of operation, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) accused CDGM of mismanaging funds and cut off 
its funding. The grant was given to another group viewed as less threaten-
ing to whites. Edelman, an influential CDGM board member, helped save 
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the program by finding a new director and persuading local leaders to 
work within the system to regain funds. The Mississippi experience none-
theless made her a strong foe of state administration (Zigler and Muen-
chow 1992). She argued that “anybody who was southern, who had been 
working with community- based programs, saw [state administration] as 
the end of all these very good southern programs.”84 In both its initial 
proposal and its lobbying efforts, the coalition fought to preserve local 
control. Critics viewed its position as an overreaction and argued that 
“you cannot build every piece of legislation around what you think might 
happen in Mississippi.”85
In both its House and Senate forms, the Comprehensive Child Devel-
opment Act of 1971 represented a fundamental change in how the national 
government approached early childhood policy. Its ten bipartisan cospon-
sors in the House described it as “the most significant proposal on child 
care ever introduced in Congress.”86 Brademas noted that it offered stabil-
ity and, “for the first time,” a “permanent commitment by the federal gov-
ernment to better the lives of all children.”87 Its key features— comprehensive 
services, socioeconomic diversity, parent- controlled programs, a substan-
tial investment of new money, and local flexibility and control— 
represented a “radical departure from previous government attitudes to-
ward early childhood services” (Steinfels 1973, 18). There was no precedent 
for its extension of national government assistance to nonpoor families, 
and it was not linked to the traditional justifications that characterized the 
emergency nursery schools, wartime day care centers, and Head Start 
(Nelson 1982, 278). Supporters of the bill did not frame it as a temporary 
response to crisis conditions. Instead, they advanced several claims that 
reflected the diverse objectives of the child development coalition, each of 
which was challenged by opponents of the legislation.
The Cases for and against the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act
As members of Congress considered the legislation, they generally fo-
cused on its eligibility requirements, the nature of the services it would 
provide, and the question of prime sponsorship. Even among its support-
ers, there was “a considerable difference of opinion as to the population to 
be served, the content of the program, and the delivery system.”88 By em-
phasizing issues of program structure, Congress arguably neglected the 
fundamental philosophical question of whether national government in-
volvement in early childhood policy was appropriate (McCathren 1981, 
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111).89 Significant public attention to that broader question did not emerge 
until President Nixon vetoed the bill in December 1971, and I will discuss 
it in that context. This section profiles four prominent rationales for na-
tional government involvement and explains how opponents responded 
to each of them.
The relationship between day care and welfare reform was the first ra-
tionale for national government intervention. The child development co-
alition did not emphasize this potential link, but the Nixon administration 
was especially interested in it. Several program indicators suggested the 
existence of a “welfare crisis” in the 1960s. Welfare caseloads, participation 
or take- up rates (the percentage of eligible persons that received benefits), 
and program outlays all grew explosively. Congress made several changes 
to welfare policy during the 1960s, but none of them had the desired effect. 
The expansion of day care availability was viewed as a potential solution 
because it would help “welfare mothers to be able to take jobs or obtain 
training in order to get off the welfare rolls— thus cutting welfare rolls in 
the short run.”90
Critics questioned this connection and pointed to the limited ability of 
earlier reforms either to move welfare mothers into the labor market or to 
provide high- quality child care for their children. For example, one essay 
on the history of day care centers in the United States questioned whether 
they had ever successfully moved women into the labor force. It concluded 
that the historical record was “filled with cautionary tales that scarcely le-
gitimate the kind of inflated rhetoric that we are now hearing” (Rothman 
1973, 13).
Cognitive development was a second justification for national govern-
ment intervention. Supporters believed that all children would benefit 
from child development programs, but they emphasized its potential im-
pact on disadvantaged children. Mondale cited recent research finding 
that “ghetto youngsters lose on the average of 17 I.Q. points between 15 
months and three years of age if they receive no preschool education or 
tutoring.”91 Supporters also claimed that child development spending 
would pay for itself over the long term due to its impact on cognitive de-
velopment and other outcomes, because it would help produce effective 
members of society, reducing future spending on various social programs. 
For example, they claimed that “providing developmental opportunities 
for disadvantaged children [could reduce] the likelihood that they will 
enter welfare rolls in the future.”92 Brademas cited the congressional testi-
mony of Sheldon H. White: “It may turn out to be more sensible to invest 
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heavily in the first years of a child’s life and spend less as he moves through 
elementary and secondary education.”93
Critics of the child development legislation, citing the Westinghouse 
study of Head Start and other sources, doubted that early childhood pro-
grams would be a positive experience. Questioning whether the develop-
mental impact of the programs would be lasting, they contended that 
young children would be better served by remaining at home. In sum, 
they argued that “sending four- year- olds off to school results in far more 
harm than good.”94 They also claimed that supporters were overselling the 
potential benefits of early childhood programs while neglecting their po-
tential drawbacks.
The third rationale for national government intervention was the 
transformation of the American workforce. The proposal would “provide 
adequate day care for the increasing number of children in families where 
both parents work.”95 Supporters of government action argued that the 
day care needs of the American family were not being met. Senator Fred 
Harris (D- OK), for example, referred to a “crisis in the availability of child 
care services.”96 Supporters of the legislation often described a discrep-
ancy between the demand for day care services and the number of avail-
able slots. A June 1971 press release argued that there were “five million 
preschool children in the United States whose mothers work, yet day care 
services are available for only 641,000 of these children.”97 With the num-
ber of working mothers projected to continue on its upward trajectory, 
supporters pressed for government action. Changes in patterns of partici-
pation in the labor force and their accompanying impact on the American 
family, they argued, required greater public investment in early childhood 
programs.
The transformation of the American labor force was due largely to in-
creased participation among women, including the mothers of young 
children. Women’s equality therefore represented a fourth rationale for 
government intervention. Supporters argued that the legislation gave “all 
women, not just the poor, a genuine choice between child care and work 
outside the home.”98 This justification was frequently associated with the 
broader movement for women’s liberation, which included child care 
availability among its major objectives. According to one report, “Twenty- 
four hour community controlled day care was a major cry around which 
women across the country rallied on Women’s Liberation Day, August 26, 
[1970].”99 The movement argued that child care should be available to all 
women regardless of their employment status, run by the people who use 
74 | Early Start
it, viewed as an educational and social experience, and voluntary. Sup-
porters claimed that “there are many mothers who would like to work but 
cannot find adequate day care.”100 Women’s equality was an especially con-
troversial rationale for national government intervention, due to its asso-
ciation with the women’s liberation movement. One observer called this 
connection the political factor “that’s doing [the most] to weaken the 
chances of getting legislation.”101
Opponents of the Comprehensive Child Development Act reacted es-
pecially strongly to the child care shortage and women’s equality justifica-
tions. They denounced the measure in strong terms, bemoaning its impli-
cations for American family life. They argued that day care enrollment 
would weaken the mother- child bond, with harmful consequences for 
children and their families. For example, one letter to House Speaker Carl 
Albert (D- OK) attributed the most serious social problems of the day to 
the breakdown of the family unit, noting, “You must realize that removing 
children from their mothers’ influence for extended periods of time dur-
ing their formative years could prove disastrous.”102 Other critics ques-
tioned the underlying premises of the women’s liberation movement, ar-
guing that most women “find spiritual and emotional satisfaction in being 
the hand that, through rocking the cradle, as the timeworn synecdoche 
has it, comes to rule the world.”103
For some opponents, the notion of government- supported child care 
was especially threatening to their values. The mayor of Belle Glade, Flor-
ida, argued that the bill was “designed to destroy the family and the home, 
place our children in government institutions, and lead us into a totalitar-
ian state.”104 A conservative publication complained that the child devel-
opment legislation would “destroy the nation’s economy, the nation’s mo-
rality, the family unit, law and order, and ALL individual incentives and 
resourcefulness.”105 The strident and alarmist tone of these critiques is 
striking.
Intense rhetorical attacks on the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act were commonplace by the late summer. The legislation was repeatedly 
denounced in harsh terms in Human Events, a publication of the John 
Birch Society. A group of conservative professors from around the coun-
try formed the Committee on Children and produced a report document-
ing the faults of the legislation.106 This elite activity was supplemented by 
the efforts of “independent parents’ groups across the country [that were] 
united in their concern over the diminishing cohesiveness of the family 
unit.”107 Trying to derail the legislation, opponents repeatedly stressed 
themes of parental autonomy and individualism, claiming that American 
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homes should remain “inviolable retreats from busybodies— especially 
federal busybodies.”108
In sum, the child development coalition and its allies claimed that their 
proposal would help welfare mothers in entering the labor force, enhance 
the cognitive development of (disadvantaged) children, meet the growing 
day care needs of the changing American family, and contribute to the 
achievement of women’s equality. The diverse members of the coalition 
privileged these goals to varying degrees but were united by their support 
of the proposal. Opponents disputed all of these claims, deriding the bill 
as “parent replacement” legislation that regarded children “almost as 
wards of the state.”109 They argued that it was fiscally irresponsible, admin-
istratively unworkable, and loaded with family- weakening implications. 
As these battle lines were drawn, however, neither side knew for certain 
whether it could claim the Nixon administration as an ally.
The Nixon Administration and Child Development Legislation
Supporters and opponents spent months attempting to divine the admin-
istration’s position on the Comprehensive Child Development Act. Advo-
cates repeatedly referred to Nixon’s 1969 message to Congress in which he 
promised to “make a national commitment to providing all American 
children an opportunity for healthful and stimulating development dur-
ing the first five years of life.”110 They claimed that endorsing the child 
development bill would enable the president to fulfill his pledge. In devel-
oping and lobbying for its proposal, however, the child development coali-
tion made limited contact with the Nixon administration. A lawyer with 
the Washington Research Project conceded that this inattention to the 
executive branch was “probably the one place where we didn’t do the job 
we should have done.”111 In June, the administration issued a statement 
“indicating interest in some form of a child development bill.”112 This tepid 
endorsement papered over a divide within the executive branch. As the 
legislation continued to wind through Congress, however, “the adminis-
tration pulled more and more away from any interest in and support for 
child development.”113 Consequently, neither supporters nor opponents 
felt confident about presidential support.
According to historian Sonya Michel (1999, 248), the Comprehensive 
Child Development Act “initially caught the Nixon Administration some-
what off guard,” because the administration had been focused on welfare 
reform. Certainly, key players like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Richard 
Nathan placed a higher priority on welfare reform than on child develop-
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ment.114 The amount of bipartisan activity on the latter topic during the 
Ninety- First Congress, however, drew notice from at least some members 
of the administration. In February 1971, HEW secretary Elliot Richardson 
decided to back the House bill from the previous session as long as some 
modifications were made. A departmental work group drafted substitute 
language, submitting its initial recommendations to the secretary just af-
ter the new House legislation had been introduced in March.
In a memo, the departmental work group highlighted several differ-
ences between its proposal and the new House legislation. Even with the 
changes made by Brademas, the new proposal placed a higher priority 
on local and parental control and was “much more community- 
dominated.”115 Prime sponsorship was a key area of disagreement. The 
departmental proposal limited prime sponsorship to states, cities with 
populations of at least five hundred thousand, and Indian reservations. 
The House bill had a more expansive definition, allowing smaller units 
of local government and public or private nonprofit groups to qualify as 
prime sponsors. The composition and role of child development coun-
cils and local policy councils was another area of disagreement, and it 
reflected the broader debate over parent and community control. In-
come eligibility standards, the provision of services for national govern-
ment employees, and the role of the Office of Child Development were 
addressed. The departmental work group also discussed potential legis-
lative strategies, but it did not make a definitive recommendation about 
how Richardson should proceed.116
Although the work group’s memo indicates that HEW was giving seri-
ous thought to child development legislation, it would be a mistake to in-
terpret this stance as the administration’s position. There was a battle 
within the administration between HEW and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). In fact, the HEW memo mentioned that “OMB is 
disinclined to recommend that the administration support child care leg-
islation.”117 OMB believed that publicly funded day care should be “strictly 
limited to families who fell under the provisions of the Family Assistance 
Plan” (Steinfels 1973, 189). This division was crucial, because Richardson 
could not testify on behalf of the administration or enter good faith nego-
tiations with Congress until OMB cleared his position. A House subcom-
mittee held hearings on the legislation in late May and early June. Rich-
ardson and Edward Zigler, director of the Office of Child Development, 
were invited to testify on behalf of the administration, but “they had noth-
ing to say [because OMB] had still not come forward with an acceptable 
position.”118 The Senate extended a similar invitation to the HEW secre-
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tary, and Richardson postponed his testimony three times as he waited for 
clearance.
On June 8, Richardson finally sent Brademas a statement explaining 
that the administration favored a “workable, unified system for adminis-
tering the various child care programs now in place and soon to be en-
acted by the Congress.”119 A Democratic insider summarized this position 
as “indicating interest in some form of a child development bill, controlled 
by the states, no authorizations listed, and considerably less parental par-
ticipation.”120 The statement was widely interpreted as a victory for Rich-
ardson and an unexpected breakthrough, but significant differences re-
mained between what the administration had endorsed and the amended 
legislation moving through Congress. Zigler and another official were not 
well received when they finally testified before a Senate subcommittee, 
even though their testimony “seemed to provide a ‘green light’ for child 
development legislation” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 142).
The primary problem was that the administration was unresponsive to 
what had occurred on Capitol Hill. The original bill had been substantially 
rewritten, and positions on such issues as prime sponsorship had begun to 
harden, but the administration failed to provide “the kind of testimony 
that could be given directly in reference to the bills being proposed; it was 
as though you were speaking into a vacuum. If one were to contemplate 
the ideal child development legislation that the administration would sup-
port, this is what it would comprise.”121 Observers continued to describe 
the administration’s position as “unclear”122 and “hazy”123 because it had 
not engaged the revisions that had already been made. Months had passed 
in which the Office of Child Development’s “hands were tied,” with “no 
way to negotiate seriously and to make any kind of promises on behalf of 
the administration.”124 In a sense, Richardson’s breakthrough was too lit-
tle, too late.
The Child Development Bill Moves through Congress
In attempting to move its proposal through Congress, the child develop-
ment coalition and its congressional allies made two crucial tactical 
choices. The first one, which set them up for significant second- guessing, 
was to conduct a stealth lobbying campaign with limited input from and 
attention to the American public at large. It brought together dozens of 
organizations and sought to line up the necessary congressional support. 
Its campaign “was not an effort to educate the country. It was undertaken 
deliberately that way, because it was thought [to be] best and the quickest 
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way to get it through the Congress.”125 Edelman described this strategy as 
a calculated gamble but a tactical necessity: “It was our judgment that . . . 
if we had any chance of getting it through we were going to have to be very 
quiet, just do our work, line up our support, and move it.”126 This stealth 
approach led one observer to claim that the legislation “was not a popular 
act, it was a lobby of lobbyists.”127 The coalition’s decision not to engage the 
public seemed to affect only the late stages of the congressional policy-
making process.
The second tactical choice made by the coalition and its allies was to 
attach the child development program to a bill extending the life of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity. The OEO was scheduled to expire on 
June 30, 1971, and they assumed that Congress and the president would 
not allow that to happen. They believed that this tactic would permit con-
sideration of the child development program at the earliest possible date 
and enhance its chances of becoming law. This tactical decision facilitated 
the proposal’s movement through Congress, but it was insufficient to pre-
vent a presidential veto.
Several major controversies arose as Congress considered the Compre-
hensive Child Development Act. Program eligibility was a major sticking 
point. Supporters generally viewed a universal program as their long- term 
goal, but the legislation would not serve all children in the short term. 
Services would be free for children living in families with incomes up to a 
certain level, and higher- income families would be able to participate by 
paying a fee. The chief policy issue was where the line should be set. The 
House and Senate versions of the legislation initially drew the line at 
$6,960 for a family of four, a figure the Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) 
had determined as the cost of family consumption.
Critics, including the Nixon administration, argued that a high cutoff 
would increase the cost of the program. After the Senate passed legislation 
with the BLS provision, Richardson sent a letter to House minority leader 
Gerald Ford (R- MI). Noting there that the legislation was inconsistent 
with the administration’s welfare reform proposal, Richardson estimated 
that a program using the BLS standard would cost twenty billion dol-
lars.128 He warned that an unfunded program would lead to a “tragically 
unfulfilled promise to the American people of the kind that has already 
undermined their confidence in the government.”129 Although the figure 
of $6,960 had received strong bipartisan support in committee, the legis-
lation was amended on the House floor to reflect the administration’s pref-
erence. Eligibility for free services would be limited to families making 
under $4,320 per year. The child development coalition and its allies 
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viewed this change as “a very serious problem because it would permit 
targeting so carefully on the poor that there would never be broad enough 
involvement in the program to increase it to meet even a fraction of the 
needs that existed.”130 The discrepancy between the House and Senate ver-
sions of the bill would eventually be reconciled by a conference commit-
tee, with the House prevailing on the eligibility issue.
Another sticking point was the issue of prime sponsorship, which be-
came “the principal item of debate during [the legislation’s] journey 
through Congress” (McCathren 1981, 106). The Nixon administration felt 
that prime sponsorship should be limited to state governments for reasons 
of administrative feasibility. It would mean that there would be no more 
than fifty administrative bodies to monitor, regulate, and fund (Steinfels 
1973, 205). Richardson relented slightly on this stance in his June state-
ment, outlining a program in which “for cities with a population of 
500,000 or more an option for self- designation as prime sponsor is avail-
able if the chief elected official requests such a designation through the 
governor.”131 As has already been discussed, many members of the child 
development coalition were skeptical of a state- based approach and felt 
that local boards would be more sensitive to the needs of poor and minor-
ity children. Mondale expressed similar reservations. He argued that any 
grant to the states “gets to be pretty thin by the time it reaches the end of 
the pipeline. It is terribly important that we make money available directly 
to community groups and directly to local governments.”132
The issue of prime sponsorship came to a head in the House, where 
Brademas battled his own committee chair, Representative Carl Perkins 
(D- KY), over the population cutoff. Brademas and Republicans on his 
subcommittee had agreed on a figure of one hundred thousand. Republi-
cans pledged to support the bill if this major feature, which they perceived 
as providing a “positive role for the states,” was retained.133 Perkins, in 
contrast, wanted to lower the figure to ten thousand. Republicans joined 
forces with a few Democrats to defeat the chair’s amendment in commit-
tee, but Perkins was successful on the House floor. This amendment in-
creased the number of eligible localities and “had the effect of stripping 
the bill of almost the entire Republican support it had in the House.”134 
State officials were alarmed by this change. Even before it was made, the 
National Governors’ Conference sent a letter to Albert Quie (R- MN) in 
which it complained that the House proposal “would, in effect, bypass 
state governments.” The conference pressed for “a strong state role with 
related federal safeguards.”135 Congress essentially ignored this entreaty. 
One Republican congressional staffer claimed that the governors “really 
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didn’t get organized” and were “totally lost in the process.”136 Their limited 
impact on the Comprehensive Child Development Act stands in sharp 
contrast to the prominent state government role during later debates over 
early childhood policy.
As Congress considered the legislation, insiders predicted an espe-
cially tough fight on the Senate floor. One staffer foresaw “some tough, 
close votes that could go either way on several issues like local vs. state 
control, parental involvement, and eligibility for other than poor chil-
dren.”137 Indeed, the first real opposition became evident as the Senate 
debated the bill in September. Senator James Buckley (Conservative- NY) 
“launched a whole attack on the concept of child development” and “de-
nounced [the bill] as an effort to impose federal control over all American 
children.”138 With administration backing, Senator Robert Taft Jr. (R- OH) 
introduced six amendments to narrow the scope of the child development 
program. The amendments would have, among other things, lowered the 
income eligibility threshold for free services and limited the role of child 
development councils. The floor managers of the bill successfully defeated 
all six amendments, which received support from conservative Republi-
cans and several southern Democrats.139
The climax of the Senate debate occurred when Taft introduced a mo-
tion to recommit the bill to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee with 
instructions to delete the child development program. The motion was de-
feated, 17– 46. On September 9, the Senate passed the bill by a 49– 12 roll- 
call vote. The House followed suit three weeks later, adding the comprehen-
sive child development program to the OEO bill on the floor. The House 
passed the OEO extension by a 251– 115 roll- call vote on September 30.
The House and Senate bills differed significantly on prime sponsor-
ship, parental control, and other features of the child development pro-
gram. As a result, the bill went to a conference committee. The conflict 
between Perkins and Brademas persisted. Perkins, using his prerogatives 
as committee chair, took the unusual step of not appointing the sponsor of 
the bill to the conference committee. Perkins feared that the legislation 
would negatively affect his rural district, a concern shared by others who 
represented similar areas, but his decision to exclude Brademas from the 
conference committee was also described as “petty” and “personality ori-
ented.”140 Conferees adopted a provision permitting localities with a pop-
ulation of five thousand or more to be designated as prime sponsors if 
they met certain requirements. This provision “infuriated House Republi-
cans because they felt that the conference committee had ignored their 
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views” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 145). Five of the six House Republican 
conferees refused to sign the conference report because they objected to 
the proposed delivery system. The provisions for prime sponsorship also 
generated staunch opposition from both Democratic and Republican gov-
ernors (Cohen 2001).
The conference committee spent significant time debating who would 
receive free child development services and what type of fee scale would 
be established for those above the cutoff. The Senate version made free 
services available for families of four with annual incomes below $6,960, 
while the comparable figure in the House version was $4,320. Mondale 
and Quie attempted to negotiate a compromise, but Richardson insisted 
on the lower figure. Eventually, Richardson endorsed a compromise on 
the fee schedule. It adopted the House cutoff for free services, incorpo-
rated a “very modest fee” for those making less than $6,960, and gave the 
HEW secretary the authority to set a sliding fee scale for families above 
that level.141 As the conference concluded and House Republicans ex-
pressed their qualms about the delivery system, however, Richardson 
“wrote a strange letter which in essence removed his initial support.”142
The child development coalition and its congressional allies generally 
praised the conference report. The American Academy of Pediatrics urged 
its adoption and described its emphasis on the community level as “re-
sponsive to the needs of individual children and communities.”143 The 
League of Women Voters concurred, stating, “Those who see in this legis-
lation threats of federal control over the minds of children should recog-
nize that it is precisely the requirements for local prime sponsorship and 
parental participation that protect against just that danger.”144 Alluding to 
the difficult conference negotiations and a possible presidential veto, 
Mondale praised the conference report and expressed his hope that “the 
compromise [on free services] would prevent a threatened Administra-
tion veto.”145 Opponents of the child development section argued that it 
would be expensive and impossible to administer and that it intruded on 
parental autonomy. On December 2, the Senate adopted the conference 
report by a 63– 17 roll- call vote. The vote in the House took place five days 
later and was much closer, due in part to administration lobbying and a 
concerted effort by minority leader Gerald Ford to defeat the conference 
report. The House adopted the report by a 211– 187 roll- call vote, with 135 
of the opposition votes coming from Republicans. The Comprehensive 
Child Development Act of 1971 was then sent to the president as part of 
the OEO bill.
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The Veto
The Nixon administration’s position on the Comprehensive Child Devel-
opment Act remained unclear and puzzling to conference committee par-
ticipants. Supporters hoped for a favorable outcome because the proposal 
responded to the president’s call for a national commitment to the first five 
years of life, reflected the top priority of the 1970 White House Conference 
on Children and Youth, and enjoyed bipartisan support in both houses of 
Congress.146 After the measure finally cleared Congress, “the signals came 
very clearly that the president was probably going to veto the bill.”147 The 
president returned the measure without his approval shortly after the 
House approved the conference report. By that point, the occurrence of 
the veto was not as surprising as its tone. Written by Patrick Buchanan, the 
president’s veto message harshly denounced the child development pro-
gram and “offered a sweeping indictment of the whole concept” (Zigler 
and Muenchow 1992, 147).
The veto message criticized other aspects of the OEO legislation but 
described the child development section as its “most deeply flawed provi-
sion.”148 It acknowledged the need for additional day care services in the 
United States but criticized the measure for its “fiscal irresponsibility, ad-
ministrative unworkability, and family- weakening implications.”149 The 
proposed cost of the program was one hundred million dollars for plan-
ning and program development in fiscal 1972 and two billion dollars in 
fiscal 1973. Nixon argued, “[T]he expenditure of two billions of dollars 
[sic] in a program whose effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated cannot 
be justified. And the prospect of costs which could eventually reach $20 
billion annually is even more unreasonable.”150 In terms of program ad-
ministration, the president criticized the child development program for 
relegating the states to an “insignificant role” and “creating a new army of 
bureaucrats.”151 He claimed that the low population cutoff “actively [in-
vited] the participation of as many as 7,000 prime sponsors— each with its 
own plan, its own council, its own version of all the other machinery that 
has made Head Start, with fewer than 1,200 grantees, so difficult a man-
agement problem.”152
Supporters of the child development program were especially offended 
by the language the president used to describe its negative implications for 
the American family. Nixon closed his veto message by asserting, “For the 
federal government to plunge headlong financially into supporting child 
development would commit the vast moral authority of the national gov-
ernment to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against 
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the family- centered approach.”153 This portrayal of the child development 
program struck a chord with many Americans, tapping into their strong 
distrust of the national government and appealing to the ideal of parental 
autonomy. Conservative columnist James J. Kirkpatrick argued that the 
veto “ranks among [President Nixon’s] finest state papers of recent 
months.”154 Supporters of the bill denounced the tone of the veto message. 
Brademas later called it “one of the most inaccurate and demagogic mes-
sages ever penned by an American president.”155 An attorney with the 
Washington Research Project said, “It was just a cruel and very deceiving 
veto message.”156
Observers attributed Nixon’s rhetoric to several factors. Some pointed 
to the president’s standing with the conservative wing of the Republican 
Party. During the summer, the John Birch Society, the American Conser-
vative Union, the Mormon Church, and several other conservative orga-
nizations had launched a letter- writing campaign against the child devel-
opment proposal. By the time Nixon issued his veto, he faced increasing 
pressure from this constituency after announcing his intention to visit 
China. In addition, conservative representative John Ashbrook (R- OH) 
had recently announced that he would run against Nixon in the 1972 Re-
publican primary. The child development program therefore “offered the 
president an opportunity to regain some of the support he might be losing 
with the trip to China. That is, he couldn’t cancel his trip to China, but he 
could veto this and echo some of the concerns about communal upbring-
ing and governmental control that the right wing had been offering.”157 
One observer stated simply, “I personally think the president made a very 
practical political decision that he had more to gain from vetoing it than 
from signing it.”158
The coordinated conservative lobbying campaign was especially note-
worthy in the absence of anything comparable among the bill’s supporters. 
One insider claimed, “It was the right wing that mobilized, and the liberal 
coalition supporting child development did not. No public outcry ensued. 
One lesson certainly to be learned from all of this, is that [supporters 
spent] too much time talking to each other and not enough time in find-
ing ways to mobilize and inform public opinion.”159 This observation in-
dicts the coalition’s tactical choice to attempt to move the bill through 
Congress without a grassroots campaign. Conservative organizations pro-
duced an avalanche of letters against the proposal, but supporters could 
not generate a comparable wave of public support.
Several observers questioned the political skill and effectiveness of the 
child development coalition, while others argued that it ultimately failed 
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to achieve its objectives due to its unwillingness to compromise.160 One 
Republican Senate staffer said of the coalition, “They felt it was an all or 
nothing ballgame, or at least that was the impression that they gave; and I 
still feel that we would have had something had they been willing to bar-
gain more.”161 Coalition leaders rejected the charge that they had not been 
sufficiently flexible. Edelman said, “It’s very clear to me in retrospect, and 
looking at the president’s message, that whatever bill we’d done would still 
have resulted in his vetoing that bill. He had no intention of signing it.”162
Other observers attributed the veto message to the declining fortunes 
of the administration’s welfare reform proposal. Historian Elizabeth Rose 
(1999, 215) explains, “When it became clear that his larger welfare reform 
measure was unlikely to pass, however, [the president] decided he had 
little use for a large- scale day care program and vetoed the bill.” Indeed, 
the presidential veto message made multiple references to the Family As-
sistance Plan, noting that it had been before Congress for over two years 
and characterizing the child development provisions as duplicative.163 The 
conflict between welfare reform and child development legislation high-
lights the difficulty of adopting innovative policy changes if they are not a 
high presidential priority (Thomas 1975, 174). In a 1975 interview, Quie 
noted that “major legislation has tended to come from an administration” 
during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies.164 The Comprehensive Child 
Development Act was a congressional initiative that was developed with 
minimal input from the executive branch. One staffer argued that a prom-
inent source of the veto was the fact that the bill was being compared to 
Medicare even though it was not a presidential initiative: “I think it would 
be difficult for any president . . . to stand up and sign a bill which he had 
not requested, a bill of this magnitude.”165 Signing such a bill, he argued, 
would implicitly acknowledge that the administration had failed to recog-
nize an important societal problem and that Congress had made up for 
the shortcomings of the executive branch.
Conclusion: The End of the Beginning
The strident tone of the veto message had its intended effect. On Decem-
ber 10, the Senate failed to override the veto. The vote was 51– 36, with 
twenty- nine Republicans and seven southern Democrats backing the 
president. Thirteen Republican senators who had previously voted for the 
conference report switched positions and voted to sustain the veto. Thus 
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the remarkable story of the Comprehensive Child Development Act came 
to an end.
Many child development advocates were disheartened by this turn of 
events. One member of the Office of Child Development said that a “post-
partum depression” swept over the agency and was shared by many indi-
viduals on Capitol Hill.166 The veto squelched any enthusiasm in the House 
of Representatives for a child development bill, as Perkins and others con-
cluded that developing new legislation would ultimately be an exercise in 
futility.167 With the benefit of hindsight, several scholars have pointed to 
the veto as a crucial turning point in the evolution of early childhood edu-
cation and care in the United States. David Kirp (2004) characterized it as 
the moment when “the national movement for universal preschool came 
heart- breakingly close to success.” Joan Lombardi (2003, 4) used similar 
language, claiming that the veto “set the child- care agenda back for de-
cades: While other countries moved ahead, the United States stood still.”
Such assessments overlook that the debate over the appropriate gov-
ernmental role in child development never really ended. As will be de-
scribed in chapter 5 of this book, the Senate pressed ahead with revised 
legislation in 1972, even though supporters recognized that they faced an 
uphill battle. For Edelman and other leaders of the child development co-
alition, the veto simply was not a reason to halt their campaign. She ex-
plained, “You go back year after year until you get it. It’s going to be harder 
to get it now, there’s going to be more debate. But it seems to me if you’re 
committed to a thing you go back.”168 The decentralized institutional 
structure of the American political system meant that child development 
supporters did not necessarily have to go back to Congress to achieve their 
policy goals. They could and did turn to other institutional venues, most 
notably the states. This tactical choice produced some political successes 
but also contributed to the long- term fragmentation of early childhood 
policy.
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4 |  Venue Shopping, Federalism, and  
the Role of the States
One of the distinctive features of the American political system is the ex-
tent to which it decentralizes political authority. This institutional frag-
mentation can impede the adoption of expansive policies, but it also pro-
vides multiple access points for reformers. Frustrated in one institutional 
context, reformers can try to achieve their goals in another setting, a phe-
nomenon known as venue shopping. Child development advocates were 
disappointed by Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act and their failure to override it, and many of them concluded that de-
veloping new congressional legislation would be an exercise in futility. The 
implausibility of success at the national level did not, however, eliminate 
the possibility of policy change. Instead, it simply meant that advocates 
would have to turn to another institutional venue to achieve their goals.
Congress continued to consider comprehensive child development 
legislation, but federalism allowed advocates to shift their focus to the 
state level. Supporters of a more expansive government role in early child-
hood education concluded that they needed “to pay a lot more attention to 
state governments than we have in the past.”1 The states were favorable 
terrain for their efforts, because state lawmakers were frustrated by their 
relatively limited role in the debate at the national level. Governors and 
other state leaders felt that the Comprehensive Child Development Act, 
with its controversial provisions for prime sponsorship, had essentially ig-
nored the states. Some of them attributed this outcome to “the ineffective-
ness of the representation of state interests and capabilities to Congress.”2 
The Education Commission of the States (ECS) used a grant from the Of-
fice of Education to launch its Early Childhood Project. The project aimed 
to facilitate better communication between Congress and the states and to 
disseminate policy- relevant information to interested state- level actors.
The combined efforts of child development advocates and professional 
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associations like the ECS bore substantial fruit in the early to mid- 1970s. 
States across the country established offices of child development to im-
prove the administration and coordination of programs for the very 
young, funded social services for children who were too young to attend 
primary school, and established preschool projects. By the middle of the 
decade, the ECS could reasonably claim that the state- level momentum in 
early childhood education “has become increasingly purposeful and so-
phisticated. The capacity of the states to plan and provide services for 
young children and their families is clearly on the rise.”3 This state- level 
activity in the aftermath of Nixon’s veto did not result in the creation of a 
comprehensive child development program, but it reshaped the structure 
and politics of early childhood education over both the short term and the 
long term.
Early State- Level Activity and the Education Commission  
of the States
At a December 1972 conference, former South Carolina governor Robert 
McNair described his experience testifying before Congress on the Com-
prehensive Child Development Act. When McNair claimed that its provi-
sions for prime sponsorship would lead to overlap and waste, the “re-
sponse from several of the more vocal members of the House Select 
Subcommittee on Education was ‘But what have the states done in the 
early childhood field? Do you come to us with clean hands?’” McNair re-
called, “Misplaced as I thought their emphasis was, it was difficult to 
answer— then.”4 The former governor’s reflections summarize one of the 
major themes of this chapter: the pace of state- level activity in early child-
hood policy picked up considerably in the early 1970s.
State governments were involved in early childhood policy before the 
debate over the Comprehensive Child Development Act, but their efforts 
were limited. Fueled by the National Kindergarten Association (NKA), a 
national umbrella organization, one arena of state- level activity was the 
provision of state funds for kindergarten. The NKA was structured as a 
national umbrella organization and included “broad representation from 
academia, elite society, and educational organizations” (Beatty 2001, 170). 
Its lobbying effort exemplified successful venue shopping. Thwarted in its 
effort to pass a national kindergarten bill, the group lobbied for universal 
public kindergarten in states and localities. In 1967, an ECS survey re-
vealed that thirty- three states provided public funds to school districts 
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that instituted kindergarten programs. Several states mandated kinder-
garten as an integral part of their public schools. A 1967 Colorado law, for 
example, required schools to establish kindergarten by September 1970 to 
maintain accreditation, and a Massachusetts law passed that same year 
required kindergartens in every school district in the state by 1973.5 The 
movement toward universal kindergarten continued into the mid- 1970s. 
At that point, it was an established public responsibility in most parts of 
the country, and the NKA board of directors “decided it had fulfilled its 
mission and dissolved the organization” (Beatty 2001, 175).
In the late 1960s, there were also hints of increased interest in child 
development more broadly. For example, in 1969, West Virginia received 
a small planning grant from the Appalachian Regional Commission. It 
used the grant to develop plans for seven regional demonstration centers 
in early childhood education, an important development in a state “with 
no specific planning being done in early education, no existing public sup-
ported early education programs to serve as models, a serious lack of cer-
tified early education teachers, and limited experience in interagency co-
ordination and cooperation in the delivery of services to children.”6 The 
following year, two of the centers were funded by the same commission. 
Their successful operation led the legislature to fund the remaining five 
demonstration centers in 1971. On November 1, 1971, Governor Arch 
Moore issued an executive order that created the Interagency Council for 
Child Development Services.7 Even though these developments possessed 
limited reach, the speed with which they occurred in a state that had dem-
onstrated limited prior interest in early childhood policy is striking.
The Education Commission of the States took several steps that high-
lighted its growing interest in early childhood education.8 In 1967, one 
year after its founding, the ECS “endorsed Early Childhood Education as 
a top priority education need in practically all the states.”9 Working with 
nine Washington- based professional associations, the organization put to-
gether a packet of materials that it mailed to key legislators and other se-
lect figures in each of the states.10 The packet included a cover letter an-
nouncing that “the staff of the Education Commission of the States stands 
ready to assist you” in developing early childhood programs.11 At the or-
ganization’s annual meeting in 1968, ECS commissioners adopted the fol-
lowing resolution: “The value of and need for early childhood education 
has been established to such a degree that there is no longer any basis for 
questioning ‘whether’ early childhood education should be provided, only 
‘how’ and ‘when.’”12 They called on Congress to “increase early childhood 
education funds for disadvantaged pupils, provide incentives for more 
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state and local financial effort, and consolidate federal programs in this 
area.”13 ECS commissioners expressed similar concerns at a September 
1968 meeting with the secretary of health, education, and welfare and the 
commissioner of education. They lobbied for a “functional block grant for 
early childhood education or some other effective means .  .  . to provide 
strong incentive for the inclusion of this level of education in all school 
systems.”14 By the late 1960s, the ECS viewed early childhood education as 
one of its top programmatic priorities.
ECS continued to work on early childhood education into the next 
decade. In 1970, ECS chairman and Utah governor Calvin Rampton 
formed a twenty- four- member Early Childhood Task Force. It published 
a report on program alternatives in child development in June 1971.15 In 
addition to providing state policymakers with basic data “on the most im-
portant alternatives for state- supported child development services,” the 
report contained several recommendations.16 It recommended using a 
comprehensive approach including children younger than three and their 
parents; instituting training programs for children and parents in their 
homes; and developing classroom programs for three- , four- , and five- 
year- olds through an expansion of Head Start. It also recommended that 
states establish credentials in early childhood education or provide for a 
specialization in early childhood education. Finally, it suggested that states 
develop sound principles of financing for their early childhood programs, 
so that “early childhood education is treated as an integral part of the 
state’s overall education program.”17
The second phase of the task force was known as the Early Childhood 
Project. Its purpose was to “provide assistance to the states to initiate or 
expand services for young children and their families through improved 
state coordination of delivery systems.”18 The project received an initial 
grant of $92,814 from the U.S. Office of Education,19 and its activities in-
cluded reviews of statewide activities, expert testimony, assistance in 
drafting legislation and executive orders, consulting and technical assis-
tance, and the dissemination of policy- relevant information.20 A related 
goal of the project was to serve as an “organized mechanism to express 
state concerns to the federal government.”21 The project had a horizontal 
component, facilitating information exchanges among state officials, and 
a vertical component, representing state officials at the national level.
The priorities of the Early Childhood Project shifted subtly in the after-
math of Nixon’s veto. One of its first endeavors was to develop a list of 
“target states” and assist them in initiating or expanding their early child-
hood programs.22 In August 1972, the task force reviewed the project’s first 
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few months and recommended priorities for its second fiscal year. It de-
cided to move away from venue shopping and reduce its emphasis on tar-
get states. The thirty- three states that had asked to participate in the proj-
ect faced similar challenges, so the task force concluded that it should 
focus on these common concerns and complete “draft model legislation 
for state use in setting up an appropriate structure for administering early 
childhood programs.”23
The ECS also hosted conferences that facilitated information ex-
change among the states. The conferences “[brought] together people 
with decision- making responsibilities to analyze the issues which they 
all face and to evaluate the techniques which they are utilizing.”24 They 
complemented the documents published by the commission and en-
abled state leaders to learn from one another’s experiences. The Early 
Childhood Project hosted its first conference on implementing state 
early childhood programs in December 1972. More than two hundred 
persons from thirty- seven states attended the conference, which fea-
tured several nationally known experts in child development.25 A 
speaker from California who described a bill that had recently been 
signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan explained, “[S]ome pre-
school and Head Start teachers were threatened by [our] approach. Al-
though they worked for the program, they began to back away. . . . Peo-
ple sometimes have stakes in what is the status quo. They may vocalize 
on change, but they may be afraid.”26 The feedback dynamic he de-
scribed, in which reformers needed to accommodate actors with a stake 
in the status quo, foreshadowed future developments at the state and 
national levels.
The Early Childhood Project received a continuation grant from the 
U.S. Office of Child Development in 1973. It added “several new emphases 
to its ongoing program of assisting the states in improving their services to 
young children and their families.”27 The project’s focus shifted to strength-
ening the family, early screening of handicapping conditions, child abuse 
prevention, day care licensing codes, and revenue sharing.28 After receiv-
ing a fourth year of funding from the U.S. Office of Child Development, 
the Early Childhood Project sponsored three regional conferences in 
1975.29 Each conference lasted three days and was devoted to needs assess-
ments, child abuse prevention, and day care issues. The conferences “were 
designed to provide technical assistance to state decision- makers.”30 The 
commission retained its interest in early childhood education policy, but 
the conferences represented the last major undertaking of the Early Child-
hood Project, which disbanded in October 1975.31 Thereafter, the commis-
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sion would pursue its goals without the formal institutional apparatus that 
the project represented.
Forces for and Obstacles to Change at the State Level
The presidential veto provoked responses in other institutional venues 
that provided the basic framework within which American early child-
hood policy subsequently evolved. It spurred a series of reactions and 
counterreactions that had a profound effect over both the short term and 
the long term. Increased activity at the state level was especially signifi-
cant. This activity was driven by two forces whose convergence produced 
various policy changes across the country. Child development advocates 
represented the first force. Their desire for a departure from the status quo 
and their pessimism about the prospects for change at the national level 
led them to search for more- favorable political terrain in the states. State 
officials represented the second force. Frustrated by their inability to influ-
ence the national debate, state- level actors, working through such organi-
zations as the ECS, devoted considerable time and attention to the issue of 
child development.
In the early 1970s, Milton J. E. Senn conducted dozens of interviews 
with the individuals involved in what he called the “child development 
movement.” A common topic in these interviews was the role of the states 
in early childhood policy. Several interviewees described increased state 
activity as desirable. A former Republican staffer called for “voluntary ef-
forts” at the state level and argued that a state- based strategy was more 
likely to be successful: “It’s quicker than having to wait for federal legisla-
tion, which is always then going to have the same specter of socialism 
about it, and . . . that’s going to turn off more people who need persuad-
ing.”32 Another Republican staffer added, “I’m pretty much convinced that 
the only way that we’re really going to see a nationwide network of the 
kinds of services that children need is probably to come at it . . . through 
the localities and through the states [and] through the local school sys-
tems.”33 These points of view reflected the emerging Republican consensus 
that the states should have a prominent role in any child development bill.
Others agreed about the role of the states. A staff scientist at the Foun-
dation for Child Development stated bluntly, “I think the state situation 
has to be taken into account. If there is a child development bill, the states 
cannot be left out completely.”34 An attorney working with the Children’s 
Defense Fund, which had been founded by Marian Wright Edelman in 
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1973, predicted, “The day is coming when we are going to accomplish at 
least as much, if not more, at the state level, because the federal govern-
ment has in so many areas done such a miserable job and wasted so much 
money; at least that’s the way people feel.”35 Similarly, Provost Nicholas 
Hobbs of Vanderbilt University, a child psychologist, claimed, “[The 
states] are becoming increasingly important, and they should become 
important— money will flow through state governments.”36 Thus actors 
with diverse backgrounds and political perspectives viewed the states as 
an increasingly viable institutional venue for the development of child de-
velopment policies.
Importantly, many state officials were open to the idea of expanding 
early childhood education programs. Several forces contributed to their 
openness. The debate over the Comprehensive Child Development Act 
brought heightened attention to the issue, raising its political profile at the 
state level. Marian Wright Edelman explained the political ramifications 
of these congressional developments, “It made the states aware there really 
was a constituency out there, which is one of the things you shouldn’t for-
get. . . . It showed them there’s gold in their mines in terms of money for 
them . . . [and] they now want to talk to us more and more and are inviting 
us to more and more of their meetings.”37 The ECS Early Childhood Task 
Force, made possible by financial support from the Carnegie Foundation, 
institutionalized this state- level interest. Through its contribution and 
“perhaps unknowingly,” the foundation “set up a group that has become 
very important in the state interest in early childhood development.”38
The congressional debate was also significant due to the content of the 
bill that the president vetoed. As has already been mentioned, many state 
officials were frustrated with their lack of input. They believed, with some 
justification, that the Comprehensive Child Development Act had privi-
leged local governments and community organizations over the states. 
Many state officials were interested in early childhood policy as a way both 
to improve the lives of young children and to defend state prerogatives 
against national encroachment. The states therefore provided favorable 
political terrain for those who were frustrated with developments at the 
national level and wanted to find a new institutional venue in which to 
pursue their goals.
The fifty states did not offer equally favorable political terrain for the 
proponents of expanded governmental activity, however. Advocates 
seemed more likely to succeed in some states than in others. For this rea-
son, one component of the venue shopping of the early 1970s was an as-
sessment of potential target states. A major goal of the ECS Early Child-
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hood Project, as has already been described, was “providing assistance to 
selected target states in initiating or expanding their early childhood pro-
grams.”39 For the ECS to become involved in a state, its governor had to 
request such assistance with the backing of the chief state agencies admin-
istering early childhood programs. By April 1972, twenty- nine states had 
asked to be considered for selection as target states, an enthusiastic re-
sponse that illustrated the state- level interest in this issue. The commis-
sion relied on several criteria in making its final determination, but the 
first criterion listed in one newsletter, “state commitment to early child-
hood services,” was revealing. With its goal of beginning intensive activity 
in no more than four states by October, the organization sought to build 
on existing state- level activity.40 This strategy was later employed by uni-
versal preschool advocates in the 1990s and early 2000s.
In addition to recognizing that their probability of success depended on 
the specific states in which they pursued their goals, child development ad-
vocates realized that they would need to clear many of the same hurdles they 
had confronted in Congress. First, government programs designed to assist 
families with young children were likely to be characterized as intrusive. An 
ECS report explained, “Attempts to support and guide the direction of fam-
ily efforts in childrearing can quickly raise fears for the sanctity of the family. 
Some persons and groups feel such efforts to be an intrusion into private 
life, bordering on socialism.”41 One consultant attributed resistance to day 
care licensing standards in Massachusetts to Americans’ “strong strain of 
‘rugged individualism’ that makes [them] uncomfortable with authority.”42 
As a result, advocates often described government programs as a “supple-
ment to the family that does not try to replace the family.”43
Supporters of an expanded governmental role in early childhood pol-
icy believed that they could overcome this cultural predisposition by 
framing their proposals as maintaining or even expanding parental choice. 
They therefore prioritized flexibility and the availability of diverse options. 
One advocate argued, “We can no longer allow the myth to continue that 
developmental goals can be achieved only through center arrangements.”44 
The availability of center- based and home- based care was the subject of 
much discussion, and the appropriate role of the public school system fur-
ther complicated this issue. Many child development advocates agreed 
with commissioner of education Terrel Bell, who argued that “the neigh-
borhood elementary school ought to assume a new role as a source for 
delivery of services for children in the neighborhood.”45 Indeed, the ap-
propriate locus of control over child development programs became a 
central element of the congressional debate of the mid- to late 1970s.
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The cost of child development programs represented a second hurdle 
to their enactment. At a December 1972 conference, Edward Zigler, who 
had served as the first director of the Office of Child Development and 
had been involved in the administration of Head Start, described pre-
school programs as expensive and concluded, “If this society had all of the 
money in the world, a universal preschool program would be to my lik-
ing. . . . When I think of all the problems of children in this country and 
all the problems of the schools, one more year of early education does not 
seem terribly important. It should not be a high priority.”46 The cost of 
early childhood education and care was also an issue for targeted and less- 
comprehensive state programs. A December 1975 ECS report noted, “Day 
care is perhaps the service most in demand and most expensive to pro-
vide.”47 It proposed several ways to fund this service, including giving tax 
credits to industry, providing small business loans for persons wishing to 
start new centers, setting up centers as part of the high school curriculum, 
making creative use of federal funds, and adding day care to a kindergar-
ten program. Program cost had been a pressing issue during the congres-
sional debate, and it also bedeviled lawmakers at the state level.
The issue of parental involvement generated considerable controversy. 
Reformers hoped state programs would enable parents to become more 
involved in their children’s lives. They feared that a lack of continuity be-
tween program and home would prevent the programs from reaching 
their potential. Some advocates called for state programs modeled on 
Head Start and community action projects.48 Most advocates agreed about 
integrating parents into any child development program, but they dis-
agreed on the amount of authority parents should exercise. Should parents 
have jurisdiction over such issues as budgeting, staffing, and program de-
sign? How should the membership and administrative responsibilities of 
key decision- making committees be determined? Some educators argued 
that parental involvement required a partnership between parents and 
professionals. One program administrator explained, “To me, the prob-
lem is not that parents don’t care or want to work with us. Too often, I’m 
afraid, they are stiff- armed by school administrators; they aren’t welcomed 
or wanted. We educators must take the initiative in reaching out a hand to 
bring parents in to share in significant policy decision making.”49 Generat-
ing a desirable level of parental involvement preoccupied policymakers 
and professionals alike as they debated how to proceed.
Another area of concern was overlap and duplication among existing 
federal and state programs. The director of Florida’s new Office of Early 
Childhood Development explained, “[W]ithin the many federal and state 
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programs, there is much overlapping and much duplication of effort; con-
fusion, frustration, and reduction of benefits have resulted.”50 He was due 
to leave his post after only one year, and he said that one of his biggest 
challenges was to “draw in enough state agency people and people from 
the private and public sector so that . . . they will pick up the ball and run 
with it.”51 His experience illustrates how supporters of policy change must 
often generate “buy- in” from existing stakeholders if they are going to be 
successful. The challenge of program fragmentation would become more 
difficult over time and represented both an administrative obstacle and a 
political obstacle to major change.
In sum, the institutional structure of the American political system en-
abled advocates to turn to the fifty states. Nevertheless, this shift in venue 
did not guarantee success, and advocates had to think carefully about both 
the objectives they would pursue and the terrain on which they would 
pursue them. Several states took action in early childhood policy in the 
years immediately following Nixon’s veto, but the policy shifts that re-
sulted did not create state- level programs that were as ambitious as the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act. One widespread policy change, 
in fact, was a bureaucratic reform whose goal was simply to improve the 
coordination and delivery of services to young children and their families.
Offices of Child Development
The heightened interest in the education and care of young children led 
dozens of states to establish offices of child development in the early and 
mid- 1970s. This administrative reform addressed the programmatic frag-
mentation that scattered services for children and their families among 
five or six different agencies. The relevant agencies included health depart-
ments responsible for immunizations, education departments offering 
special education, and welfare departments administering a range of child 
and family services. Advocates of expanded governmental activity viewed 
the creation of state offices of child development as an indication of “an 
increasing awareness of the need to coordinate services to children and 
families, and to allocate public funds in ways that will enhance family vi-
ability and ensure the maximum development of human potential.”52
Several factors contributed to the creation of state offices of child de-
velopment. The congressional debate over the Comprehensive Child De-
velopment Act played a crucial role. In a 1973 interview, Marian Wright 
Edelman explained, “Since [the veto], the states have understood that 
96 | Early Start
there is going to be child development one way or another and they ought 
to get in it. And you have a lot of states now beginning to open up their 
offices of child development. I think it’s more style than substance.”53 An-
other advocate was more sanguine about the benefits of these administra-
tive changes, calling the offices “one of the good things that’s come out of 
the veto.”54 He claimed that even if states did not establish the comprehen-
sive programs advocates preferred, the mere existence of the offices meant 
they would be prepared if the national government became willing to send 
them money for child development programs. A September 1973 ECS re-
port mentioned that very possibility and suggested that state lawmakers 
designate the office as the state’s prime sponsor for any child development 
programs authorized by Congress. Such a designation, it argued, “pro-
vides a way for a state to be ready to take advantage of federal legislation 
which may be enacted at some future date, if a state wishes to be in that 
position.”55
Other national developments contributed to the creation of state of-
fices of child development. In the mid- 1970s, an ECS report claimed that 
this activity could be attributed to “a combination of ideas, forces and 
events.” Contributing factors included the creation of Head Start and 
other programs in the mid- 1960s, a continuing increase in the number of 
working mothers in the United States, the 1970 White House Conference 
on Children and Youth, and the initiation of the federal Community Co-
ordinated Child Care program.56 In addition, the Nixon administration 
had established the Office of Child Development within the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1969. The creation of state offices of 
child development mimicked administrative developments at the national 
level.
While the national debate brought heightened attention to the need for 
a coordinating agency at the state level, some of the earliest state activity 
occurred in the period leading up to Nixon’s veto. A 1969 amendment to 
the Appalachian Act enabled the Appalachian Regional Commission to 
fund child development programs. Several states took advantage of these 
funds to create interagency committees for child development. The Ar-
kansas Governor’s Council on Early Childhood Development was created 
through an executive order in 1969,57 and a December 1971 executive or-
der established the Mississippi Child Development Council.58 Other in-
teragency committees were created legislatively. In 1971, the state legisla-
ture in North Carolina passed a bill establishing that state’s Governor’s 
Advisory Commission on Children and Youth.59 These and other agencies 
“helped to create interest in other states, provided the impetus for action 
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by serving as specific examples of the need for planning and coordination 
and served as models from which the [office of child development] con-
cept evolved.”60
State- level interest in the coordination of early childhood services 
soon became national in scope. It took on a standardized form as more 
states referred to the agencies as offices of child development. One of the 
first states to do so was Idaho, where Governor Cecil Andrus established 
the state’s Office of Child Development by executive order in November 
1971. It was located in the Office of the Governor, which gave it the “clout, 
rights, and privileges” associated with the state chief executive, as well as 
“the necessary interdepartmental support for reorganization and coordi-
nation of children’s services.”61 In Colorado, an executive order created the 
Governor’s Commission on Children and Youth, in a state where “until 
recently there were no efforts to coordinate existing early childhood pro-
grams or develop a comprehensive state plan.”62 In 1972, Massachusetts 
established its Office for Children within the Executive Agency of Human 
Services. One of that office’s goals was to assure “the sound and coordi-
nated development of all services to children.”63 In Minnesota, a planning 
group began to develop recommendations for the governor about how to 
“create a mechanism within state government for coordination of child 
development and child care programs, research, training, and technical 
assistance.”64
The movement to establish state offices of child development gained 
additional momentum in 1973. By January, the ECS had published a book-
let containing model legislation that had been drafted by the commission’s 
Early Childhood Task Force. A separate newsletter described the bureau-
cratic reform as an administratively desirable way for the states “to demon-
strate their willingness to take the initiative in child development programs, 
rather than being put in the position of reacting to federal legislation.”65 
This portrayal, combined with the commission’s advice to designate the 
office as a prime sponsor for any congressional child development pro-
grams, illustrates how state officials had become more assertive about their 
role in early childhood policy. This assertiveness had not been evident dur-
ing the debate over the Comprehensive Child Development Act. Only two 
years later, state officials viewed themselves as key stakeholders in this pol-
icy arena and mobilized to protect their prerogatives.
By February 1973, twelve states, in every region of the country, had cre-
ated offices of child development. They included Alaska, Arkansas, Flor-
ida, Idaho, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.66 In May, Louisiana gover-
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nor Edwin Edwards signed an executive order establishing an office of 
early childhood development within the department of education. Similar 
executive orders were being considered in Washington and Utah.67 Sev-
eral states considered the administrative reform during their 1973 legisla-
tive sessions. Legislators in Colorado introduced a measure that “closely 
followed the model legislation drafted by the ECS Early Childhood Proj-
ect.”68 Similar bills were introduced in Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, 
and New York, and the Hawaiian legislation was enacted into law in June. 
Supporters attributed this outcome to the obvious need for reform, the 
involvement and support of key administrators, and “a policy commit-
ment on the part of the governor to the basic concept incorporated in the 
legislation.”69 State- level activity continued into the summer, as confer-
ences on child development were held in Arkansas and Louisiana.70
Fourteen state offices of child development existed by July 1973, with all 
but one of them established in the previous two years.71 That year, admin-
istrators in twelve states voted to create the National Association of State 
Directors of Child Development. The newly elected president of the pro-
fessional association explained that its two primary objectives “would be 
to exchange information and promote child development programs and 
related services in all states, and to strengthen the voice of the states in 
setting national policies in those areas.”72 The group soon began to pursue 
its second objective. Its members unanimously endorsed a resolution call-
ing on President Nixon to name a permanent director of the Office of 
Child Development; the post had been vacant for over a year. The direc-
tors also “voted to develop legislative criteria to be used to measure the 
acceptability of federal child development legislation,” agreeing to meet in 
December to adopt guidelines.73 The creation of the professional associa-
tion and its early activities illustrate the increased assertiveness of state 
officials in this policy arena.
State activity continued in 1974. That year’s volume of the Council of 
State Governments Suggested State Legislation included the model legisla-
tion developed by the ECS.74 A law establishing an office of child develop-
ment gained enactment in Tennessee, and similar legislation was consid-
ered in Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and West Virginia. The Tennessee statute granted the new of-
fice “broad authority for comprehensive child development programs for 
children under six.”75 In Massachusetts, the legislature endorsed the Chil-
dren’s Budget, which provided eighteen million dollars in new state mon-
ies for children’s services throughout the state. It funded an expanded pre-
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school program for the physically handicapped and included five hundred 
thousand dollars to “finance the first year of new demonstration day care 
projects designed for children from all families . . . on a sliding scale ba-
sis.”76 The governor of Idaho broadened the scope of that state’s Office of 
Child Development to include all human services programs.77 Child de-
velopment advocates suffered a setback in Florida, however. The legisla-
ture refused to appropriate any funds to that state’s Office of Early Child-
hood Development, effectively terminating its operations.78
The widespread establishment of state offices of child development was 
important for both policy and political reasons. In policy terms, the offices 
were viewed as a way to coordinate the planning and delivery of services 
for young children and their families and to ameliorate the programmatic 
fragmentation and duplication that characterized existing arrangements. 
The goal of this administrative reform was to “use the existing govern-
mental structure more effectively and to control increasing expenditures 
by reducing the duplication of services and directing state planning to-
ward a preventive orientation.”79 Proponents believed that the offices 
would help coordinate the work of state and local agencies and the public 
and private sectors, enabling states to use their manpower and financial 
resources as effectively as possible.
The political impact of the state offices was equally significant. They 
signaled heightened state interest in early childhood policy and gave state 
officials an institutional foothold through which they could attempt to de-
fend their perceived interests. The founding of the National Association of 
State Directors of Child Development was important, as was the establish-
ment of the Association of Early Childhood Specialists in State Depart-
ments of Education in April 1974. These professional associations promoted 
the exchange of policy- relevant information among interested parties and 
lobbied for programs at the state and national level. A September 1975 letter 
illustrates the latter dynamic. Writing to one of the congressional champi-
ons of child development legislation, the former president of the National 
Association of State Directors of Child Development argued that the states 
deserved a more prominent role in such legislation. Focusing on the state 
offices, he claimed, “[W]hile much of the movement in the states is of re-
cent vintage, it is significant. I respectfully urge you to give every consider-
ation to encouraging these efforts by providing support . . . for those states 
that have shown their good faith and capability to do statewide planning 
and coordination.”80 State lawmakers could also point to several other steps 
that gave them a stronger stake in this policy arena.
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Other Policy Changes at the State Level
The establishment of state offices of child development illustrated how 
more states needed a bureaucratic apparatus to coordinate early child-
hood services. State governments were increasingly active. Both the num-
ber and size of state early childhood programs grew considerably during 
the early to mid- 1970s. States conducted “needs assessments” to determine 
the ideal and present levels of services available. They provided public 
support for various forms of prekindergarten services and developed cer-
tification requirements for prekindergarten teachers, paraprofessionals, 
and administrators. These policy shifts did not establish comprehensive 
child development programs, but they nevertheless gave state officials an 
expanded stake in this policy arena.
Demographic changes spurred state officials to conduct “needs assess-
ments” in their jurisdictions. Rising numbers of working mothers de-
manding day care for their children, in combination with troubling trends 
in nationwide infant mortality and poverty rates, led some observers to 
conclude that American children faced increasingly problematic condi-
tions. The goal of a needs assessment was to generate practical knowledge 
about what children needed in a particular jurisdiction. More than a sim-
ple service inventory, a needs assessment typically began with a statement 
of such broad goals as the ability of all children to realize their cognitive 
potential. It then discussed a potential service that would contribute to the 
achievement of the goal and compared its availability to the number of 
children in the state who would benefit from it. This process was intended 
to assess the desirability of expanding existing programs and establishing 
new ones. Those conducting a needs assessment were encouraged to think 
about how they were going to implement its results. Coalition building 
and convincing the broader public that the needs merited a governmental 
response were crucial elements of a successful assessment. In addition, a 
needs assessment would only become a viable plan of action if it ranked 
the needs it identified and accounted for the political and fiscal realities of 
the state in which it was conducted.81
Needs assessments, in sum, combined a statement of goals with data 
on the status of children and families. Their goal was to give “state policy-
makers and the public  .  .  . a clearer idea of what services and programs 
exist, what further resources are needed and what kinds of services are 
desired.”82 At its 1967 annual meeting, the ECS adopted a resolution call-
ing on the states to conduct something like a needs assessment. It stated, 
“Each state is urged to set up a broadly- based task force to study the avail-
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able resources and recommend the commitments necessary to establish a 
comprehensive program of educational experiences for all preschoolers in 
the state.”83 Needs assessments were supposed to be comprehensive, in-
corporating health care and other issues in addition to education. Many 
states conducted needs assessments over the next decade, often under the 
auspices of the councils and offices of child development described in the 
previous section. The assessments were especially common in the after-
math of the debate over the Comprehensive Child Development Act. A 
May 1976 report stated, “The majority of the states indicate that they have 
initiated or completed some type of assessment procedures within the last 
three years.”84 Many of the assessments focused on services for young chil-
dren and their families.
A few examples illustrate the wide range of social services examined by 
needs assessments. In Alabama, the Interdepartment Coordinating Com-
mittee for Early Childhood Development conducted a study in approxi-
mately half of the state’s counties on the need for health, nutrition, educa-
tional, and social services for children between the ages of one and six. In 
Arkansas, the Office of Early Childhood Planning conducted a statewide 
needs assessment of services for children from birth to age eight in such 
areas as early education, child care, and health care. Indiana’s state com-
mittee for the Community Coordinated Child Care program conducted a 
statewide survey to assess the status of licensed day care centers for chil-
dren between the ages of three and five. The Child Development Planning 
Project in Minnesota carried out a statewide analysis of the full range of 
services available to children from birth to age six. In Utah, the Office of 
Child Development conducted a statewide needs assessment survey of 
day care services, preschool and kindergarten education services, and 
child welfare services for children from birth to age eight.85
The widespread performance of needs assessments illustrates the 
heightened state- level interest in early childhood policy. In the early to 
mid- 1970s, many states also funded social services for children who were 
too young to attend primary school or established preschool projects. 
Needs assessments were significant not only in and of themselves. They 
also reflected a broader interest in policy change and, in some states, 
helped bring about such change. The ECS, because it viewed early child-
hood policy as a top programmatic priority, carefully tracked these 
changes through various reports and surveys that provide a useful lens 
through which to view state- level activity.
A 1972 survey examined state spending patterns and certification re-
quirements. It asked about kindergarten and preschool programs and 
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concluded that “public support for kindergarten and other early child-
hood services is growing.”86 It found that forty- two states provided some 
form of state aid for kindergarten. State aid for prekindergarten was lim-
ited; only twelve states offered some form of public support. It was more 
common for states to provide “pre- first graders” such state- supported ser-
vices as medical and dental care, nutritional programs, or special pro-
grams for the handicapped. At least thirty states offered such services, 
which were typically targeted at the economically disadvantaged or the 
handicapped. Certification requirements for preschool teachers and ad-
ministrators, which existed in twenty- four states, also signaled increased 
interest in early childhood policy. The survey tracked the number of col-
leges with degree programs in early childhood education and the number 
of junior or community colleges with associate degree programs.87 In 
terms of public funding, services, and certification requirements, state in-
volvement in early childhood policy was widespread.
The ECS conducted a follow- up survey two years later. Its results sug-
gested additional movement between 1972 and 1974, and a report on the 
survey concluded that “public support for kindergarten and other early 
childhood services continues to grow.”88 This growth was more evident 
along some dimensions than others. Even by 1974, for example, state fund-
ing for prekindergarten programs was “still the exception rather than the 
rule.”89 Only eleven states (California, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washing-
ton, and West Virginia) provided public support, which represented a 
slight decline. However, the number of states offering “pre- first graders” 
other state- supported services, such as medical and dental care, nutri-
tional programs, or special programs for the handicapped, rose from 
thirty in 1972 to thirty- eight in 1974. The certification of professionals 
working in early childhood was also slightly more common. Half of the 
states required certification for prekindergarten teachers and administra-
tors by 1974, while the number of states requiring certification for prekin-
dergarten paraprofessionals rose from two to six.90
The certification of paraprofessionals garnered significant interest in 
the early 1970s and led to the creation of the child development associate 
(CDA) credential. The U.S. Office of Child Development and three early 
childhood organizations developed the credential. Motivated by “the 
growing need for skilled child care workers to provide quality programs 
for young children in the United States” (Hinitz 1998, 88), they assumed 
that the skills needed to work with children were not related to a specific 
number of credit hours in formal college- level courses but could be ac-
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quired through a properly structured training program.91 A consensus on 
the original competency standards was reached in 1974, even though crit-
ics argued that it was “too oriented toward the needs of educational pro-
grams such as Head Start and preschools, and shortchange[d] the per-
sonal, affective requirements of a round- the- clock day care center.”92
In May 1975, the ECS Early Childhood Project distributed a report 
tracking state- level policy shifts in early childhood policy. Based on vari-
ous sources, the report listed legislation on “the very young and educa-
tion” that passed in 1974. Seventeen states established preschool projects 
or began preschool activity that year. This count provides a conservative 
estimate of state- level activity, because it does not include bills that were 
vetoed, failed, or were carried over or bills that fell into related categories. 
Even this conservative estimate indicates the breadth of state action in the 
aftermath of the presidential veto. Most of the projects were compensatory 
in nature and served disadvantaged populations. They did not provide 
universal access to preschool or related services. For example, the primary 
purpose of a Connecticut project was to provide a learning experience for 
preschool children with learning disabilities. A project in Illinois provided 
an early intervention program for three- and four- year- old children who 
exhibited sensorimotor, language, or conceptualization delays or disor-
ders or social affective disorders. Maryland provided early childhood ser-
vices to the hearing impaired and the visually impaired. A North Dakota 
project supplemented the minimal services available to preschool chil-
dren in the rural northwestern region of the state, with a special emphasis 
on serving the learning disabled.93 These projects illustrate the widespread 
interest in early childhood programs but suggest that most policy initia-
tives were targeted rather than universal.
In the fall of 1975, the ECS conducted a telephone survey whose goal 
was to “determine what the priorities for young children were, some of the 
major barriers to meeting those priorities and predictions of future 
trends.”94 One to three persons were interviewed in each of the states 
about their top priorities. Day care, cited as a priority in thirty- nine states, 
ranked as the third- highest priority overall. A report on the survey men-
tioned that one obstacle to increased day care funding was the “reluctance 
of some legislators to authorize programs that might ‘take the child away 
from the home,’” explaining that some state legislators did not accept “a 
mother’s right to work.”95 It suggests that the state- level debate over day 
care funding echoed the themes that were prevalent during congressional 
discussions of child development.
Respondents identified several areas of concern with respect to exist-
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ing programs. They worried about the efficiency and cost- effectiveness of 
their service delivery systems and about fragmentation and duplication of 
services. Worried about not having sufficient staff to administer the ex-
panding state programs, they advocated additional training programs for 
in- house staff. Many respondents also cited such barriers to implementa-
tion as insufficient capabilities for data collection and a lack of public 
awareness. The activities described in this chapter, such as the creation of 
state offices of child development and the performance of needs assess-
ments, sought to address some of these concerns.
The foreword of the report touched on the states’ relationship with the 
national government. It acknowledged that “the federal government is set-
ting the top priorities for children in the United States,” but it was highly 
critical of national policymaking.96 According to the foreword, national 
government activity and funding helped set state political agendas, but 
these national priorities “are not arrived at systematically” and “are far 
from comprehensive.”97 Furthermore, the foreword noted that the ten-
dency of national agencies to bypass state governments and work directly 
with localities promoted additional fragmentation, duplication, and inef-
ficiency. Combined with the examples cited elsewhere in this chapter, the 
tone of the foreword suggests a new assertiveness among state officials in 
early childhood policy.
Conclusion: The States as Stakeholders
By the mid- 1970s, the states had become a major locus of policymaking 
activity. Some supporters of the early childhood movement nevertheless 
remained frustrated with the pace of policy change. At the annual confer-
ence of the National Association for the Education of Young Children in 
November 1975, the ECS Early Childhood Project arranged a symposium 
for educators and state leaders. Many members of the three- hundred- 
person audience “expressed great frustration in trying to accomplish con-
crete gains in early childhood programs.”98 Their efforts had not led to the 
development of the kind of widespread, comprehensive programs they felt 
were necessary in order to serve the needs of young children and their 
families, and one panelist even suggested that the early childhood move-
ment may have passed its peak. There were legitimate reasons for this 
frustration. By December 1975, services like early health screening, family 
counseling, preschool, and day care were “available in only a limited num-
ber of communities and usually only to families on welfare or otherwise 
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deemed likely to require welfare assistance in the future.”99 Those who felt 
that most American families needed access to these services were dis-
mayed by their limited availability.
Focusing solely on the limited reach of state- level early childhood pro-
grams, however, fails to recognize their short- and long- term significance. 
Offices of child development and preschool projects gave state officials an 
increased stake in this policy arena, and some observers speculated that 
these tentative initial steps were a sign of things to come. One observer 
predicted that “the trend over the last four, five years toward looking more 
to the states is probably .  .  . going to go further.”100 Indeed, that was the 
goal of many of the state lawmakers who worked through such organiza-
tions as the ECS in their efforts to expand the governmental role in early 
childhood policy. They hoped heightened state activity would demon-
strate to doubters in Congress and elsewhere “that the states have not only 
the will but the capacity to play a major role.”101 The Comprehensive Child 
Development Act had largely bypassed the states, and state officials were 
determined not to be overlooked in future legislation. Thus the venue 
shopping of the early 1970s altered the political contours of the broader 
debate over early childhood policy, establishing an increasingly powerful 
stakeholder whose preferences would have to be taken into account.
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5 |  Congressional Activity and the Dissolving 
Early Childhood Coalition
As state officials established early childhood programs in the early and 
mid- 1970s, Congress continued to debate the appropriate role for the na-
tional government in this policy arena. The demise of the Comprehensive 
Child Development Act did not settle the issue, even though the measure’s 
supporters recognized that major policy changes were unlikely. This chap-
ter examines the congressional aftermath of Nixon’s veto, during which 
comprehensive initiatives like the Child and Family Services Act of 1975 
and narrower proposals like the Child Care Act of 1979 faltered. Preschool 
advocates scored important victories, however, by establishing and de-
fending more- limited government interventions. The treatment of depen-
dent care expenses in the Internal Revenue Code evolved, with important 
changes that broadened the reach of tax relief and facilitated the prolifera-
tion of many different types of child care (Michel 1999, 237). Enrollment in 
and spending on the Head Start program grew, and its beneficiaries and 
defenders acquired additional political clout.
By the end of the decade, preschool education in the United States 
looked considerably different than it had at the beginning of the 1970s, in 
terms of both its general features and its political dynamics. This chapter 
explains how the congressional developments of the 1970s fragmented 
early childhood policy while simultaneously giving disparate actors a 
stake in existing arrangements. The absence of a comprehensive national 
approach, paired with the state- level developments described in chapter 4, 
helped solidify the decentralized nature of this policy realm as enrollment 
in private- sector preschool programs, generally serving a more affluent 
clientele, rose dramatically. This multifaceted evolution transformed the 
politics of early childhood by restructuring the preferences of various ac-
tors, making it more difficult for them to coalesce around a single policy 
prescription. Perhaps the most striking development of the 1970s was the 
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dissolution of the coalition supporting a comprehensive child develop-
ment program. Members embraced the idea of government involvement 
in this policy realm, but they disagreed on the form that such involvement 
should take. The increased political activity of such groups as the Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers brought this disagreement to the fore.
Action in the Senate, Inaction in the House
The sweeping language of Nixon’s veto convinced many supporters of 
child development legislation that, in the words of one official, “[i]t was 
pretty clear that nothing much was going to happen.”1 The bipartisan con-
sensus on the need for government action had evaporated, especially in 
the House of Representatives. The controversial actions taken by the con-
ference committee in 1971 and the opposition of the Nixon administration 
caused many House Republicans to shy away from the issue. A bipartisan 
group of senators was undaunted, however. When Congress reconvened 
in 1972, Senators Gaylord Nelson (D- WI), Jacob Javits (R- NY), and Robert 
Taft Jr. (R- OH) joined Walter Mondale (D- MN) in sponsoring the Com-
prehensive Headstart, Child Development, and Family Services Act. The 
bill proposed “a network of preschool educational services for low- income 
children and developmental day care programs for youngsters whose par-
ents are working.”2 Participation in all programs would be voluntary.
Supporters claimed that the bill demonstrated their desire to resolve all 
“reasonable differences between the Administration and Congress.”3 Ad-
dressing the controversy over prime sponsorship, the bill raised the popu-
lation requirement from five thousand to twenty- five thousand, a shift 
that reduced, by more than two- thirds, the number of localities eligible to 
serve as prime sponsors. Other features of the revised legislation, includ-
ing the increased powers of mayors and governors serving as prime spon-
sors, caused supporters to argue that it was more administratively work-
able than the vetoed legislation had been. It also retained the fee schedule 
from the vetoed legislation, included an increased authorization for staff 
training and planning, and reduced authorizations for the first operational 
year by 40 percent, from $2 billion to $1.2 billion. In a May press release 
after the bill cleared the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, 
Mondale asserted that “these and other changes adequately meet the con-
cerns expressed by the president when he vetoed the original bill.”4
The revised legislation also gave the states a more prominent role in 
program administration. It “reserved ten percent of the funds for use by 
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the states to encourage comprehensive state cooperation and planning” 
and allowed five states to be funded on a demonstration basis as the sole 
prime sponsor of programs.5 These concessions did not satisfy state offi-
cials. Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee, chair of the Education Com-
mission of the States, claimed, “[T]hese alterations do not go far enough 
to meet the objectives of our established policy. There are still major flaws.” 
He criticized the measure’s provisions for prime sponsorship, argued that 
its local policy councils would “dilute the responsibility” of state and local 
officials, and said that the bill would “complicate the planning and coordi-
nation of comprehensive state child development programs and services.”6 
In June, Senator Peter Dominick (R- CO) introduced an amendment that 
gave the secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
the authority to choose between competing state and local prime sponsors 
on the basis of their effectiveness. The successful passage of the Dominick 
amendment substantially increased the opportunities for states to serve as 
prime sponsors. The Senate eventually passed the Comprehensive Head-
start, Child Development, and Family Services Act by a 73– 12 vote.
The bill received an unfavorable response outside the Senate chamber. 
Many liberals felt that its Democratic sponsors made too many conces-
sions. The Dominick amendment was a source of particular concern. One 
supporter argued that Nelson and Mondale “pretty much gave the other 
side everything they wanted.”7 These concessions were insufficient to gen-
erate any enthusiasm among conservatives. According to the Emergency 
Committee for Children, “While the rhetoric of the new bill has been 
made less offensive to the traditions of the family, the substance of the 
program remains the same.”8 It criticized the bill’s cost and administrative 
provisions and argued that it would cause irreparable harm to children 
and families by undermining parental authority. Furthermore, the in-
volvement of the national government “in the hitherto private area of 
family life” was labeled a “precedent to totalitarianism.”9 The new Senate 
bill did not win over its most conservative critics.
Perhaps more important, the proposal generated minimal support in 
the House of Representatives. According to one observer, “There was sim-
ply nobody to pick up the ball in the House. . . . and there was no way to 
get people together again on the bill.”10 Several factors worked against 
House action, foremost among them the opposition of Republicans who 
claimed that the revised proposal simply substituted a vast expansion of 
Head Start for the child development title in the previous bill.11 They ar-
gued that any “expansion of Head Start or any other child development 
program must come through the public school systems.”12 This critique 
indicated that House Republicans envisioned an educational approach.
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In addition to several substantive differences of opinion, political fac-
tors were also at work. Senate opponents had not defeated the bill, but 
they slowed down its consideration through various procedural maneu-
vers. By the time the House took up the new bill, the looming election cast 
doubt on its prospects. Many southern Democrats hoped to avoid votes 
on social issues that might identify them with the presidential campaign 
of Senator George McGovern (D- SD); they preferred to spend the rest of 
the term campaigning in their districts. Some observers speculated that 
House Republicans were reluctant to compromise because they antici-
pated a landslide victory that would give them a House majority.13 A com-
bination of policy and political factors prevented House action on the 
Senate bill.
After the 1972 elections, child development returned to the congres-
sional agenda. Several House members introduced bills that would have 
used a system of prime sponsors at the community level to provide child 
care services, with priority given to economically disadvantaged children 
and to the children of working mothers or single parents. The proposals 
differed in their authorization levels, provisions for prime sponsorship, 
child care standards, and fee schedules. None of them, however, earned 
the same prominence or came as close to passing as did the Comprehen-
sive Child Development Act.
The Ninety- Third Congress (1973– 74) took three actions with regard to 
child care. First, it enacted the Social Services Amendments of 1974, which 
affected the child care services provided under Title IV- A of the Social Se-
curity Act. Second, it passed the Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and 
Community Partnership Act of 1974, which extended the authorization for 
that program and made some changes. The passage of these two laws il-
lustrates the early fragmentation of government programs. The national 
government provided child care funds through multiple sources. Third, 
Congress held hearings on the pressures facing the modern American fam-
ily.14 These hearings highlighted the “tremendous increase in the number 
of mothers who are working” and the “virtual disappearance of the ex-
tended family” (Mondale 1975, 14). They also laid the foundation for an-
other congressional effort at comprehensive child development legislation.
The Child and Family Services Act of 1975
In some ways, the congressional debate over the Child and Family Ser-
vices Act of 1975 resembled the earlier debate over the Comprehensive 
Child Development Act. Advocates of increasing the national govern-
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ment’s role in early childhood policy introduced an ambitious measure 
that preserved the core features of the bill Nixon vetoed. Many of its sup-
porters had been members of the original coalition that Marian Wright 
Edelman assembled, and they used similar rhetoric to illustrate the “need” 
for legislation. Likewise, many of their opponents had been involved in 
the 1971 debate, and the highly charged rhetoric on which they relied was 
even more intense than it had been four years earlier. Like its predecessor, 
the Child and Family Services Act did not become law.
In other ways, however, the 1975 congressional debate illustrated subtle 
shifts in the politics of early childhood policy. Not much time had passed 
since the veto, but a different constellation of actors had an interest in the 
topic. For example, developments in the intervening years gave the states 
a more pronounced role in this policy arena. Similarly, the American Fed-
eration of Teachers, which played a peripheral role in 1971, became “ac-
tively involved in negotiations over the form and substance of new initia-
tives” (McGill- Franzen 1993, 70). Its involvement ignited a debate among 
supporters about the appropriate role of the public schools. The coalition 
began to dissolve as its members advanced competing visions based on 
their self- interest.
The Lessons of 1971
Reflecting their earlier experiences, backers of the Child and Family Ser-
vices Act adjusted the content of their bill and their political strategy. In 
the fall of 1973, the day care coalition presented a proposal to congressio-
nal leaders that resembled the vetoed legislation but included some lan-
guage from the 1972 Senate bill. Its major changes included a first- year 
authorization of two hundred million dollars for training and planning, 
with an authorization of “such funds as necessary” to follow in subsequent 
years. The proposal favored localities, but it made greater state involve-
ment possible by eliminating the population threshold for prime sponsor-
ship and imposing a requirement that potential prime sponsors demon-
strate their ability to coordinate programs.15 Child development advocates 
viewed their greater openness toward state involvement as essential. In 
February 1973, one supporter argued that state governments would have 
to be incorporated into any child development bill.16 Their proposal also 
returned full administrative and policy control to the child development 
councils and made changes to the fee structure.17
The coalition delivered its proposal to Mondale and Javits in the Senate 
and to Brademas in the House. Although Brademas took a more skeptical 
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view than his Senate colleagues, the coalition proposal provided the tem-
plate for bills that were introduced in 1974 and 1975. Brademas described 
the 1974 House version of the bill as “somewhat more modest” than the bill 
Nixon vetoed in 1971. He noted that it placed a stronger emphasis on “the 
planning and development of programs prior to their actual implementa-
tion.”18 Even so, the Child and Family Services Act remained ambitious 
legislation.
In terms of political strategy, supporters made a concerted effort “to 
avoid the anti- family image Nixon had tagged on the 1971 bill” (Mc-
Cathren 1981, 122). The bill’s title reflected this objective. It included the 
word family to reflect advocates’ belief that one could not help children 
without assisting their families. They hoped that framing the proposal as a 
family support program would “make politicians feel better” and give it 
“much more political appeal.”19 The coalition had redrafted the bill line by 
line with that goal in mind, and its congressional allies tried to convince 
their colleagues that the child development program would not infringe 
on parental prerogatives. Mondale claimed that the bill would “strengthen 
the role of the family as the primary and fundamental influence on the 
development of the child,” by giving parents “the opportunity to choose 
among the greatest possible variety of child and family services” (Mondale 
1975, 15).
Advocates portrayed the Child and Family Services Act as family- 
strengthening legislation. They stressed that participation would be vol-
untary and that children would be eligible “only after a written request 
from the parents or guardians has been received.”20 Brademas noted that 
the bill “requires parental involvement at every stage in the planning, de-
velopment, and implementation of programs.”21 By emphasizing defer-
ence to parental prerogatives, supporters attempted to combat the charge 
that the bill was incompatible with mainstream American values. Sup-
porters frequently mentioned that the bill was supported by many re-
spected organizations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
United States Catholic Conference, the League of Women Voters, the Na-
tional Council of Churches, the Education Commission of the States, the 
United Auto Workers, and the American Association of University 
Women.22 They argued that this broad support indicated that the bill was 
not the radical proposal that its critics described. They also emphasized 
that it possessed broad bipartisan support and was “similar to provisions 
recently advocated by a Republican congressional task force and by both 
parties in their platforms at their 1972 national conventions.”23
Supporters of the bill nevertheless acknowledged that they faced an 
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uphill battle. The political and economic context had changed since the 
veto. Some of these changes were specific to the issue of early childhood. 
In March 1975, political scientist Gilbert Steiner described “an increasing 
fracturization of the children’s cause” and worried that supporters would 
find themselves “cutting each other up and making no advances whatso-
ever.”24 The increasing prominence of the states and the American Federa-
tion of Teachers, which will be described in more detail shortly, exacer-
bated this fragmentation. In addition, resistance to national government 
involvement was stronger than it had been in 1971, when more partici-
pants “had sort of a benign view of Head Start and thought it was kind of 
like nursery school and, well, nursery school’s okay.”25 These benign views 
changed as policymakers and the public became more familiar with the 
stakes involved in early childhood policy.
The limited political prospects of the Child and Family Services Act 
also reflected broader changes in American society and politics. Historian 
Edward Berkowitz (2006) describes 1974 as the dividing line between 
postwar and modern America. As the country experienced a slumping 
economy, a growing national debt, and galloping inflation, the creation of 
major new domestic programs became increasingly difficult. In addition, 
the Watergate scandal led to the inauguration of a new president. Gerald 
Ford was more conservative than his predecessor, and in keeping with his 
efforts to “whip inflation,” he sought to reduce government spending on 
education, child development, and many other social programs. The Wa-
tergate scandal also affected public opinion, leading Americans to be more 
skeptical and less trusting of their government. The scandal contributed to 
a Democratic landslide in the 1974 elections, but the victors operated in a 
new policymaking environment in which “ambitious federal social pro-
grams were off the table” (Berkowitz 2006, 232). The combination of “eco-
nomic malaise and political crisis sent the welfare state into retreat” 
(Schulman 2001, xv).
Most supporters of the legislation acknowledged that it was unlikely to 
pass. The coalition did not “expect passage or enactment of a major bill in 
the next year or two” and viewed it “more as a vehicle on which to keep the 
issue alive and on which to hold hearings.”26 In a 1977 speech, Brademas 
isolated two crucial obstacles: “In the first place, we knew that President 
Ford would have vetoed the bill and that we simply would not have had 
the votes to override such a veto. Secondly, we knew that such were the 
strains upon the budget for the immediate fiscal year that we would not 
have had the money to authorize the amounts contained in our original 
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bill.”27 Knowing that success was unlikely, however, did not stop advocates 
from pressing their case.
The Rationale for the Child and Family Services Act
In addition to portraying the Child and Family Services Act as family- 
strengthening legislation, advocates relied on many of the same argu-
ments they had advanced in 1971. They described the bill as a cost- effective 
response to demographic changes. Women, including mothers with young 
children, continued to join the workforce in record numbers. This trend 
created a “revolution in labor- force expectations,” as “it became the norm 
for women to work outside of the home during the seventies” (Berkowitz 
2006, 68). In a November 1974 speech, the director of the Women’s Bureau 
claimed that “the availability of child care is often the pivot upon which a 
woman’s decision to work or remain at home turns.”28 The rising number 
of preschools and kindergartens that served American children offered 
mostly part- day programs.
Day care centers generally offered schedules that were a better fit for 
working mothers, but proponents argued that there were too few slots to 
meet the “increasingly urgent need” for day care.29 For example, Brademas 
claimed that “six million children under the age of six have mothers who 
work, while there are only one million places in licensed day- care centers 
for these children.”30 In December 1974, a Congressional Research Service 
report concluded that day care as an institution was insufficiently respon-
sive to important societal changes.31 Trends in women’s participation in 
the labor force, increases in the number of single- parent families, and de-
clines in average family size led developmental psychologist Urie Bronfen-
brenner to conclude, “It’s clear that something has got to be done, and 
enough people are going to become involved that they’ll make that fact 
known.”32
Supporters of the bill also argued that it was a wise long- term invest-
ment. For example, Mondale lamented that many children were “placed in 
understaffed day care centers that destroy the mind and spirit.”33 Through-
out his 1972 reelection campaign, Mondale argued that these “cheated 
children . . . often turn up in institutions for the retarded . . . in unemploy-
ment lines . . . and in prisons. And the American taxpayer picks up the tab 
in the increasing cost of welfare, unemployment compensation, crime and 
other programs that symbolize our failure.”34 Proponents argued that 
spending money on child development programs would reduce future 
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spending on various social services. Their claims about the “need” for 
child development legislation and its cost- effectiveness were not new, and 
a loud chorus of critics rejected their arguments.
The Opposition Campaign and the Anonymous Flyer
Like their adversaries, opponents of a more expansive role for the national 
government in early childhood policy relied on familiar arguments. They 
seemed to be in a strong political position in 1975. Resistance to a child 
development program had increased, and economic and political changes 
made the creation of major new domestic programs increasingly difficult. 
The political battle over child development had been a formative moment 
for the “New Right, whose remarkable growth, beginning in the early 
1970s, derived in part from its opposition to universal child care” (Michel 
1999, 238). Opponents of the Child and Family Services Act were well or-
ganized, forming the National Coalition for Children to combat the pro-
posal. The coalition represented parents’ groups in forty states and the 
American Conservative Union. It described itself as a “veritable army of 
parents, church- goers, and other citizens comprising a genuine grassroots 
movement which has arisen in opposition to a decade of federal imposi-
tion of programs and values to which the Judeo- Christian tradition is 
mostly opposed.”35 The emergence of this grassroots network, which was 
joined by other opponents, helps explain why the opposition campaign 
was especially intense.
Some critics questioned the need and desirability of a child develop-
ment program. One essayist argued that “the day- care ‘emergency’ we are 
being told about doesn’t exist, and didn’t exist in 1971 when the revolution-
aries began telling us about it.”36 Other opponents contended that the na-
tional supply of day care was “approximately equal” to the demand for 
early childhood programs.37 They presented data purporting to show that 
there was no overall shortage of services, and they pointed to surveys sug-
gesting that American families of all racial backgrounds and at all income 
levels preferred to “have their preschool children cared for in their own 
homes by friends and relatives or in conveniently located family group 
care situations provided by relatives or neighbors— not in publicly subsi-
dized centers.”38 Critics also argued that child development programs 
would not deliver educational benefits, especially over the long term. Ex-
isting research, they claimed, demonstrated that “most preschool educa-
tion projects appear to have little or no effect on the long- range cognitive 
abilities of participating children.”39
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Other critics objected to the specific provisions of the Child and Fam-
ily Services Act. In congressional testimony, HEW secretary Caspar Wein-
berger expressed “extreme dissatisfaction with the bill,”40 claiming that it 
was administratively unwieldy and duplicative. Speaking on behalf of the 
administration, he explained, “We strongly disagree with the idea behind 
this bill that we must build a wholly new delivery system for child care 
services which would bypass, even ignore altogether, the existing array of 
publicly funded services now directly and indirectly benefiting our chil-
dren.”41 He criticized the bill for lacking direct linkages to existing pro-
grams like Head Start, the Work Incentives program, or the programs op-
erating under various titles of the Social Security Act.42 Weinberger also 
claimed that the bill gave the national government a “far too pervasive role 
in the organization and delivery of social services at the local level” and 
“push[ed] state governments to the sidelines, thereby overriding the tradi-
tional federal- state relationship.”43 This arrangement was administratively 
unworkable because it required the national government to work directly 
with thousands of local governments and voluntary organizations serving 
as prime sponsors. Weinberger’s testimony resonated with the objections 
expressed in Nixon’s veto message.
Cost was a prominent issue during the congressional debate. Wein-
berger argued that the “enormous strain [the bill] would ultimately place 
on the federal budget” was especially unwelcome during a period in which 
the United States confronted a large national deficit.44 An editorial in the 
Norman (OK) Transcript acknowledged the bill’s “admirable goals” but 
concluded that “it is probably an idea whose time has not yet come,” be-
cause “with the state of the economy we just can’t afford it at this time.”45
Other critics used melodramatic language to describe the stakes of this 
legislative battle. They characterized the Child and Family Services Act as 
an affront to American values. Calling it a “grandiose, federally funded, 
social planning scheme,”46 the National Coalition for Children claimed 
that the bill represented “the last power grab for children by the unwanted 
hand of the social planner.”47 An editorial in the Indianapolis Star labeled 
the bill “socialistic” and a “fantastic monstrosity,”48 and one in the Wall 
Street Journal claimed that the child development lobby wanted “to substi-
tute government professionals for the family.”49 Another critic said that 
the bill would create “special centers for propagandizing America’s chil-
dren, very much in the style and manner of the Hitler Youth,”50 and con-
cluded that it “would change Uncle Sam into Big Mama.”51 Although ad-
vocates portrayed the proposal as family- strengthening legislation, critics 
continued to describe it as a threat to parental autonomy.
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In his memoir, Brademas described how members of Congress re-
ceived a “rivulet, then a Niagara, of letters” attacking the measure (Brade-
mas 1986, 42). One constituent wrote to Speaker of the House Carl Albert 
(D- OK), “I think this is about the most absurd piece of legislation I have 
ever seen.”52 Another letter writer asserted, “This is a communistic act and 
is against the people’s constitutional rights. It is also against the will of God 
and should never have been printed. We are supposed to be a free people 
in a free and democratic society. If this bill is passed, all is lost.”53 Another 
critic claimed that the bill opened the door “to federal control of the divine 
institution of the family which is the center of American life.”54 Using 
apocalyptic language, one constituent asked the Speaker, “Are you voting 
for this measure or against it? This bill is a struggle of forces. In a very real 
sense, it is a vote for God or Satan. Where does your soul fall?”55 The vol-
ume and tone of these letters illustrate the enormous outcry over the mea-
sure and the passionate terms on which it was denounced.56
Supporters attributed most of the allegations against the bill to an 
anonymous flyer that began circulating during the fall of 1975.57 Its origins 
were murky, as media accounts and observers traced it to various regions 
of the country. According to the Washington Post, the campaign “began in 
the area of Oklahoma and Texas but soon moved to points North and 
East,”58 while the Kansas City Star noted that “much of the distribution has 
been in the Middle West.”59 In February 1976, Brademas voiced suspicions 
that the flyer had originated in McLean, Virginia, or Washington, DC.60 
His guess seemed to implicate the Emergency Committee for Children 
and the National Coalition for Children, but both groups strongly denied 
this charge.61
Regardless of its origins, the anonymous flyer effectively galvanized 
opposition to the Child and Family Services Act. It claimed, “If passed 
[the bill] would take the responsibility of the parents to raise their children 
and give it to the government. . . . This all smacks of communism. This is 
what in fact has been and is being done in Soviet Russia.”62 The flyer in-
cluded quotations from the Congressional Record suggesting that the bill 
would even give children the right to “sue [their] parents if they required 
[them] to go to Sunday school.”63 Its claims were repeated in editorials, 
television reports, and the flood of letters that constituents mailed to Con-
gress. The flyer also led opponents to claim “that parents who are not do-
ing a good job will have their children taken away from them, that parents 
cannot teach their children about God, that a charter of children’s rights is 
being added to the act, and that parents would lose the right to form their 
children’s characters.”64
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The language and impact of the flyer infuriated supporters of the legis-
lation. Brademas decried its “false and totally outrageous allegations.”65 He 
argued, “It is high time to put a halt to these Watergate tactics of reckless 
smear and deception.”66 Mondale characterized it as “one of the most vi-
cious and inaccurate propaganda campaigns I have witnessed in my fif-
teen years of service” and claimed that “there is not a shred of truth in any 
of these charges.”67 Opinion writers across the country, including oppo-
nents of the bill, denounced the flyer. One editorial blasted its “wild and 
completely false allegations.”68 Another characterized the flyer as a “pa-
rade of imaginary horribles” and “a circular made up of patent untruths 
and wild distortions.”69 A third argued that the attacks sink “to new lows 
of irresponsibility and falsehood.”70 The flyer’s emphasis on religious in-
struction led a group of religious organizations to issue an “interreligious 
statement” that read, “These charges are totally inaccurate. There is noth-
ing in this legislation that relates to religious preferences or religious in-
struction; nothing that relates to or alters the existing legal relationship 
between parents and their children; and nothing that provides for com-
pulsory service of any kind.”71 Even two strong opponents of the legisla-
tion, the American Conservative Union and the National Coalition for 
Children, disavowed the charges leveled in the flyer.72
Some observers attributed the ultimate demise of the Child and Family 
Services Act to the anonymous flyer. Media accounts quoted supporters 
who claimed that the attacks “substantially hindered” its likelihood of pas-
sage.73 Neither the House nor the Senate endorsed the proposal, a decisive 
defeat that another observer attributed to the vociferous opposition cam-
paign: “Never in the history of American politics has a grassroots cam-
paign based on distortion and blatant falsehood been so widespread, so 
virulent, and so successful” (McCathren 1981, 120). The truth, however, 
was more complex. Even before the smear campaign began, Brademas 
and Mondale “had in fact already decided, for other reasons, to set [their] 
proposals aside” (Brademas 1987, 41). In the summer, the two congress-
men “agreed that if we pressed ahead with the bill in that session, Presi-
dent Ford would veto it and thereby seriously set back our effort. So we 
quietly decided to postpone action in 1975 in the hope that a Democrat 
would be elected to the White House in 1976” (Brademas 1986, 42). In 
October, Mondale acknowledged that the proposal would “certainly be 
vetoed” and that it lacked sufficient support for an override.74 The two 
congressmen decided to postpone action before the anonymous flyer be-
gan to circulate, and Mondale’s acknowledgment occurred before the op-
position campaign received widespread publicity. By early 1976, observers 
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asserted that the bill “has no realistic chance of adoption” and that “the 
furor is a false alarm.”75 The flyer and the reaction it spawned demon-
strated the intensity of the opposition to the Child and Family Services 
Act, but they were not solely responsible for its defeat.
The Dissolving Preschool Coalition: The Role of the States and 
the American Federation of Teachers
Several areas of disagreement arose during congressional testimony on 
the bill. The appropriate role of the private sector was a contentious issue. 
Between 1970 and 1974, enrollment in private nursery schools had in-
creased from 763,000 to 1,184,000 (55.2 percent), while enrollment in pub-
lic nursery schools had grown from only 333,000 to 423,000 (29.7 per-
cent).76 Several witnesses urged that for- profit centers be excluded from 
public funding, citing past abuses and “arguing that the profit motive itself 
is a disincentive to providing the highest quality care for children.”77 Oth-
ers argued that it was logical to rely on the private sector “in areas where 
no other child care facilities exist or where existing public facilities are 
overcrowded.”78
The authorization levels in the measure were also controversial. Some 
witnesses expressed concern about the new emphasis on planning and 
training during the program’s first year. They wanted immediate authori-
zations for program operation, claiming that “good programs could die 
out for lack of funds, leaving parents with no alternative care arrange-
ments for a year while the system is being planned and personnel trained.”79 
Others argued that these funds were insufficient to provide comprehen-
sive services to children and their parents. Defenders of the bill argued 
that the authorization provisions refuted the charge that the child devel-
opment program was unaffordable.
The topic of parental participation sparked disagreement over the 
composition and authority of parent policy committees and other groups. 
Eligibility requirements and the establishment of fee schedules also di-
vided supporters of the legislation. Some witnesses favored the require-
ments and schedules proposed in the bill, others proposed slight modifi-
cations, and a third group argued that the child development program 
should be free and universal. Witnesses also debated the question of 
minimum standards and provisions for training personnel during the 
hearings.80
While several issues caused divisions within the child development co-
alition, none caused as much angst as the issue of prime sponsorship. Sec-
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tion 104 of the Child and Family Services Act revisited the designation of 
prime sponsors, and several witnesses “based their entire testimony on the 
crucial issue of the best delivery system for the services to be offered.”81 
The appropriate role of state governments was a common point of conten-
tion. Some witnesses claimed that state governments would be effective 
prime sponsors because of their resources and oversight capabilities, but 
others argued that they were “too large and too remote to bring flexibility 
and quality to local programs serving communities with highly individual 
needs.”82 By September 1975, thirty- seven states had either a functioning 
office of child development, a grant to plan and establish an office, or an 
office functioning in part of the state.83 In a letter describing this recent 
activity, a West Virginia official urged Brademas to “encourage these ef-
forts by providing support through the Child and Family Services Act for 
those states that have shown their good faith and capability to do state-
wide planning and coordination.”84 In addition, the number of states pro-
viding public aid to kindergartens and to preschools had also increased 
since 1971. The states were firmly entrenched stakeholders, and state offi-
cials defended their existing prerogatives.
The increased assertiveness of state government representatives illus-
trated the broader fragmentation of early childhood policy. Press accounts 
noted that the national government “is providing an estimated $2 billion 
for child- care services through a confused welter of about 60 programs 
designed for disadvantaged families.”85 The Emergency Committee for 
Children called for greater “public discussion of the duplicative statutes 
on day care.”86 Government officials like Weinberger “sharply criticized 
the present system’s fragmentation among over 200 agencies.”87 When Jo-
seph A. Califano Jr. prepared a report on family policy for aspiring presi-
dential candidate Jimmy Carter, he said that the United States offered an 
“inconsistent patchwork of policies affecting families.”88 The role of the 
states in this policy hodgepodge is especially important because it illus-
trates a subtle shift in the congressional debate. State governments played 
a minor role as Congress considered the Comprehensive Child Develop-
ment Act, but their representatives were a much stronger lobbying pres-
ence four years later. This increased activity reflected both lessons drawn 
from the previous debate and the immediate impact of the venue shop-
ping described in chapter 4 of this book.
National policymakers were also forced to grapple with a new candi-
date for prime sponsorship, namely, the public schools. On September 8, 
1974, Albert Shanker penned a union- paid advertisement in the New York 
Times with the title “Early Childhood Education Is a Job for the Public 
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Schools.” Shanker, who had become president of the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFT) in August after defeating David Selden in a bruising 
campaign,89 argued that the Comprehensive Child Development Act and 
the Child and Family Services Act would lead to conflicting responsibili-
ties, duplication and overlap, gaps and unevenness of access, and wide 
variation in service quality, because they allowed a broad range of spon-
soring agencies.90 He wrote, “The demands of special interests must give 
way to coherent public policy. As we expand the education of our chil-
dren, the responsibility for the enlarged program must be borne by the 
public schools.”91 While admitting that the public schools were not per-
fect, Shanker argued that they were well suited to administering a univer-
sal system of early childhood education and care.
The campaign to expand the role of the public schools did not end 
with Shanker’s essay. The AFT worked fervently on the issue and was ac-
tively involved in negotiations over the substance and form of new initia-
tives. It was a strong political force. A 1975 study of education interest 
groups described the AFT as one of the only “Washington- based associa-
tions .  .  . at the top of the heap of ‘representational effectiveness’ in the 
field of education policy” (Bailey 1975, 28– 29). The AFT also affected the 
stance that organized labor writ large would take on the legislation. Be-
cause the bill did not urge public school responsibility for the child devel-
opment program, the AFT threatened to block labor support (McGill- 
Franzen 1993, 70). In October 1975, a staffer on the House Subcommittee 
on Select Education wrote an internal memorandum in which he con-
fided, “One thing that scares me is . . . our bill’s lack of emphasis on the 
local public school as prime sponsors. . . . If we want blue collar support 
we must assess the power of Al Shanker.”92 The stance taken by the AFT 
strained the child development coalition, sparking a debate over “the po-
litical necessity of bargaining for AFT support in order to move any bill” 
(McCathren 1981, 94).
In January 1976, the AFT joined seven other education organizations 
to announce “a new, unified thrust” in early childhood development pro-
grams. Labeling itself the U.S. OECD Forum of Education Organization 
Leaders, the coalition called for an expanded national program of early 
childhood education and argued that the “public school system should 
have a major responsibility in the delivery of this service.”93 At the news 
conference announcing its objectives, the coalition issued a statement ar-
guing that the schools were well suited to carry out a program that was 
developmental, rather than custodial, in nature. The statement concluded, 
“We recognize that this growing need demands a response from educators 
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at every level. Given our understanding of the problem and our knowl-
edge of what the schools can do, the members of the Forum call upon 
Congress to authorize the necessary funds to enable schools to begin the 
job.”94
What caused the AFT to propose a child development system that 
would be administered by the public schools? In April 1975, education 
commissioner Terrel Bell had described early childhood education as a 
source of jobs for unemployed teachers: “We ought to utilize many of our 
trained teachers that the taxpayers have helped to train and now don’t 
have jobs in this field. If they need some more training . . . and I suspect 
that is the case  .  .  . we ought to provide it.”95 Political scientist Gilbert 
Steiner observed that the program Shanker endorsed would enable him 
“to find jobs for the large number of primary school teachers who are and 
will soon find themselves superfluous in a declining birthrate situation.”96 
Other observers expressed similar sentiments. They argued that whatever 
the merits of the AFT’s position, the union was “frankly motivated by the 
desire to find jobs for its members.”97 Critics like the Emergency Commit-
tee for Children blasted the AFT proposal as the “first step toward a 
scheme of universal early childhood education perhaps from age 3, a pro-
gram which is openly advocated by certain teacher organizations as a 
means— to put it bluntly— of creating jobs.”98
The AFT proposal contributed to the dissolution of the child develop-
ment coalition.99 A New York Times article described a “struggle for power 
between the teachers and the supporters of the Mondale- Brademas 
bills.”100 Another account claimed that “the fragile coalition of 1975 was 
quickly torn apart” by the disagreement over the appropriate role of the 
public schools (McCathren 1981, 124). Critics charged that the AFT pre-
sented a simplistic view of the public schools: “The image of the public 
school as a rational organization, the center of the community, flexible in 
programming, and accessible to parents, although certainly desirable, is, 
to say the least, questionable” (Fishhaut and Pastor 1977, 40). They argued 
that the school system would overemphasize educational development, 
undermining the more comprehensive objectives of a child development 
program.
Critics also contended that public schools often failed to achieve real 
parent participation or develop program continuity. As a result, they con-
cluded that a uniform approach was less desirable than a more localized 
and diversified one. Some critics conceded that public school systems 
would occasionally be appropriate prime sponsors, but they argued that 
each individual community should make that determination for itself.101 
122 | Early Start
Other critics claimed that a system administered by a single prime spon-
sor would deprive communities of the richness provided by a more plural-
istic approach. They portrayed the fragmentation of existing programs as 
desirable because it offered greater parental choice. One set of critics 
wrote, “Parents will want different things for their children, and options 
should be available to enable them to make meaningful choices” (Fishhaut 
and Pastor 1977, 47).
Various actors had a stake in the status quo, which helps explain why 
the AFT proposal earned a mixed reception. Early childhood programs 
had changed significantly in a short period of time. The rapid growth in 
private- sector nursery school enrollment and the rise of for- profit day 
care centers, in combination with a mélange of state- level programs, 
meant that the AFT proposal would potentially harm several constituen-
cies. One observer noted, “Perhaps the most immediate issue is the con-
trol and future of some 100,000 licensed day- care and child development 
facilities that serve about one million children outside the established 
school system.”102 The AFT may have viewed a child development pro-
gram as a potential source of jobs for its members, but other stakeholders 
resisted its proposal for precisely that reason. An official of the Salvation 
Army explained, “It appears that the American Federation of Teachers is 
pushing to have day care turned over to boards of education so that the 
jobs day care teachers now hold will be given over to the public school 
teachers.”103
Other critics portrayed the proposal as a threat to existing service pro-
viders. They argued that “the funding of programs by any single prime 
sponsor would prevent opportunities for growth of programs under other 
sponsors and might possibly extinguish them altogether” (Fishhaut and 
Pastor 1978, 123– 24). Organizations representing private and community- 
based service providers, including Head Start, “saw Shanker’s proposal as 
a threat to their existence” (E. Rose 2010, 66). Rather than bringing to-
gether a stronger coalition in favor of an expanded role for the national 
government in early childhood policy, the AFT proposal exacerbated ten-
sions within the child development coalition. Some early childhood edu-
cators viewed it as no more than a power grab.
Summary: The Demise of the Child and Family Services Act
Supporters of the Child and Family Services Act of 1975 knew that they 
faced an uphill battle. The shifting political and economic environment 
made the enactment of expansive social policies unlikely, and opponents 
The Dissolving Early Childhood Coalition | 123
of a child development program were better organized than they had been 
just four years earlier. Whereas the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act cleared Congress only to be vetoed by President Nixon, the Child and 
Family Services Act made limited progress. The opposition campaign 
against the measure, represented by an anonymous flyer that sparked a 
flood of irate letters to Congress, was sometimes cited as the primary 
cause of the bill’s demise. However, the rhetorical claims made by its op-
ponents and supporters had not changed much from earlier congressional 
debates. What had changed in the intervening years was the universe of 
actors who viewed themselves as stakeholders. State governments were 
more active in this policy arena, and their representatives were more en-
gaged in congressional policymaking than they had been in 1971. The role 
of organized labor also shifted as the American Federation of Teachers 
advanced a proposal that helped split the child development coalition into 
competing camps. These divisions contributed to the demise of the Child 
and Family Services Act and the further fragmentation of American early 
childhood programs.
Early Childhood Policy and the Carter Administration
In November 1976, Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford to win 
the presidency. Walter Mondale, the primary Senate advocate of child devel-
opment legislation, was elected vice president. Before taking office, Carter 
had lamented the incoherence of American family policy and argued that 
“the enactment of a comprehensive child development bill to provide qual-
ity, non- profit child care must be one of our major national priorities.”104 His 
campaign rhetoric and the presence of a familiar ally as vice president fos-
tered cautious optimism among the supporters of increased public invest-
ment. Brademas, who had become majority whip in the House, noted that 
he and others were “anxiously awaiting the policies that the Carter Admin-
istration will propose.”105 Although the change in presidential administra-
tions seemed to herald a more hospitable political climate for child develop-
ment legislation, the late 1970s were a period of frustration and 
disillusionment for advocates. The Carter administration did not prioritize 
early childhood policy, and even the president’s modest proposal to host a 
conference on the American family generated controversy.
The struggling economy was an important barrier to the consideration 
of comprehensive child development legislation. The economic environ-
ment limited the prospects for ambitious initiatives in domestic policy 
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and reduced Carter’s ability to collaborate with Congress on new entitle-
ment programs (Berkowitz 2006, 113). In the words of the vice president, 
there were “high expectations for what was possible under a new Demo-
cratic president, and a lot of backlogged expectations— only we didn’t 
have the economy that would pay for it” (Mondale 2010, 192).
Even if economic circumstances had been more favorable, however, it 
is far from certain that the administration would have forcefully advo-
cated major policy change. It “strengthened the federal role in education,” 
but “it did not make education a central component of its domestic pol-
icy” (Thomas 1983, 283). The most controversial action Carter took was 
the creation of the national Department of Education. This action repre-
sented the fulfillment of a campaign pledge. The National Education As-
sociation had long supported the creation of a freestanding education de-
partment. In 1976, “in exchange for receiving the NEA’s first presidential 
endorsement, Jimmy Carter pledged to back the idea” (Kahlenberg 2007, 
213). The move was criticized by conservatives who invoked states’ rights 
and opposed the growth of the federal bureaucracy. It also drew fire from 
liberals who worried that the NEA would exercise outsized interest over 
the department. Carter nevertheless used the power of the presidency to 
achieve departmental status for the education agency.
Other education issues, including early childhood policy, did not re-
ceive a similar presidential commitment. In fact, the creation of the De-
partment of Education caused Carter to be characterized as “the president 
who almost ended Head Start as we know it” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 
171). At the behest of the Office of Management and Budget, which advo-
cated a broad- based agency, Carter called for Head Start to be placed in 
the new department. Head Start parents, the National Head Start Associa-
tion, and other advocates of the program objected vehemently to this pro-
posal. They feared that a broad- based department would be dominated by 
teachers unions and administrators, and they argued that inclusion in the 
new department would undermine the basic rationale of Head Start. With 
its emphasis on comprehensive services and parent involvement, Head 
Start was more than an education program. Carter’s proposal was viewed 
as a betrayal of Head Start and his African American supporters, and by 
the time the Department of Education bill was enacted, Head Start had 
been deleted. The episode resolved the relationship between Head Start 
and the Department of Education, but it was a harrowing experience for 
program advocates (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 188).
As a presidential candidate, Carter proposed to convene a White House 
conference on the American family. Even this modest initiative, however, 
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greatly frustrated several constituencies. Activists complained that the 
White House failed to take the conference seriously. Organizations repre-
senting African Americans, Catholics, and those with an interest in social 
welfare policy “complained in common about ignored requests for meet-
ings, perfunctory replies to questions about the conference planning pro-
cess, and promised deadlines for action that were not met” (Steiner 1981, 
40). Furthermore, the original conference leadership team dissolved in a 
matter of months. Wilbur Cohen, a former HEW secretary who had 
helped draft the Social Security Act in 1935, agreed to serve as national 
chairman but then announced that a health problem would preclude his 
participation.106 The potential appointment of Patricia Fleming as execu-
tive director also aroused controversy. Critics questioned whether Flem-
ing, a divorced working mother of three, was an appropriate choice. After 
agreeing to accept the position, she resigned before her appointment was 
announced publicly (Steiner 1981, 42– 43). Rather than being an “uplifting, 
feel- good event, the conference degenerated into arguments over whether 
one type of family was better than another” (Berkowitz 2006, 111). The 
promised conference finally took place in the summer of 1980, and its 
recommendations focused on such traditional issues as job- related pres-
sures and the tax treatment of families (Steiner 1981, 45). Thus the Carter 
administration proved itself both unwilling to advance a major proposal 
on early childhood policy and incapable of exercising leadership on the 
broader issue of family policy.107
The Child Care Act of 1979
With the executive branch essentially sidelined, the initiative shifted back 
to Capitol Hill. Senator Alan Cranston (D- CA), a fierce critic of how the 
administration handled the conference on the American family, was 
joined by four Senate colleagues in introducing the Child Care Act of 
1979.108 The bill was the culmination of more than two years of work. The 
Senate Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, chaired by 
Cranston, held a series of hearings in California and Washington during 
which it heard from parents, child care providers, and others as it shaped 
the legislation.109 The proposal differed in several important ways from 
the Comprehensive Child Development Act and the Child and Family 
Services Act.
At a basic level, the Child Care Act lacked the ambition and scope of its 
predecessors. It was characterized as a “very limited and incremental child 
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care bill [that] attempted to reach a compromise among the important 
interest groups over the design of new programs” (McCathren 1981, 126). 
Its eligibility provisions were illustrative. Previous proposals targeted the 
children of poor and middle- class families and viewed universal access as 
a long- term goal. Cranston, in contrast, described the target constituency 
of his proposal as families “whose incomes are too low to get any substan-
tial benefit from the tax credit and too high in many cases to be eligible for 
programs . . . which are targeted on welfare or poverty- level families.”110 
The Child Care Act focused on poor and working women who were strug-
gling to remain in the workforce and off of welfare. Its “very limited goal” 
was “to create a modest system of child care not limited to low- income 
parents” (McGill- Franzen 1993, 70).
The Child Care Act also moved away from its predecessors’ emphasis 
on comprehensive services and the Head Start model. The title of the leg-
islation reflected this shift. The bill acknowledged that some families 
might need health, nutrition, or social services, but it carefully avoided 
use of the term comprehensive. Instead, it emphasized child care services 
for working mothers. At a subcommittee hearing in February, Cranston 
described existing programs as “severely overtaxed” and argued that pol-
icy changes were necessary “as the rising cost of living and other social 
conditions bring more and more mothers of young children into the 
workforce in order to maintain decent standards of living for their fami-
lies.”111 Cranston’s rhetoric and the move away from comprehensive ser-
vices implied a custodial model of early childhood programming whose 
goal was to enable mothers to work. This shift was also reflected in the 
legislation’s limited provisions for parental involvement. Though it guar-
anteed that services would be voluntary, it “did not establish the parent- 
and consumer- dominated councils with specific policymaking powers as 
did the 1971 bill” (Beck 1982, 328).
The Child Care Act also advanced an alternative approach to the issue 
of prime sponsorship. It went even further in expanding state government 
prerogatives than had the Child and Family Services Act. Cranston’s pro-
posal “assumed that states would be prime sponsors (or would determine 
to which state and local agencies to delegate these responsibilities)” (Beck 
1982, 328). The Child Care Act did not deliver funds from the national 
government to local projects run by community organizations or to local 
governments. Rather, its “clear meaning was to pass federal funds to states, 
which would make major policy and allocation decisions” (Beck 1982, 
328). State governments would possess tremendous discretion in program 
implementation.
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While it would be a mistake to attribute this provision exclusively to 
the lobbying efforts of state governments, it is important to recognize 
their visible presence in the late 1970s. For example, the ECS chairman 
sent President Carter a letter in February 1977 urging the new president 
“to publicly adopt the position that education improvement is directly 
tied to the improvement of state/federal relations and that the primary 
direction of federal activity should be to support and supplement the 
states.”112 State officials often complained that federal regulations dupli-
cated state government efforts, a claim that resonated especially strongly 
in early childhood policy. With its assumption that states would serve as 
prime sponsors, the Child Care Act seemed responsive to this line of ar-
gument. The executive director of the ECS described the bill as “well 
suited to furthering ongoing efforts at the state level to improve child and 
family service delivery systems.”113
The limited ambition of the Child Care Act reflected political and eco-
nomic realities. Politically, Cranston hoped that the bill would be accept-
able to the diverse constituencies with a stake in this policy arena. One 
objective of the subcommittee hearings in 1977 and 1978 was to “smoke 
out the supporters and detractors and read the present sentiments of those 
most directly involved in the child care debate” (McCathren 1981, 126). 
After the demise of the Child and Family Services Act of 1975, there was 
little doubt that support from those individuals and groups would be nec-
essary to overcome the strong opposition of conservative policymakers, 
columnists, and interest groups. Such support failed to materialize, how-
ever, and the bill failed to generate much enthusiasm from the child devel-
opment community.
The Child Care Act of 1979 was also modest financially. Reflecting the 
public mood of austerity and the promise of the Carter administration to 
cut government spending, Cranston attempted to portray the bill as effi-
cient and cost- effective legislation whose “ultimate savings will far out-
weigh the short- term expenditures.”114 Revisiting a line of argument that 
had appeared in 1971 and 1975, Cranston argued that the bill would pay for 
itself through tax revenues from increased parental earnings and through 
reduced expenditures on other government programs. Recognizing the 
budgetary constraints under which lawmakers operated, Cranston argued 
that public spending on child care was money well spent.
Cranston hoped his modest proposal would be acceptable to the wide- 
ranging stakeholders with an interest in early childhood policy. But the 
coalition that had come together in 1971 had splintered in 1975 and was 
“hopelessly divided” by 1979 (McCathren 1981, 131). The divide over the 
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role of public schools, growing enrollment in proprietary child care cen-
ters, and the political solidification of Head Start meant that his moderate 
proposal generated limited enthusiasm.
The unequivocal opposition of the Carter administration further dis-
appointed Cranston. At a subcommittee hearing in February, one admin-
istration official described existing national government child care fund-
ing. Citing Head Start, services provided under Title XX of the Social 
Security Act, and the child care tax credit, she concluded, “Given the size 
and nature of this commitment, we do not believe that another categorical 
program for child care is warranted at this time.”115 In a testy response, 
Cranston argued that the administration position would be “more credi-
ble if your agency acknowledged the need for a systematic and coordi-
nated approach such as provided in [the Child Care Act] but said that the 
federal government did not want to pay the price at this point.”116 He could 
not resist noting the irony of “a Carter- Mondale administration appearing 
before this subcommittee in opposition to child care legislation.”117 At a 
March 15 press conference, the senator announced that he was canceling 
further hearings on the bill, effectively killing it for the 1979 congressional 
session.
The Continued Growth of Head Start and the Tax Credit
Despite the demise of comprehensive congressional initiatives like the 
Child and Family Services Act and modest proposals like the Child Care 
Act of 1979, the national government’s role in early childhood policy 
evolved throughout the decade. In terms of enrollment and spending, 
Head Start grew dramatically during the late 1970s. Program enrollment 
had declined from 374,000 during fiscal year 1972 to 279,340 during fiscal 
year 1977, but by fiscal year 1979, Head Start served 429,500 children, an 
increase of more than 50 percent over a two- year period. During the same 
period, expenditures rose from $376 million during fiscal year 1972 to $425 
million during fiscal year 1977, before rising sharply to $680 million dur-
ing fiscal year 1979.118 These figures suggest that President Carter, despite 
proposing to locate Head Start within the new Department of Education, 
was an important ally. He publicized Head Start’s effectiveness and began 
a trend of requesting substantial increases in its budget. In doing so, the 
president “put Head Start on a course that would be difficult for the next 
president to reverse” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 190). The political so-
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lidification of Head Start, however, contributed to further programmatic 
fragmentation in this policy arena.
Parental involvement was a central component of Head Start and a key 
source of policy feedback, especially after the formation of the National 
Head Start Association in 1973. A May 1978 Head Start assessment report 
is illustrative. The assessment team visited twenty- nine Head Start pro-
grams in twenty- three states and interviewed over a thousand people. Its 
report noted that parents “who actively participate in the program gain 
valuable personal and consumer skills, are often motivated to pursue 
higher life goals, and sometimes experience career development through 
employment in the program.”119 Many Head Start parents began as volun-
teers but eventually became aides, cooks, teachers, and even program di-
rectors. The transition from volunteer to teacher was especially common. 
Of the twenty- nine sites visited by the assessment team, “at least 17 [58.6 
percent] had teachers who were, at one time, parents of Head Start chil-
dren and had worked their way up the career ladder.”120 This common 
transition occurred at a time when the program was focused on improv-
ing the educational credentials of its staff. The report concluded, “From 
the teams’ perspective as outsiders, the many personal success stories of 
parents who became actively involved suggest that it is in reality an area of 
significant program achievement.”121 Some officials argued that the em-
ployment of Head Start parents aided the broader community because the 
employees served as “role models helping to motivate their peers.”122
The centrality of parent involvement had broader political implica-
tions that reflected Head Start’s origins within the Community Action 
Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The report therefore in-
cluded a stand- alone section devoted to the program’s community role. 
Head Start served both as an information and referral service for low- 
income families and as “an advocate for all children and families. Pro-
grams have helped develop parent self- confidence and leadership, intro-
duce concepts such as parent involvement and teacher aides into the 
school systems, and provide economic upward mobility for many par-
ents.”123 In other words, community activism was a crucial component of 
Head Start’s organizational mission. According to the report, Head Start 
advocacy had evolved “from confrontation to cooperation” as Head Start 
programs became “part of the system in their communities.”124 Although 
the report focused on local affairs, the program also developed a strong 
presence in congressional politics.
The heightened political status of Head Start altered the political land-
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scape. The Child Care Act of 1979, with its restrictive eligibility provisions 
and its move away from comprehensive services, reflected this shift. The 
bill “did not envision a competitive or parallel program to Head Start” 
(McCathren 1981, 127). Instead, it tried to accommodate existing stake-
holders in the hope that they would endorse the legislation. Such support 
did not materialize, however. Head Start supporters warily viewed the 
Child Care Act as a potential threat to their existing prerogatives. For ex-
ample, a witness testifying on behalf of the Child Welfare League of Amer-
ica argued that Head Start should be expanded and “appropriately shielded 
regardless of what kind of new early childhood legislation is enacted.”125 
Head Start backers had made similar claims after the president proposed 
to include Head Start in the Department of Education. Their defensive 
posture in both contexts illustrates how policy feedback contributed to 
divisions within the child development coalition. Head Start backers con-
centrated on preserving their gains. They nominally backed more- 
ambitious legislative proposals but expressed reservations about them.
Head Start was not the only national program to experience consider-
able growth during the 1970s. With relatively little fanfare, Congress mod-
ified the dependent care tax deduction on several occasions, embedding 
these changes within omnibus tax reform legislation. Established in 1954, 
the tax deduction originally was limited to six hundred dollars per year 
and was phased out for families with income between forty- five hundred 
and fifty- one hundred dollars. The Revenue Act of 1964 raised the income 
threshold from forty- five hundred to six thousand dollars and made hus-
bands with incapacitated wives eligible for the deduction. In the 1970s, 
Congress made a series of more- substantial changes, transforming the de-
duction into a tax credit with considerably broader eligibility provisions.
The first major change occurred in 1971, when President Nixon signed 
the Revenue Act of 1971 a mere day after vetoing the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act. The Revenue Act made any individual maintaining a 
household eligible for the deduction, subject to a gainful employment re-
quirement. It also modified the definition of a dependent, increased the 
deduction limit to forty- eight hundred dollars per year, and increased the 
income threshold at which the deduction began to be phased out from six 
thousand to eighteen thousand dollars. In terms of services covered, the 
Revenue Act allowed the deduction for household services in addition to 
direct dependent care and limited the deduction with respect to services 
outside the taxpayer’s household. The law sought to encourage the hiring 
of domestic workers, encourage the care of incapacitated persons at home, 
and provide relief to middle- and low- income taxpayers.126
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President Nixon praised the Revenue Act in the same veto message in 
which he lambasted the Comprehensive Child Development Act. Utiliz-
ing the tax code to achieve social policy goals, he wrote, “reflects my con-
viction that the federal government’s role wherever possible should be one 
of assisting parents to purchase needed day care services in the private, 
open market, with federal involvement in direct provision of such services 
kept to an absolute minimum.”127 Nixon claimed that the revised tax de-
duction would potentially benefit 97 percent of all families in the country 
in which two parents were employed, offering them “free choice of the 
child care arrangements they deem best for their families.”128
The treatment of dependent care in the tax code changed again in the 
mid- 1970s. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 raised the income tax threshold 
at which the deduction would be phased out from eighteen thousand to 
thirty- five thousand dollars, and the Tax Reform Act of 1976 replaced the 
tax deduction with a nonrefundable tax credit. Supporters of the latter 
change argued that a tax credit would be especially beneficial for taxpayers 
in the lower tax brackets. Table 1 illustrates the deduction’s limited reach 
as of 1973, especially among low- income taxpayers. More than 90 percent 
of the individual returns in the lowest income category claimed the stan-
dard deduction, making them ineligible, and only 0.2 percent of the re-
turns in that category claimed child and dependent care expenses.129 Sup-
porters of the shift to a tax credit also praised its administrative benefits. 
They argued that the rules governing married couples, divorced and sepa-
rated persons, and payments to relatives were unduly restrictive and that 
computation of the deduction was too complex.130 The shift to a tax credit 
TABLE 1. Expenses for Child and Dependent Care on Individual Income Tax Returns, 1973
      Child and  Total Amount 
  Standard  Itemized Dependent of Child and
 Number of Deduction Deduction Care Expense Dependent Care
Income Level Returns Claims (%) Claims (%) Claims (%) Expense Claims ($)
Less than 27,038,000 25,283,000  1,311,000  52,300  $35,981,000
 $5,000  (93.5%) (4.8%) (0.2%)
Less than 20,582,000 14,811,000  5,771,000 453,231 $333,562,000
 $10,000  (72.0%) (28.0%) (2.2%)
Less than 15,804,000  8,098,000  7,706,000 715,050 $486,738,000
 $15,000  (51.2%) (48.8%) (4.5%)
Over 17,269,000  4,009,000 13,260,000 605,320 $435,275,000
 $15,000  (23.2%) (76.8%) (3.5%)
Source: Statistics of Income 1973: Individual Income Tax Returns, Internal Revenue Service Publication 79 
(11- 76) (Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, 1976), tables 1B (p. 2), 2A (p. 40), and 2.9 (p. 60).
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seemed to have an immediate impact. Between 1976 and 1980, the number 
of tax returns on which the dependent care credit was claimed increased 
from 2,660,000 to 4,231,000 (59.1 percent), and the amount of credit 
claimed rose from $548 million to $956 million (74.5 percent).131
Using the tax code to achieve social policy objectives is one of the dis-
tinctive features of the American welfare state (Hacker 2002; Howard 
1997). Supporters of this approach often argue that tax expenditures are 
less intrusive and less bureaucratic than the direct provision of services by 
government agencies and that tax expenditures provide a wider range of 
potential options. Politically, tax expenditures represent a potentially eas-
ier road to policy change because “whereas direct spending programs re-
quire new legislation, which Congress is not obligated to act upon, tax 
expenditures can be tucked away in must- pass bills” (Howard 1997, 179). 
As an illustration of this distinction, the transformation of the dependent 
care tax deduction in 1970s did not receive much media or public atten-
tion. It occurred in a series of omnibus revenue bills that were enacted at 
the same time that direct spending programs repeatedly failed to gain en-
actment. Tax expenditures can have profound long- term implications. 
They “can continue indefinitely because they are not subject to periodic 
budget battles” (Kelly 2003, 608).
The transformation of the tax code generated two forms of policy feed-
back with crucial political implications. First, it altered middle- class par-
ents’ stake in the ongoing debate. The changes “may have removed a po-
tentially powerful constituency for direct public spending on day care” by 
entrenching a system of tax subsidies that supported private day care for 
the middle class rather than embracing the goal of universally available, 
publicly provided services (Morgan 2001, 243). The creation of the child 
care tax credit, in combination with other factors, facilitated the prolifera-
tion of employer- sponsored, voluntary, for- profit, family- based, and other 
forms of early childhood care. As government assistance “became inextri-
cably associated with poverty and its remediation, nonpoor parents chose 
or were compelled to turn to private alternatives” (Michel 1999, 237).
Changes in tax policy thus contributed to the divide between the pub-
lic and private sectors that is one of the distinctive features of early child-
hood education in the contemporary United States. The clients and advo-
cates of different kinds of care were a “divided constituency that was, in 
turn, perpetuated by congressional vacillation between targeted and uni-
versal forces” (Michel 1999, 278). Parents who were satisfied with the qual-
ity and availability of early childhood care options might fear that such 
options would no longer exist under a universal government program, 
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making them suspicious of initiatives like the Child Care Act. The average 
dependent care credit per tax return was only $207 in 1979,132 so material 
self- interest was probably less important to these parents than was their 
perceived autonomy.
The second form of policy feedback generated by the transformation of 
the tax code was the political mobilization of service providers. One of the 
distinctive features of the politics of tax expenditures is the political mobi-
lization of third- party providers (Howard 1997, 9). This dynamic emerged 
as Congress considered the Child Care Act. During a subcommittee hear-
ing on February 21, the chairperson of the Private Child Care Providers 
Allied Association listed private providers’ concerns about the bill. She 
noted that they “represent the majority of center delivery in the United 
States through owner- directed for profit and director or board directed 
not for profit programs.”133 In a prepared statement, the National Associa-
tion for Child Development praised the bill for its “promotion of avail-
ability and diversity of child care services by involving the entire range of 
providers, proprietary, public, and nonprofit” and for its “increased em-
phasis on participation by the states.”134 It expressed concern, however, 
about the “standards with which a provider would have to comply to par-
ticipate in the program.”135 The prominence of third- party providers at 
congressional hearings was an important development because it illus-
trated how the contours of this policy arena had shifted during the 1970s. 
Fueled by the growth of governmental programs like Head Start and the 
transformation of the tax code, a more diverse set of stakeholders mobi-
lized to defend their existing prerogatives.
Conclusion: The Shifting Terrain of the Late 1970s
In assessing the impact of a critical juncture in the policymaking process, 
one must distinguish between its short- term and long- term consequences. 
This chapter focused on the former, examining congressional develop-
ments immediately after Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Child Devel-
opment Act. On the surface, not much seems to have changed. The ambi-
tious Child and Family Services Act of 1975 was justified and criticized in 
language that resonated with earlier debates and failed to gain enactment. 
The Child Care Act of 1979 was narrower in scope and bowed to economic 
and political realities. It also did not come close to being adopted by Con-
gress. Many of the same actors were involved in all three episodes.
Focusing solely on the failure of Congress to adopt major legislation, 
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however, overlooks important ways in which the early childhood policy 
sector changed during the 1970s. The absence of a comprehensive national 
policy did not imply stasis. The social and political forces that put the issue 
on the nation’s political agenda, including the widespread entry of moth-
ers into the labor force and changing perceptions of the value of early 
childhood education, contributed to heightened demand for child care 
and dramatic increases in preschool enrollment in both the public and the 
private sector. Public policy changes contributed to these trends, even 
though they garnered significantly less attention than did the episodes 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The transformation of the tax 
code entrenched a system of tax subsidies that supported private day care 
for the middle class and that facilitated the proliferation of various forms 
of early childhood care (Michel 1999; Morgan 2001, 2006). The political 
solidification of Head Start contributed to the tremendous growth of that 
public program in terms of enrollment and expenditures. The policy 
changes of the 1970s helped solidify the divide between the public and 
private sectors that is a distinctive feature of early childhood policy in the 
United States. Low- income and middle- class families tended to rely on the 
public and private sector, respectively.
Focusing solely on the repeated failure of the national government to 
enact major child development legislation also overlooks crucial political 
changes. Most important, the 1970s witnessed the gradual dissolution of 
the coalition that had come together to support the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act. Many of the same actors were involved in later debates, 
but their perspectives and preferences changed along with the shifting 
contours of this policy arena. The growth of the private sector removed a 
potentially powerful constituency for universal legislation— middle- class 
parents— and helped mobilize third- party providers. Defenders of Head 
Start became increasingly wary of how proposals to expand the role of the 
national government would affect their authority and funding. Represen-
tatives of state governments argued that any changes to national policy 
should recognize and build on what was occurring at the state level. Fi-
nally, the American Federation of Teachers exacerbated existing tensions 
within the child development coalition with its call for giving the public 
schools responsibility for administering a universal program. In sum, the 
1970s witnessed increased fragmentation and decentralization in terms of 
both the shape and the politics of early childhood policy. This trend would 
continue into the following decade.
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6 |  Policy Stability and Political Change  
in the 1980s
The fragmentation of early childhood policy in the United States can be 
traced to developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially Nixon’s 
veto of the Comprehensive Child Development Act. The veto was a critical 
juncture not only because it dashed the hopes of those who wanted a larger 
role for the national government. It also caused those advocates to engage 
in venue shopping, an attempt to move the debate to more favorable insti-
tutional terrain. Their tactical shift produced numerous short- term victo-
ries, from the political solidification of Head Start to the creation of several 
state- level programs. These short- term victories, ironically, created addi-
tional long- term hurdles to their objectives, hurdles that advocates were 
unable to overcome. In fact, the heritage of this venue shopping was a more 
splintered and fragmented coalition supporting major policy change. Ris-
ing enrollment in early childhood programs of various types, the creation 
and expansion of state programs, and the growth of Head Start shifted the 
political terrain on which later congressional debates occurred.
The 1980s were not a period of major change in early childhood policy 
at either the national or the state level. The issue fell off the congressional 
agenda in the early part of the decade, and when Congress devoted more 
attention to it in the late 1980s, ambitious and incremental reform propos-
als did not make much legislative progress. Several policy changes oc-
curred at the state level, but most state programs remained limited in 
scope. They served a targeted clientele and did not adopt the comprehen-
sive approach to child development that had been popular during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Examining the limited changes of the 1980s is ana-
lytically useful, however, because it illustrates how the politics of early 
childhood policy had shifted in subtle ways.1 Advocates of greater public 
investments made limited progress partly because they were unable to co-
alesce into a unified force for policy change.
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Congressional Politics: Critics Coalesce  
and Supporters Split
After the demise of the Child Care Act of 1979, congressional interest in 
early childhood education and care fell dramatically. The presence of Re-
publican Ronald Reagan in the White House represented a seemingly in-
surmountable obstacle to major policy change, and retrenchment replaced 
expansion as the overarching objective of policy reform. Programs like 
Head Start were not immune from the administration’s efforts to reduce 
spending on social programs. Head Start supporters thwarted a proposal 
to turn the program over to the states and a drive to undercut its national 
leadership. The program’s budget survived virtually intact, but Head Start 
was forced to serve more children while cutting back on its hours, ser-
vices, and technical assistance.
Head Start’s ability to resist any more dramatic changes was attributed 
to a combination of “the dedicated federal agency staff who remained to 
administer the program; the increasingly sophisticated organization of 
Head Start directors, parents, and staff; the resulting bipartisan support in 
Congress; and the well- publicized research on the effectiveness of Head 
Start and “Head Start– like” programs” (Zigler and Muenchow 1992, 193). 
Working with program administrators and such organizations as the 
Children’s Defense Fund, the National Head Start Association emerged as 
“a force with which all politicians must contend” (Zigler and Muenchow 
1992, 210). Its mobilization and largely successful defense of Head Start 
illustrates the political significance of policy feedback.
In terms of early childhood policy more broadly, the 1980s were a pe-
riod of minimal policy change. In 1990, one advocate of reform lamented, 
“The primary problem, in my opinion, is that in the 1980s early education 
was removed from . . . the nation’s agenda.”2 Most of the nation’s political 
and intellectual energy focused on the “excellence” movement, an effort to 
raise educational quality through various changes in elementary and sec-
ondary education.3 Policy discussions regarding children who were too 
young for formal schooling focused on custodial child care rather than 
educational programming. The Reagan administration successfully ad-
vanced a combination of tax cuts and tax breaks that sought to “facilitate 
parent choice and spur child care initiatives in the private sector” (Michel 
1999, 256). These policies were especially helpful to middle- class women 
who needed care upon entering the labor force and were capable of the 
financial planning the policies required.
Partisan politics undermined more- ambitious initiatives. Republicans 
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called for state and local control, flexible solutions, and “reasonably firm” 
answers to questions about the impact of child care, in advance of further 
national government involvement (Hatch 1982, 258). Democrats generally 
envisioned a more expansive role for the national government and de-
scribed child care as a “necessity for families of all types of conditions” 
(Kennedy 1982, 261). This stalemate was not broken until Republican pres-
idential candidate George H. W. Bush proposed a national child care pro-
gram during the 1988 campaign, and Congress endorsed the Child Care 
and Development Block Grant Act two years later. The legislation funded 
child care subsidies for low- income working families and other efforts to 
improve program quality (Cohen 2001). It required every state to develop 
a child care plan for working families and galvanized a series of public and 
private activities in the states, while distributing most of its funds to par-
ents through vouchers (Lombardi 2003, 40).4
Short- term political forces helped prevent major change, yet several 
long- term forces were also influential. Congress, particularly the House of 
Representatives, had changed significantly in the decade since compre-
hensive child development legislation was first proposed. These reforms, 
such as the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, created a more diffuse power 
structure that increased the time and effort required to enact legislation. 
Brademas noted that the changes had made “all the more complicated the 
task not only of the president but of the leadership of the House in putting 
together majorities for both domestic and foreign- policy legislation” 
(Brademas 1987, 126). Critics argued that the reforms made Congress “dra-
matically less effective and accountable” (Frum 2000, 280). Those who 
desired a more expansive role for the national government in early child-
hood policy faced a challenging institutional environment.
Long- term shifts in the political terrain, especially in the interest group 
universe, were especially significant. The political heritage of Nixon’s veto 
included a mobilized opposition movement and a fragmented supporting 
coalition. Blocking the comprehensive proposals of the 1970s was a key 
learning experience for opponents of national government involvement. 
By the early 1980s, the opposition was “tough and well organized” (Beck 
1982, 309). It included such organizations as the National Coalition for 
Children, the American Conservative Union, the Moral Majority, the 
Heritage Foundation, the Eagle Forum, and the National Conservative 
Research and Educational Foundation. Observers were struck by the 
“promptness with which opposing groups organize when child care legis-
lation is under consideration” (Grotberg 1981, 11). Their political engage-
ment meant that a stealth campaign like the one conducted on behalf of 
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the Comprehensive Child Development Act was no longer possible. Op-
ponents were too well organized for that strategy to work.
Furthermore, divisions within the early childhood policy community 
hamstrung supporters of national government intervention. The develop-
ments of the 1970s meant that “active political support for child care [was] 
more splintered and more difficult to mobilize than it was a decade ago” 
(Beck 1982, 308). Political frustration was one source of this fragmenta-
tion. In addition, since the early 1970s, the private sector, religious organi-
zations, and state and local agencies had sought to meet the increased de-
mand for programs serving young children. Their efforts expanded the 
range of stakeholders with an interest in early childhood policy.
These stakeholders held competing views about whether and how the 
existing policy repertoire should change. In defending their prerogatives, 
they sometimes undercut the effectiveness of reformers whose objectives 
they claimed to share. The subsequent “rifts between public and private 
provision, and among the clients and advocates of different kinds of care, 
created a divided constituency” (Michel 1999, 278). The existence of new 
subnational early childhood programs exacerbated this fragmentation 
and created another set of actors with an interest in maintaining existing 
arrangements. When Congress returned to the issue in the late 1980s, divi-
sions within the early childhood policy community dampened the pros-
pects for either comprehensive or incremental change. The fate of two 
unsuccessful initiatives from the late 1980s illustrates how the politics of 
early childhood policy had shifted over time. The coalitions on both sides 
of the issue had changed so substantially that the obstacles faced by advo-
cates of increased government intervention were higher.
Smart Start: The Community Collaborative for Early 
Childhood Development Act of 1988
In the late 1980s, members of Congress introduced several bills on early 
childhood policy. Smart Start: The Community Collaborative for Early 
Childhood Development Act, introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy 
(D- MA) in 1988, was especially noteworthy because its ambitious scope 
resonated with the comprehensive legislation of the 1970s. Congress did 
not endorse Smart Start, an outcome that did not surprise its sponsor.5 Its 
provisions, its failure to gain enactment, and the arguments advanced by 
its supporters all resonated with earlier congressional debates. Those areas 
of overlap, however, mask crucial differences in the politics surrounding 
Kennedy’s proposal. Growing enrollment in preschool programs, the cre-
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ation and expansion of state programs, and the political solidification of 
Head Start helped change the terms of the congressional debate. The di-
verse witnesses who testified on Smart Start pledged fealty to its overarch-
ing goals, but they also worried that its adoption would negatively affect 
their prerogatives.
Smart Start was an ambitious piece of legislation whose emphasis on 
universal access to comprehensive preschool services resonated with the 
proposals of the early 1970s. Kennedy said that its main objective was to 
“make early childhood development programs universally available to the 
nation’s four- year- old children.”6 Most witnesses focused on its educa-
tional component, but Smart Start sought to promote good nutrition and 
parental involvement and to provide prenatal and diagnostic services on a 
full- day, full- year basis. The bill reserved at least half of its slots for chil-
dren in families with incomes below the poverty line. Children in families 
with incomes under 115 percent of the poverty line would receive services 
at no cost, while eligible children from families with incomes above this 
benchmark would be subject to a sliding fee scale. Smart Start called for 
up to $500 million in government funds in its first year of operation, with 
that figure rising to $750 million and $1 billion in subsequent years. Sena-
tor Robert T. Stafford (R- VT), a member of Congress since 1961, noted 
that Smart Start constituted a sharp shift from the congressional agenda of 
the early 1980s: “I recall that several years ago the options put forward for 
serving the young were primarily grounded in employer incentive pro-
grams. Much has changed. Now we in Congress are seeing major legisla-
tive initiatives designed to expand services to preschool children.”7 Senate 
hearings on Smart Start therefore provide a good analytical opportunity to 
examine whether and how preschool politics had changed since the early 
1970s.
The witnesses who testified on behalf of Smart Start made claims that 
echoed those made by their predecessors in the 1970s. They highlighted 
trends in the American labor market and in preschool enrollment. In-
creased participation in the labor force by the mothers of young children, 
they argued, meant that “the demand for good day care far exceeds the 
availability of good day care.”8 One witness noted that from 1970 to 1985, 
rates of participation in the labor force by mothers with children under 
the age of five had risen from 30 percent to 54 percent, while preschool 
enrollment rates among children whose mothers were not in the labor 
force had increased from 37 percent to just over 50 percent.9
These figures suggested that preschool attendance was an increasingly 
standard part of American life, which caused some witnesses to focus on 
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equity concerns. One witness lamented the existence of a “two- tier sys-
tem” in which children from lower- income families were less likely to en-
roll in high- quality preschool or child care programs.10 This concern helps 
explain why Smart Start reserved at least 50 percent of its program slots 
for children in low- income families. Some supporters claimed that these 
children were at risk for later school failure and were therefore especially 
likely to benefit from preschool enrollment.11
Many witnesses portrayed early childhood programs as cost- effective 
investments. This argument was not new, but during the 1980s, it was 
ubiquitous. Supporters cited successful examples like the Perry Preschool 
Program and compared them to “a vaccine to help ensure healthy devel-
opment of many children and youth.”12 Senator Jeff Bingaman (D- NM) 
claimed, “Several studies have documented that every dollar spent for 
quality preschool education can return up to $6 in lower cost for later 
education, for public assistance and for the criminal justice system. Even 
with our current budget deficits, I do not see how we can afford not to in-
vest in quality education and child care.”13 This high rate of return was 
contingent on the existence of quality options, but few witnesses added 
this important caveat.14 Instead, they claimed that every dollar invested in 
Smart Start would pay for itself over the long term.
The political terrain on which the debates of the late 1980s occurred 
differed in several important ways from that of the 1970s. In an editorial 
calling for increased public investment, the New York Times asserted that 
attitudes about children had changed dramatically since Nixon’s veto, 
making it possible “to identify and energize a potential coalition on behalf 
of early childhood intervention.”15 Indeed, the witnesses who testified on 
behalf of Smart Start were strikingly diverse. Kennedy claimed that the 
appearance of business leaders, government officials, educators, and advo-
cates at one hearing reflected a “spirit of community and cooperation, 
which is the basis of this legislation.”16
The engagement of the business community was especially important. 
The Committee for Economic Development issued a policy statement en-
titled Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disad-
vantaged. Several witnesses mentioned the report. Owen Butler, vice- 
chairman of the organization, chaired two subcommittees on early 
childhood education, visited twenty- three states to meet with individuals 
and groups working on the issue, and appeared before Congress to discuss 
Smart Start. He said, “The single most important investment that the na-
tion can make for its future is to provide comprehensive preschool prepa-
ration for every educationally and economically disadvantaged child in 
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the country.”17 Smart Start supporters treated this strong endorsement 
from a business group as further evidence that early childhood programs 
should be viewed as cost- effective investments.
Several other constituencies appeared at the hearings, suggesting wide-
spread interest in early childhood policy. One hearing featured a biparti-
san panel of governors who had been involved in early childhood educa-
tion. Several educational associations also appeared. For example, the 
National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) had convened 
its National Early Childhood Education Task Force in 1988, and an NASBE 
representative discussed what it had learned at hearings in Atlanta, Chi-
cago, Boston, and San Francisco.18 Other witnesses represented groups 
whose members worked with young children and their families, such as 
the National Alliance of Pupil Services Organizations.19 Another witness 
appeared on behalf of the National Black Child Development Institute, 
which was leading the Ad Hoc Day Care Coalition, a group of more than 
seventy organizations seeking to expand access to quality child care pro-
grams.20 This coalition resonated with the one that Marian Wright Edel-
man led in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
It is tempting to describe the expanding range of constituencies with 
an interest in early childhood policy as a resource for advocates of ex-
panded public investment, as the New York Times did in the aforemen-
tioned editorial, but doing so overstates their cohesiveness. While state 
officials, Head Start supporters, and the educational community agreed 
on the merits of expanded access to high- quality early childhood pro-
grams, they advanced competing visions of how to achieve that goal. Their 
main areas of disagreement illustrate how the existing policy repertoire 
constrained the options available to national lawmakers during the late 
1980s.
Several lawmakers and witnesses argued that any increased policy re-
form should, in the words of New Jersey governor Thomas H. Kean, “build 
on what we’ve got.”21 Testifying before Smart Start was formally intro-
duced, Kean advised, “Don’t create new mechanisms and new bureaucra-
cies.  .  .  . I would rather see you put your energies into nurturing these 
proven winners than proceed with a bill that departs from the basic prin-
ciples which have already proved successful.”22 Several senators expressed 
similar views. Kennedy explained, “Basically, my vision of Smart Start is 
that it is really a funding stream to build on existing agencies that are pro-
viding services within the community.”23 When another witness expressed 
concern that Smart Start would have a negative impact on Head Start, 
Kennedy responded, “We build on those types of programs which have 
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been effective for preschool children. We’re not trying to reinvent the 
wheel.”24 Senator Claiborne Pell (D- RI) argued that Smart Start would en-
able existing programs like Head Start and the Chapter I Compensatory 
Education Program to reach a greater percentage of eligible young chil-
dren: “We must be very sure as we go along that we build on the already- 
proven successes of the programs in being. What we need here is a tre-
mendous infusion of funds for this very good objective.”25 Senator 
Christopher Dodd (D- CT) said, “Smart Start . . . is intended to build upon 
already existing programs to upgrade their services, extend their hours. 
Obviously, we don’t want to duplicate programs if they already exist. That 
would be a waste of money.”26
Many witnesses also argued that Smart Start should build on existing 
programs. The president of the National Education Association claimed, 
“The most prudent investments build on existing programs.”27 A repre-
sentative of the National Association for the Education of Young Children 
used language echoing that of Senator Kennedy: “Given the tremendous 
need for services that exists, particular care must be given in both plan-
ning and implementation stages to avoid overlap and duplication of ser-
vices. . . . Resources are too desperately needed within the field to spend 
money on reinventing the wheel.”28 The prominence of this theme sug-
gested a consensus that Smart Start should not create a new program from 
scratch.
Witnesses disagreed, however, about the specific direction Smart Start 
should pursue. By 1988, the national government and many state govern-
ments allocated funds to early childhood programs, while community- 
based organizations and private- sector entities across the country pro-
vided preschool services. As a result, the witnesses representing these 
varied constituencies had different things in mind when they asked the 
senators to build on existing programs. The need for better coordination 
and program integration came up repeatedly. Even more revealing, how-
ever, is the fact that diverse witnesses who embraced the overall objec-
tives of Smart Start nonetheless viewed it as a potential threat to existing 
programs.
The governors who appeared before Congress hoped Smart Start 
would provide additional funding for but refrain from onerous mandates 
on state programs. They claimed that state governments, unlike other ju-
risdictions, were capable of marshaling the resources necessary to ensure 
that child development efforts were well coordinated and cost effective. 
They argued that the national government should be relegated to a sup-
port role. Minnesota governor Rudolph G. Perpich, a Democrat appearing 
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on behalf of the National Governors Association, focused “on how your 
early childhood legislative proposal can best assist and encourage our ef-
forts on the state level.”29 Perpich seemed to find a receptive audience. 
During his opening statement, Senator Kennedy had explained that he 
had asked the bipartisan panel of governors “for their ideas about how we 
can best complement the early childhood education programs in their 
states.”30
The fact that state officials lobbied for additional funds and authority is 
unremarkable, but it represented a sea change from the debates of the 
early 1970s. Recall that state officials felt excluded from the debate over the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act. Seventeen years later, the gover-
nors were consulted before similar legislation was introduced. Further-
more, Congress seemed to heed their requests. At a subsequent hearing, a 
witness praised Smart Start by saying, “[It] is dedicated to quality. It has 
the appropriate regulations. It is also building on state initiatives. . . . And 
that is a really valuable thing.”31
What explains this remarkable shift in the role of the states? The states 
were seen as integral players in early childhood policy partly because of 
their history of activity. Some of this activity dated back to the early 1970s, 
while some of it was of more- recent vintage. During an exchange with 
Perpich, Senator Orrin Hatch (R- UT) noted that the states “haven’t sat 
around waiting for the federal government to come up with solutions.”32 
Other witnesses also highlighted recent developments at the state level. 
One explained, “You could make [an] argument that since states have al-
ready begun, why create another agency to deliver educational services? It 
seems to me, that would be a replication of effort.”33 Another noted, “The 
individual states have already begun to move aggressively in the direction 
you propose. Your proposals, if adopted, will encourage all states to move 
and will greatly expand the programs in states and cities where movement 
had already begun.”34 Another witness praised Smart Start for its defer-
ence to the states: “Rather than attempting to impose a new uniform fed-
eral program, Smart Start builds on the active efforts of 23 states which 
have already begun preschool initiatives in the 1980s.”35 Smart Start was 
often described as a partnership between local, state, and national govern-
ments, a portrayal that would not have applied to the Comprehensive 
Child Development Act.
Another key concern was the relationship between Smart Start and 
Head Start. Smart Start supporters often invoked Head Start in claiming 
that the wider availability of preschool access would benefit children. 
Some Head Start supporters worried, however, that Smart Start would di-
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vert resources from a program they regarded as successful. The president 
of the National Head Start Association said, “We are concerned about the 
possible establishment of two federal funding streams. . . . [The] solution 
of taking money from Head Start and giving it to Smart Start is exactly 
what we fear.”36 Responding that Smart Start sought to support and en-
hance Head Start, Dodd acknowledged, “I appreciate your concern, be-
cause it is one expressed by an awful lot of people. In fact, I had that initial 
concern. Because I think Head Start has been so successful that I did not 
in any way want to see it diminished at all, or eroded, through well in-
tended legislative efforts that would distract dollars from a very worth-
while, proven, successful program.”37
Indeed, the possibility that the existence of Smart Start would have 
negative consequences for Head Start arose repeatedly. Pell described 
himself as “very concerned that these efforts not diminish successful ex-
isting programs such as Head Start and Chapter I.”38 A witness represent-
ing business and professional firms in Colorado noted that Head Start 
reached “far too few children and parents who are clearly eligible.  .  .  . 
[Head Start] must not be neglected by the Congress, even as you make 
additional forward movement with other proposals.”39 In addition to con-
cerns about Smart Start’s potential financial impact on Head Start, there 
was a possibility that the programs would compete for personnel. Staffers 
at Head Start centers and other community- based organizations generally 
received lower wages than public elementary school teachers, and some 
witnesses worried that these professionals would leave Head Start once 
they fulfilled Smart Start’s training requirements. One witness explained, 
“As public- funded programs come in, if they act as a drain to teaching 
staff, it can be a very serious problem in terms of what local communities 
are sometimes facing.”40 The mobilization of Head Start supporters illus-
trates how existing arrangements constrained the options of those who 
favored policy change. Because Head Start was generally viewed as suc-
cessful, senators emphasized how Smart Start would complement it and 
facilitate its expansion. They did not want to be perceived as promoting 
legislation that would potentially lead to its demise.
Finally, the educational community endorsed Smart Start and other 
early childhood initiatives but was an ambivalent ally. Governor James 
Blanchard of Michigan, a Democrat, described “elements in the education 
community that won’t support a major, new initiative in preschool until 
they receive what they feel are an adequate sum of dollars for their pro-
grams.”41 Educators worried about possible competition for scarce public 
funds, and the issue of administrative responsibility also provoked ten-
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sion. The tension surrounding prime sponsorship had helped derail the 
comprehensive legislation of the 1970s. Reprising that debate, several wit-
nesses insisted that Smart Start should give school systems the primary 
responsibility for running early childhood programs. The president of the 
National Education Association, noting that the schools offered safety, 
trained personnel, and facilities, argued “that the programs should not 
duplicate what we are offering in the public schools.”42 Albert Shanker of 
the American Federation of Teachers described prime sponsorship as an 
area of concern and said that state and local education agencies should be 
given administrative priority. He argued that “the education community 
at all levels has the major role to play in a new program such as Smart 
Start.”43
Other witnesses were skeptical of ceding too much control to the pub-
lic schools. They questioned whether public schools provided an appro-
priate pedagogical environment for young children: “[S]chools have not 
been known for allowing children a lot of freedom. And young children 
need that opportunity. . . . [T]hey learn in an active way, not sitting pas-
sively behind the desk.”44 The arguments advanced on both sides of the 
debate reflected tensions within the early childhood policy community. 
These tensions made coalition formation and maintenance difficult.
In sum, Smart Start’s ambitious scope and lack of success resonates 
with the comprehensive legislation of the 1970s. In the intervening years, 
however, shifts in the policy and political landscape had created fissures 
within the early childhood policy community. Representatives of state 
governments, Head Start, and the educational community appeared be-
fore Congress in an attempt to move the legislation in their desired direc-
tion, sometimes contradicting one another in the process. They endorsed 
the general idea of policy change but sought to prevent the creation of new 
programs that would impinge on their existing prerogatives. The existence 
of a diverse range of early childhood programs represented a political con-
straint for those who wanted to alter the status quo. This feedback dy-
namic made it more difficult to mobilize the support necessary to navigate 
the legislative process.
The Prekindergarten Early Dropout Intervention Act of 1988
Members of Congress considered several proposals that were less ambi-
tious than Smart Start. Senator Lawton Chiles (D- FL) introduced the Pre-
kindergarten Early Dropout Intervention Act of 1988, which would have 
authorized grants to local educational agencies, community- based orga-
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nizations, and nonprofit private organizations that operated early inter-
vention programs for dropout prevention. The main goal of the legisla-
tion, according to Chiles, was “to reduce the number of children who later 
drop out of school by providing high- quality early education which fo-
cuses on the development of language and cognitive skills.”45 It would 
have provided twenty- five million dollars to programs for three- and four- 
year- olds. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources held a 
hearing on the bill in May, but the chamber took no further action. De-
spite its limited legislative progress, the Senate testimony illustrated four 
important features of the debate over early childhood policy in the late 
1980s.
First, early childhood education was increasingly viewed through an 
economic lens and framed as an investment. Multiple witnesses cited its 
cost- effectiveness. A major theme of the hearing was that every dollar 
spent on preschool would pay for itself by reducing long- term spending 
on various government programs. One witness said of high school drop-
outs, “Many of these children will, of course, drop out of school, but they 
will not drop out of our lives. They will linger to haunt our pocketbooks, 
if not our individual or collective consciences. They will . . . fill our welfare 
rolls and our jails.”46 An academic researcher claimed that early childhood 
programs would reduce spending on the criminal justice system, welfare, 
and special education and would increase the taxable earnings of older 
youths.47 Other witnesses cited the results of the Perry Preschool Project 
and the recent report by the Committee for Economic Development in 
their calls for massive investments in prekindergarten and child care. 
Committee chairman Edward Kennedy summarized this line of argu-
ment: “We have benefited in recent times from the very convincing evi-
dence that this investment in early intervention— and it is an investment— 
has enormous potential.”48
Second, the bill’s supporters generally envisioned a circumscribed role 
for the national government. A representative of the American Federation 
of Teachers argued that “there is a federal role in providing leadership and 
support aimed at stimulating additional early childhood education ser-
vices.”49 Another witness explained, “One of the things that excites me 
about this bill is that it suggests that state and local agencies really do need 
to take a very strong role in implementing appropriate programs.”50 Mul-
tiple witnesses described the national government as an agenda- setting 
force that could highlight the significance of early childhood program-
ming or as a potential funding source. Program development was gener-
ally viewed as something that was better left to service providers or state 
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and local officials. Kennedy noted that national officials had “a lot to learn 
from the local experiences,” a sentiment that was not expressed during the 
hearings of the late 1960s and early 1970s.51 The Prekindergarten Early 
Dropout Intervention Act envisioned a demonstration project in which 
the national government would fund local projects and assess them to 
determine which ones merited expansion. This objective was less ambi-
tious than the goals espoused by Smart Start and the comprehensive legis-
lation of the 1970s.
Third, several witnesses characterized program coordination as crucial 
in light of the shifting programmatic terrain of early childhood policy. 
Describing a prekindergarten program in Florida, one witness noted, “In-
teragency cooperation, with Head Start, Title XX, church and private day 
care facilities, has improved markedly [and] resulted in joint efforts to im-
prove programs and share information and resources.”52 Other witnesses 
focused on the need for coordination between prekindergarten and Head 
Start. Chiles explained, “We see literally jealousies between people who 
are involved in Head Start and the educators on the other side, and many 
times there are overlapping bureaucracies and jurisdictions.”53 A repre-
sentative of the American Federation of Teachers expressed concern 
“about the relationship between these programs, Head Start, and other 
existing early childhood programs.”54 A witness representing the Ameri-
can Association of School Administrators (AASA) was blunter: “AASA 
does not believe it is necessary to create a new early childhood educational 
structure. Existing programs should be supplemented, not supplanted.”55 
This testimony suggests that existing stakeholders viewed the creation of 
new programs as potentially threatening. Program coordination was not 
only a bureaucratic problem to be addressed during implementation. It 
also represented a political hurdle to policy change. Existing providers 
wanted to expand access to preschool services but were wary of new pro-
grams that might encroach on what they perceived to be their turf.
Fourth, the question of service delivery continued to divide the early 
childhood policy community. Given the incremental nature of the mea-
sure being discussed, it is especially striking that witnesses zeroed in on 
the issue of administrative responsibility. The Prekindergarten Early 
Dropout Intervention Act would have enabled community- based organi-
zations and other nonprofit organizations to receive grants for early child-
hood education, and the educational community reacted warily. Noting 
that the proposal called for local matches and additional resources, they 
argued that local educational agencies possessed financial resources that 
they could dedicate to early childhood programs. A representative of the 
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American Federation of Teachers argued, “We believe that at the local 
level the mechanism for choosing the administering agency should em-
phasize the local education agency exclusively.”56 The AASA representa-
tive said, “We maintain that governance should be in the hands of local 
school boards where early childhood programs are provided.”57 Head 
Start centers, community- based organizations, and other providers found 
such proclamations troubling. Even in the context of incremental reform, 
the question of service delivery generated open hostility among different 
constituencies in the early childhood policy community.
Summary: The Changing Congressional Politics of  
Early Childhood Policy
The 1980s were a difficult period for advocates of a more expansive role for 
the national government in early childhood policy. Both comprehensive 
and incremental proposals failed to make much legislative progress. It was 
a decade “when all social service programs in this country were cut and 
were at risk.”58 Retrenchment replaced expansion as the overarching goal 
of policy change, and defenders of programs like Head Start focused on 
consolidating their earlier gains.
By the late 1980s, the rhetoric and the politics of early childhood policy 
had changed significantly. Supporters increasingly portrayed program ex-
pansion as a cost- effective long- term investment as they lobbied for a rela-
tively circumscribed role for the national government. Changes in the 
political terrain were even more important than these rhetorical shifts. In 
the years since Nixon’s veto, constituencies including the public schools, 
Head Start centers, and private service providers had developed stakes in 
this policy arena. They mobilized to defend their prerogatives whenever 
Congress considered changes to the status quo. Intramural squabbles 
within the early childhood policy community emerged in the context of 
both ambitious legislation, such as Smart Start, and incremental propos-
als, such as the Prekindergarten Early Dropout Intervention Act of 1988. 
While they were not the only factor that caused these bills and others like 
them to make limited progress, they represented a significant hurdle to 
policy change.
While major legislative proposals languished, the tax code continued 
to evolve in significant ways.59 By the end of the 1980s, the child and de-
pendent care credit amounted to 30 percent of qualifying expenses for 
those with adjusted gross incomes of ten thousand dollars or less. The 
credit amount then fell by a percentage point for each two thousand dol-
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lars of adjusted gross income over ten thousand dollars, until it bottomed 
out at 20 percent for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes greater than 
twenty- eight thousand dollars. The maximum amount of qualifying ex-
penses to which the credit could be applied was twenty- four hundred dol-
lars if one child was involved and forty- eight hundred dollars if two or 
more children were eligible. The maximum credit ranged from $480 to 
$720 annually for taxpayers with one eligible child and from $960 to 
$1,440 for taxpayers with two or more eligible children.60 In the eyes of its 
supporters, the tax credit facilitated parental choice and enabled various 
nongovernmental providers to deliver the desired services. It facilitated “a 
healthy pluralism of child care providers [and did] not create a monopo-
listic bureaucratic system.”61
The political dynamics surrounding early childhood policy in the late 
1980s illustrate the constraining effect of the existing policy repertoire.62 
Such stakeholders as state government officials, Head Start supporters, and 
the operators of public- and private- sector programs repeatedly told na-
tional lawmakers that they should build on the existing system. Testifying 
in 1990, the president of the California Child Care Resource and Referral 
Network asked Congress to “use our experience and our knowledge [and] 
learn from our mistakes and successes. We implore you to build on what 
we’ve got in California, and now elsewhere in the country; that you will 
build on a model that works.”63 This type of lobbying effort was not unique 
to the early childhood policy community. In the early 1980s, one study of 
American education policy noted that a “major effect of federal [educa-
tion] policy has been, for better or worse, to establish certain dependencies, 
interest group structures, and action channels across local, state, and fed-
eral levels” (Elmore and McLaughlin 1983, 320). In the context of early 
childhood education, these developments contributed to the fragmenta-
tion of a potential coalition supporting major policy change. Constituen-
cies that agreed on the desirability of program expansion failed to coalesce 
around a specific proposal, in part because they viewed the creation of new 
programs as a political threat. Moving the issue onto the congressional 
agenda proved significantly easier than did altering the status quo.
The Education Reform Movement and Early Childhood 
Policy in the States
The contours of education policy shifted dramatically during the 1980s, 
especially in terms of intergovernmental relations. Organizations of local 
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administrators, teachers, and school board members had traditionally 
dominated education policymaking, with state governments concentrat-
ing on such tasks as enforcing minimum standards for teachers and facili-
ties. The 1980s, however, were a period of centralization during which 
state governments exercised considerable authority. This shift “was led by 
a ‘new breed’ of governors who became far more involved in shaping local 
education policy than in years past” (Fusarelli 2002, 140; see also Wong 
2008). Inspired by several critical studies of American public education, 
including A Nation at Risk, many of them made education their top legis-
lative priority.
The need for reform was often portrayed as an economic necessity dur-
ing an era of rapid globalization. Governors and other state officials ar-
gued that stronger schools would attract businesses and jobs, because they 
believed that businesses valued educational systems that produced well- 
trained workers and provided quality schools for employees’ families. An 
economic recession and fear of increased economic competition from 
such countries as Japan contributed to the appeal of education reform, 
especially, but not only, in southern states (McDermott 2011). For exam-
ple, the Education Commission of the States proclaimed, “Increasing eco-
nomic competitiveness from foreign countries has stirred interest in 
greater productivity and in talent development. . . . International competi-
tion requires higher achievement for all students.”64 More- demanding 
school curriculums, stricter requirements for teachers, minimum compe-
tency tests for high school graduation, and a variety of other reforms were 
portrayed as ways to compete in the global economy. This “new politics of 
education productivity” affected how people discussed education reform 
and their perceptions of what was at stake (Cibulka 2001).
Two important political shifts accompanied the emergence of educa-
tion reform as an electoral issue. The first shift was the heightened involve-
ment of the business community. Many business leaders felt a strong stake 
in education reform and made a concerted effort to set the political agenda 
and influence policy decisions. The second shift was the more prominent 
role of national organizations and networks. The Education Commission 
of the States, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of 
Chief State School Officers, and the National Governors Association all 
accelerated their education policy activities during the 1980s (Mazzoni 
1995). Their involvement meant that even though many important policy 
changes occurred at the state level, “a national discussion shaped the way 
the problem was framed and the specific solutions were advocated” (Cib-
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ulka 2001, 25). Beginning in the early 1980s, the influence of national and 
international forces grew considerably (Mazzoni 1993).
The primary impact of the education reform movement was felt at the 
elementary and secondary levels, but it also aroused interest in early child-
hood education. The imposition of more- stringent standards generated a 
need for more remedial programs and a rationale for compensatory pre-
kindergarten programs. The results of the Perry Preschool Program re-
inforced this rationale by suggesting that low- income and disadvantaged 
children would benefit from early childhood education (Grubb 1987, 19).65 
In combination with the growing prevalence of working mothers and an 
emerging emphasis on moving welfare recipients into the workforce, the 
education reform movement placed early childhood policy on the politi-
cal agenda.
At least eleven states enacted some form of early childhood education 
between 1979 and 1987, and others used existing school- aid mechanisms 
to fund such programs in the schools. Several states formed commissions 
to study the options available to them (Grubb 1987, 1). It is important not 
to overstate the importance of these early childhood initiatives, however. 
They were generally limited in scope. Beginning in 1984, for example, 
school districts in Minnesota offered its Early Childhood Family Educa-
tion program to all families with children under age five. The program 
included parent discussion groups, home visits, parent- child activities, 
health and developmental screenings for children, and information about 
community services. In 1984, all school districts in Missouri were required 
to offer similar services through the state’s Parents as Teachers program. 
Arkansas created the Home Instruction Program for Preschool Young-
sters in 1986. It offered home visits from paraprofessionals and group ac-
tivities for the parents of at- risk four- and five- year- olds.66 Supporters of 
greater public investment praised these initiatives but noted that they fell 
far short of a comprehensive approach.
Several factors prevented the adoption of more- expansive programs, 
including their potential cost. Such exemplary initiatives as the Perry Pre-
school Program had high operating costs because they exhibited high 
adult- child ratios and employed staff with strong educational credentials. 
Policymakers therefore faced a trade- off between cost and quality: the 
most beneficial early childhood programs were likely to be very expensive. 
With finite resources, officials knew that high- quality programs would not 
be able to reach all of the young children who would potentially benefit. 
Universal, high- quality programs were not financially feasible. State pro-
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grams varied their services, operating hours, staff salaries, and other fea-
tures in order to accommodate these fiscal realities (Grubb 1987).
Divisions within the early childhood community represented a second 
obstacle to a more expansive approach. Diverse groups lobbied for ex-
panded access and funding, but they remained wary of one another. For 
example, virtually every major professional organization affiliated with 
the public schools endorsed universal schooling for four- year- olds, but 
their endorsements generated limited enthusiasm from groups represent-
ing child care providers and minority children. The National Association 
for the Education of Young Children and the National Black Child Devel-
opment Institute believed that traditional child care was incompatible 
with traditional kindergarten or first- grade education and felt that pro-
grams serving preschoolers should not fall under the aegis of the public 
school bureaucracy (McGill- Franzen 1993, 8). Educators downplayed the 
developmental content of early childhood programs, and early childhood 
professionals argued that the schools were too rigid and didactic to serve 
a younger constituency. This split led one observer to claim that “the real 
question for future policy is not whether these differences exist, but 
whether they can be contained and narrowed— whether educators and 
early childhood advocates can reach some compromise” (Grubb 1987, 29). 
Differences in teaching philosophies contributed to turf battles that pre-
vented the supporters of expanded preschool services from organizing 
themselves into a unified and effective political force.
In September 1989, the early childhood community received a boost 
when President George H. W. Bush called a meeting with the nation’s gov-
ernors to develop a plan to improve public education. The president, 
members of his cabinet, and the governors addressed several topics as 
they met for two days at the University of Virginia. Before the summit, the 
president of the Education Commission of the States described early 
childhood education as a potential discussion topic. He hoped that the 
summit would reset and refocus federal spending on early childhood and 
clarify the roles of the states and the national government. He argued that 
the “federal government must get its act together since multiple depart-
ments presently have differing approaches.”67 The executive director of the 
National Association of State Boards of Education said, “We are especially 
excited about the focus on goals for the nation and the states, and the at-
tention given to early childhood education.”68
As the summit concluded, President Bush and the governors issued a 
joint statement in which they committed themselves to developing a de-
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fined set of national education goals, to building a federal- state partner-
ship based on flexibility and accountability, and to restructuring educa-
tion in all states. The statement highlighted early childhood education at 
several points. The “readiness of children to start school” was the first item 
listed in its section on performance goals. The financial role of the na-
tional government was “to promote national education equity by helping 
our poor children get off to a good start in school.” The statement urged 
that “priority for any further funding increases be given to prepare young 
children to succeed in school.”69 The education summit, which drew sig-
nificant publicity as only the third time in American history that the pres-
ident called a meeting with the governors to discuss a single major issue, 
devoted considerable attention to school readiness and, by extension, to 
early childhood policy.70
In sum, many states attempted to increase the number of children en-
rolled in early childhood programs during the 1980s and early 1990s. They 
funded prekindergarten programs, supplemented Head Start, or did both. 
The number of states providing education- related services to 
prekindergarten- aged children nearly tripled from 1979 to the early 
1990s.71 Policy initiatives for three- and/or four- year- olds were endorsed 
by education commissioners and gubernatorial panels in such geographi-
cally and politically diverse states as California, Connecticut, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina 
(McGill- Franzen 1993, 4– 5).
Even after this period of activity, however, the reach of state early child-
hood education programs remained limited. By the mid- 1990s, twenty- 
five states funded their own programs, five supplemented Head Start, and 
nine did both. Most state- funded prekindergarten programs reached a 
limited clientele. The Arkansas Better Chance program, for example, 
served at- risk or poor three- to five- year- olds. Michigan spent $42.6 mil-
lion to support school districts operating comprehensive compensatory 
education programs for educationally disadvantaged four- year- olds in 
1994– 95. In 1993– 94, Oregon spent $24.5 million to support the needs of 
low- income three- and four- year- olds, early childhood special education 
services, and preschool children with disabilities. In most states where 
such services were offered, spending on prekindergarten programs repre-
sented 2 percent or less of total state school aid.72 Nationwide, publicly 
sponsored programs served only 8 percent of the approximately eleven 
million American children who attended preschools or some form of 
child care facility.73
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Conclusion: Policy Stability and Political Change
For the most part, the 1980s were a period of limited policy change. Many 
congressional initiatives were considered but ultimately rejected, and the 
state programs that gained enactment were mostly targeted programs that 
were narrow in scope. The most significant shifts in early childhood policy 
had to do with the political dynamics surrounding the issue. More con-
stituencies viewed themselves as stakeholders, and they mobilized both to 
voice their support for increased public investment and to protect their 
existing prerogatives. As the episodes profiled in this chapter make clear, 
it became increasingly difficult to construct a coherent coalition support-
ing major policy change. The political landscape began to shift in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however. The education summit drew heightened 
attention to the issue of school readiness, and a handful of developments 
at the state level suggested that more- profound changes might be in the 
offing.
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During the past fifteen years, national and state officials have devoted sub-
stantial attention to early childhood policy. After chronicling the demo-
graphic, intellectual, and political forces that returned the issue to the po-
litical agenda, this chapter focuses on the congressional developments of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the last two decades, Congress has 
held many hearings on early childhood policy and considered numerous 
legislative proposals. Its activity resulted in limited policy change, how-
ever, and evinced little interest in an expanded role for the national gov-
ernment.
The primary focus of contemporary congressional discussions illus-
trates how the legacy of previous policy decisions constrains the options 
available to reformers. Instead of recapitulating the debate over compre-
hensive programs, Congress paid more attention to program coordina-
tion. The creation and expansion of early childhood programs at the state 
and national levels led to concerns about duplication and inefficiency. 
Program coordination not only invoked administrative concerns. It also 
reflected the political challenges involved in altering existing arrange-
ments. Governors and state officials, Head Start supporters, and various 
educational and professional associations viewed themselves as having a 
stake in the education and care of young children.
These constituencies agreed on the merits of investing additional pub-
lic resources, portraying additional spending as a cost- effective invest-
ment in the country’s future. They also agreed that national lawmakers 
should build on existing programs rather than implementing new initia-
tives. Each of them had programmatic turf to defend, however, and they 
reacted warily to proposals they perceived as encroaching on their pre-
rogatives. As a result, translating increased interest in early childhood into 
concrete policy change proved difficult. Even when the different groups 
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agreed that changes were desirable, they could not agree on the form those 
changes should take.
Increased Interest in Early Childhood Education
Early childhood policy gained heightened prominence in the late 1990s. 
Scholars attributed this “surge of interest” to such forces as female em-
ployment patterns, neuroscience research, and a political emphasis on 
school readiness (Clifford et al. 2005, 127). In some ways, these forces were 
analogous to the demographic, intellectual, and political factors that 
placed early childhood policy on the national political agenda in the 
1960s. Indeed, the rhetoric used to justify attention to this policy arena 
resonated with the claims of an earlier era.
Changes in the American workforce contributed to the renewed inter-
est in early childhood policy. The percentage of mothers working outside 
the home rose sharply between the Second World War and 1970, and this 
trend continued for the next quarter century. By 2000, 53 percent of mar-
ried mothers with infants, 59 percent of unmarried mothers with infants, 
and more than 60 percent of mothers with children under age three were 
in the labor force.1 Supporters of government intervention argued that of-
ficials should accommodate this trend rather than debating its desirability. 
One report explained, “These changes are unlikely to be temporary shifts 
in social and economic patterns. . . . Employed parents, and young chil-
dren needing high- quality early care and education options, are a fact of 
life in today’s world.”2 Labor force participation patterns were described as 
one of the “contemporary realities” that justified doing more for young 
children than American society had done in the past.3 They did not neces-
sitate a specific course of action but “generate[d] pressure for schools to 
deal with day care, early childhood education, after- school care and pro-
posals for new school calendars.”4
Intellectual trends also contributed to the renewed interest in early 
childhood policy. In the late 1990s, supporters of program expansion in-
voked neuroscience research to make the case for additional public invest-
ment. They argued, “A steadily growing body of scientific evidence [sug-
gests] that the quality of young children’s environment and social 
experience lays the groundwork for success in school and has a decisive 
impact on children’s lives.”5 It was discovered that the fetal brain begins 
early in pregnancy to form the trillions of brain cell connections it will use 
during its lifetime. This rapid development continues through a child’s 
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early years and does not begin to taper off until around age eleven. The 
plasticity of the brain meant that early positive experiences could help fa-
cilitate future learning and cognition. Negative environments would have 
the opposite effect, but their impact could be mitigated if such conditions 
were reversed.6 Scientists found that “countless potential connections may 
wither away or never form at all” without a healthy prenatal environment 
and appropriate sensory input starting at birth.7 One supporter concluded, 
“The brain, that great plastic vessel of expanding knowledge, is a won-
drous device that undergoes exponential growth in the earliest years at a 
rate unequalled at any later age. Opportunities not exploited during the 
preschool years may be lost forever” (Maeroff 2006, 36– 37). This melodra-
matic language was fairly common.
By emphasizing the significance of a nurturing and stimulating envi-
ronment during the early years and suggesting that the absence of such an 
environment would produce “long- term costs to children and society,”8 
neuroscience research provided preschool supporters with another item 
for their rhetorical tool kit. To them, the research findings “looked like 
nuggets of pure gold” (Kirp 2007, 100). They argued that custodial pro-
grams were insufficient to facilitate brain development and that only edu-
cational programs would have a positive impact. Thus intellectual forces 
played a crucial role in raising the public profile of early childhood policy. 
One scholar describes a “near- consensus that the academic research on 
brain development in infants has been enormously influential at focusing 
attention on the importance of a child’s experiences in the early years on 
subsequent development” (L. White 2004, 670).
The education reform movement and the related emphasis on “school 
readiness” increased the prominence of the economic rationale for invest-
ing in early childhood initiatives. Proponents argued that the long- term 
benefits individuals gained by attending a high- quality preschool program 
redounded to society as a whole in terms of reduced spending on welfare 
and criminal justice programs and the existence of a well- trained work-
force that was better able to compete in the global economy. Some econo-
mists portrayed high- quality early childhood education as a smart public 
investment that would produce a strong return. Their findings enabled 
preschool supporters to “appeal directly to pocketbook interests” (Kirp 
2007, 92). For example, New York lieutenant governor Betsy McCaughey 
Ross argued that an expansion of prekindergarten would lead to reduced 
state spending on special education.9 Arguments about the cost- 
effectiveness of preschool were common by the late 1990s.
Indeed, advocates focused intensely on the economic benefits of early 
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childhood spending.10 They argued that preschool attendance would help 
ameliorate disparities in school readiness among children of different eth-
nicities and socioeconomic statuses and that children who entered kin-
dergarten “ready to learn” would be less likely to need remedial services. 
Supporters cited the North Carolina Abecedarian Project, the Perry Pre-
school Project, and the Chicago Child- Parent Centers as examples of cost- 
effective preschool programs. Colorado governor Roy Romer, a Demo-
crat, explained that he had “become increasingly convinced that the early 
childhood years represent a significant opportunity to implement public 
policy actions that can help us address some of our most pressing social 
problems— school dropouts, welfare dependence, crime and youth vio-
lence.”11 Many preschool supporters shared his views.
Early Childhood Policy in the 1990s: Heightened Salience 
but Limited Change
The demographic, intellectual, and political forces described in the pre-
ceding section helped place early childhood policy on the national politi-
cal agenda in the 1990s. Despite heightened interest in the topic and the 
inauguration of President Bill Clinton, the nation’s first Democratic chief 
executive in more than a decade, no major shifts in national policy oc-
curred. The Clinton administration “strongly support[ed] early childhood 
intervention strategies” (Wong 1995, 30). It “placed a high priority on 
steady increases in early childhood funding.”12 Its most important pro-
grammatic innovation was Early Head Start, a federally funded 
community- based program for low- income pregnant women and families 
with infants and toddlers. Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna 
Shalala formed an advisory committee in 1994 to design Early Head Start, 
which “evolved out of Head Start’s long history of providing services to 
infants and toddlers.”13 The program served children under the age of 
three and represented an extension of what already existed, rather than a 
new policy direction. The creation of Early Head Start epitomized the tra-
jectory of early childhood policy during an era of heightened political sa-
lience but incremental policy change.
The absence of innovation was not due to a lack of interest. Goals 2000, 
the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
declared that by the year 2000, all children in the United States would 
enter school ready to learn. Legislators and executive branch officials at 
the national level concentrated on the relationship between student 
The Congressional Heritage of a Critical Juncture | 159
achievement and what happened before children entered school, leading 
to a heightened focus on early childhood education. For example, the U.S. 
commissioner of education statistics described early childhood education 
as a “critical area of focus.”14 Several corporations expressed an interest in 
the education of young children. For example, DuPont offered financial 
incentives to encourage child care programs in Delaware to pursue ac-
creditation through the National Association for the Education of Young 
Children, because it believed that the existing state licensing requirements 
were minimal. The corporation hoped that the incentives would “commu-
nicate the message that [it] believed in the importance of good- quality 
care.”15
In 1997, the White House hosted two conferences on early childhood 
policy. The first, entitled “What New Research on the Brain Tells Us about 
Our Youngest Children,” focused on recent advances in developmental 
neuroscience. It sought to bring heightened attention to the educational 
content of programs serving young children. The second conference was a 
multidisciplinary, multiday affair that was intended to galvanize nation-
wide interest in the education and care of young children. It seemed suc-
cessful initially. According to David Kirp (2007, 150), the conference 
caused attendees to consider “expanding Early Head Start and Head Start 
to include working- and middle- class families, or helping parents to be-
come better consumers of child care, or adopting nationwide quality stan-
dards, or maybe even enacting a version of the fabled 1971 [Comprehen-
sive] Child Development Act.”
It did not take long, however, for this enthusiasm to evaporate. Advo-
cates grew frustrated with the pace of change, arguing that lawmakers had 
not done nearly enough to pursue their school readiness goals. One activ-
ist complained, “It would be as if we had declared our national intent to go 
to the moon and back in a decade but had not created NASA or a new 
space center to make sure that it happened.”16 The absence of major new 
funding or major new programs frustrated those who had expected the 
1990s to be a more auspicious era.
Program coordination was a major stumbling block, due to the exist-
ing maze of competing programs administered by different agencies at 
different levels of government. According to the Government Account-
ability Office, the national government administered approximately ninety 
early childhood programs through eleven agencies and twenty offices by 
the late 1990s.17 In 1997, slightly over half of the federal funds devoted to 
early childhood were administered by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, the Treasury Department was responsible for approximately 
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one- fourth of the funds, and the Department of Agriculture and Depart-
ment of Education were each responsible for about one- tenth of the 
funds.18 This extraordinary range did not include the rising number of 
programs administered by subnational governments. Major program-
matic change would therefore require the administrators and constituen-
cies who benefited from existing arrangements to set aside their jurisdic-
tional turf battles and work together. Although many of them 
acknowledged the desirability of better coordination, they could not agree 
on how best to achieve this objective.
In 1999, a Senate committee held two days of hearings on program 
coordination in early childhood education. Senators and witnesses de-
scribed jurisdictional conflicts among existing programs and lamented 
their effects. According to Senator Richard Durbin (D- IL), “Some of the 
agencies involved here and some of the people involved here, despite their 
best intentions, get caught up in a mind set, a turf battle, jurisdictional 
problems. . . . That is a recipe for duplication and inefficiency.”19 Senator 
George Voinovich (R- OH) pointed out that a key hurdle to program coor-
dination was the fact that the disparate government agencies involved in 
early childhood did not share the same goals. For example, the Depart-
ment of Education prioritized school readiness to a greater extent than did 
the Department of Health and Human Services.20 Like his Democratic 
colleague, Voinovich worried that the multiplicity of existing programs 
was inefficient. He said, “I cannot believe that out of all of these education 
programs that we have got up here, there are not some of them that ought 
to be closed down or, in the alternative, the money that is being spent 
could be better allocated into something that is going to provide a better 
return in terms of investment.”21 It was easier to draw rhetorical attention 
to the shortcomings of the status quo, however, than it was to address 
them.
The relationship between Head Start and other early childhood pro-
grams drew special scrutiny. A representative of the Department of Educa-
tion described the challenges involved in coordinating Head Start and the 
Child Care and Development Block Grant. She explained, “A lot of our 
work . . . is about how to work with both communities and states in build-
ing partnerships across those two pieces.”22 Successful collaborations had 
occurred in some states. Voinovich described how the expansion of Head 
Start in Ohio was made possible by locating Head Start centers and child 
care programs “at the same place so you do not duplicate the physical fa-
cilities.”23 The sharing of facilities represented a basic form of coordination, 
however, and most observers hoped for more- extensive collaboration.
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The relationship between Head Start and the public school system also 
received substantial attention. Tensions between these two constituencies 
dated at least to the mid- 1970s, when the American Federation of Teach-
ers proposed a universal system of preschool run under the auspices of the 
public schools. Head Start supporters were wary of this administrative 
prescription and worried that the schools would not offer developmen-
tally appropriate programming. This disagreement represented a crucial 
hurdle to program coordination and arose repeatedly in the late 1990s. 
Durbin asked witnesses to discuss “this whole question of whether or not 
integrating [Head Start] into the school system is really putting a clash 
between two cultures that have been created over the last three decades.”24 
Many witnesses provided anecdotal examples of collaboration and sug-
gested that the two constituencies were taking steps to confront the issue. 
They nevertheless acknowledged that significant gaps remained and that 
more work needed to be done. One witness pointed out that Head Start 
leaders tended to view themselves as offering a comprehensive child de-
velopment program that included educational services, whereas school 
leaders tended to view themselves as part of the educational system.25
The hearings focused on program coordination at the national level, 
but several witnesses claimed that the issue was also relevant in the states. 
Senator John Edwards (D- NC) explained, “I have been in a bunch of Head 
Start centers, and I have been in a lot of Smart Start centers, and I had this 
visceral reaction that there is very little coordination.”26 He was troubled 
by program overlap and service gaps, and his observations are especially 
striking because the state- level Smart Start program to which he referred 
was often portrayed as exemplary. Coordination across government levels 
was a related issue. One Department of Education official explained that 
her agency wanted to help states and local communities provide high- 
quality early childhood education. When she convened meetings with 
various stakeholders, however, she often found that they were suspicious 
of one another: “There was a lot of discomfort initially. People [felt] they 
were going to lose their identity and might even lose their funding.”27 Tak-
ing the time to overcome these initial suspicions was essential because 
“the personal relationships really matter in order to get past the turf battles 
and the other obstacles. People need to know each other and be able to 
pick up the phone to talk to each other.”28 Systematically addressing the 
shortcomings of the status quo proved difficult despite this heightened 
emphasis on program coordination.
In sum, a supportive presidential administration and multiple confer-
ences on early childhood education produced minimal policy change at 
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the national level. A crucial obstacle to more- encompassing changes was 
the difficulty of bringing together a unified supporting coalition. The pro-
grammatic fragmentation that characterized early childhood policy meant 
that multiple stakeholders had turf to protect. They reacted warily to pro-
posals to change the status quo (even if these proposals sought only to 
coordinate existing programs), because they feared that change would 
negatively affect their administrative prerogatives or their budgets. Frag-
mentation among the early childhood policy community was not, of 
course, the only obstacle to major policy change. The Republicans who 
took over both houses of Congress after the 1994 midterm elections viewed 
the retrenchment of government programs as a top objective. It is there-
fore revealing that similar issues emerged as stumbling blocks once Re-
publicans controlled Congress and the presidency in the early 2000s.
Early Childhood Programs and the Presidency  
of George W. Bush
By the early 2000s, there was bipartisan agreement that early childhood 
programs merited increased public investment. Democrats and Republi-
cans pointed to neuroscience research suggesting the long- term signifi-
cance of children’s experiences before the age of five and agreed, in broad 
terms, about its policy implications. At a February 2002 hearing on early 
childhood education, Senator Christopher Dodd (D- CT) asserted, “We 
are no longer arguing about the science of this.  .  .  . As far as I am con-
cerned, that debate is over with.”29 An exchange between conservative Re-
publican Christopher Bond (R- MO) and liberal director Rob Reiner en-
capsulated the emerging consensus about the need for greater government 
involvement. As the hearing concluded, Bond acknowledged its consen-
sual tone, “I mentioned to Rob Reiner that it is unfortunate that we agree 
on everything, because this place thrives on controversy. . . . If there is not 
a fight, it does not get covered, and I do not see anybody picking any fights 
today.”30
This emerging consensus did not lead to major policy changes, how-
ever. Republicans and Democrats focused on different dimensions of re-
form, and activists and other stakeholders offered their own policy pre-
scriptions that rarely matched those of the officeholders they lobbied. 
During the presidency of George W. Bush, Congress held numerous hear-
ings on early childhood policy. The hearings focused on school readiness, 
cognitive development, public- private partnerships, preschool access, 
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program quality, and other issues. Most participants agreed that policy 
change was desirable, but they disagreed on the proper course of action.
Two issues proved especially controversial. First, the proposals of the 
early 2000s reignited the long- standing debate over the appropriate edu-
cational content of programs for children under five. Several initiatives 
emphasized early literacy and were criticized for neglecting other dimen-
sions of child development. A second divisive issue concerned the appro-
priate way to address program fragmentation. There was nearly unani-
mous agreement that the existing system was fragmented and that such 
fragmentation was counterproductive, but proposals to integrate services 
aroused the suspicions of existing stakeholders.
Cognitive Development and Early Childhood Education
The signature education initiative of the early 2000s was the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB). The central pillar of NCLB was accountability, which 
it sought to achieve through an extensive system of testing and a require-
ment that all schools, districts, and states make annual progress toward 
the goal of bringing all their students at least to “academic proficiency” by 
the end of the 2013– 14 school year.31 Although NCLB focused on elemen-
tary and secondary education, it had ramifications for early childhood 
policy because some members of Congress viewed its application to pre-
school education as a logical extension.
Two other features of NCLB were relevant to early childhood policy. 
The first, the Early Childhood Educator Professional Development Pro-
gram, provided competitive grants to partnerships providing high- 
quality professional development to early childhood educators working 
with children from birth through kindergarten entry who came from 
low- income families in high- need communities. The second, Early Read-
ing First, sought to enable children to start school with the skills they 
needed to become proficient readers. Early Reading First targeted chil-
dren from low- income families and awarded grants directly to a variety 
of early learning programs, including Head Start and private child care 
providers.32
Shortly after signing NCLB into law in early 2002, President Bush 
launched his initiative Good Start, Grow Smart. This proposal sought to 
strengthen the academic focus of Head Start programs, encourage states 
to develop quality criteria for early childhood programs that were aligned 
with their K– 12 standards, and expand research into effective prereading 
and language curricula and teaching strategies. One administration offi-
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cial explained, “The goal is to use the findings of scientifically- based re-
search, particularly in the area of reading, to strengthen the education 
component of federal early childhood programs so that such programs 
effectively help prepare children for success in school.”33 With its focus on 
early literacy, the goals of Good Start, Grow Smart resonated with those of 
NCLB.
Even before the launch of Good Start, Grow Smart, the Bush adminis-
tration had evinced a preference for programs that prioritized cognitive 
development. In February 2001, First Lady Laura Bush unveiled an initia-
tive called Ready to Read, Ready to Learn, which “helped put early learn-
ing into the national spotlight.”34 Its two main goals were “first, to ensure 
that all young children are ready to read and learn when they enter their 
first classroom; and second, to help our Nation recruit the best and the 
brightest to become teachers, especially in classrooms in our most impov-
erished neighborhoods.”35 Reading skills and teacher recruitment would 
play prominent roles during subsequent congressional discussions. Dur-
ing the summer of 2001, the White House brought together hundreds of 
educators, researchers, librarians, business leaders, and federal officials for 
the Summit on Early Childhood Cognitive Development. At the summit, 
the administration announced the formation of an interagency task force 
“that will work to determine the best ways to ensure young children enter 
school ready to learn,” and the secretary of education announced a plan to 
overhaul Head Start by placing a heightened emphasis on the develop-
ment of literacy and prereading skills.36 These diverse initiatives shared a 
focus on early literacy.
Critics of the administration’s initiatives asserted that early childhood 
programs should pursue broader objectives. They favored a “whole child” 
approach that incorporated social and emotional development in addition 
to prereading skills. Edward Zigler explained, “If we want a nation of read-
ers, we have to look beyond teaching phonics. We have to look at the 
whole child, the parents, and at all of the people and experiences that 
make up the child’s early learning environment.”37 Another congressional 
witness made a similar appeal. He noted that behavioral problems com-
promised the learning of many young children and argued, “If we really 
want to enhance children’s readiness for school, then we must pay as much 
attention to the development of their social and emotional competence as 
we do to their cognitive and linguistic abilities. . . . Knowing the alphabet 
on your first day of school is not enough if you can’t sit still or control your 
temper in the classroom.”38
Critics did not dispute the significance of cognitive development but 
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argued that focusing exclusively on literacy would be myopic if programs 
did not address children’s physical, social, and emotional development. 
Others worried that the accountability provisions of NCLB would trickle 
down to preschool- aged children and claimed that such testing would be 
counterproductive. One critic claimed, “People worry for good reason 
about subjecting children to experiences that really could be harmful and 
certainly would not enhance their cognitive development.”39
The disagreement about the appropriate educational content of early 
childhood programs recapitulated a long- standing controversy about 
what such programs should accomplish. Some viewed them as custodial 
programs designed to assist working parents, while others viewed them as 
a means of facilitating child development. Even popular programs like 
Head Start were affected by this ongoing debate. In 2003, the Bush admin-
istration introduced a standardized assessment that was to be given to all 
Head Start students twice a year. Early childhood experts contended that 
the test was an inappropriate tool and would produce data of questionable 
usefulness due to its focus on letter, number, and word recognition. Con-
gress ultimately halted the test in 2007 (E. Rose 2010, 206).
Head Start supporters frequently reminded other interested parties 
that the program pursued nutritional, social, and other goals in addition 
to its educational objectives. During a hearing on the appropriate role of 
the national government in early childhood education and care, Christo-
pher Dodd noted that the balance between developmental and other goals 
varied across existing programs. He lamented that developmental stan-
dards had not been included in the Child Care and Development Block 
Grant program, explaining that “any effort we made to set additional de-
velopmental standards or qualities that teachers ought to have and so 
forth  .  .  . was vehemently opposed at the time and has been over the 
years.”40 His observations highlighted how long- standing divides within 
this policy arena had hardened over time, making policy change even 
more difficult. Those with a stake in the status quo viewed potential 
changes with suspicion, a feedback dynamic that affected the reauthoriza-
tion of Head Start.
Program Coordination, Block Grants, and Head Start
By the early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans agreed that program frag-
mentation represented one of the most glaring deficiencies of the status 
quo. The gradual evolution of early childhood policy had created a pleth-
ora of funding streams and programs, many of which served narrow con-
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stituencies. Senator James Jeffords (I- VT) explained, “Currently, parents 
must work through a maze of programs and an array of funding streams 
to learn about or gain access to quality early care and education programs. 
And, what we don’t need is another narrowly tailored program which only 
addresses the needs of a few and provides few dollars.”41 Many congres-
sional witnesses used similar language as they lamented this fragmenta-
tion. Rob Reiner described the existing system as a “haphazard, under-
funded, incoherent approach that does not meet the needs of this vast 
majority of our nation’s youngest children.”42 Edward Zigler said that the 
“variable quality and persistent fragmentation [of existing programs] re-
sult in a confusing array of services for families, marked inefficiencies in 
the use of public and private resources, a difficult environment for assur-
ing accountability and assessing impacts, and significant inequalities in 
access to programs that are most effective.”43 Program fragmentation, in 
sum, contributed to an inefficient use of societal resources and an uneven 
playing field for young children. The issue elicited sufficient concern that 
a House subcommittee held a hearing in April 2005 on “improvement 
through integration.” Witnesses from Georgia, Oklahoma, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, and elsewhere talked about collaborative efforts in their 
respective states, focusing primarily on the relationship between Head 
Start and other programs.
Program coordination was thought to be particularly problematic in 
the context of Head Start. When it was created in 1965, Head Start repre-
sented the only opportunity for many disadvantaged children and families 
to receive developmental services. By the turn of the twenty- first century, 
however, several national and state programs were pursuing similar goals. 
The programs evolved along separate tracks, with only “minimal formal 
coordination of efforts across child care, early intervention of services of 
children with disabilities, and preschool programs with Head Start.”44 
Many observers, worried that the proliferation of early childhood pro-
grams was leading to inefficiencies, argued that coordinating or possibly 
integrating these programs was desirable. Such integration was difficult to 
achieve, because the programs operated by different, sometimes incom-
patible, rules. For example, the eligibility cutoff for Head Start was lower 
than that of every federal and state- funded child care program and many 
state prekindergarten programs. This variation made it “challenging to 
bring together children in the same classroom.”45
In many states, Head Start and public prekindergarten programs had 
different governance structures. In Georgia, Head Start was “governed by 
a local entity, policy councils, and board of directors whereby parents take 
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a very active role in the governance of the program. [The] Georgia Pre- K 
Program is governed on the state level, through contractual agreements 
with [its] providers.”46 Governance structures affected jurisdiction over 
programs, implicitly invoking the prime sponsorship debate that re-
mained controversial. Local Head Start leaders were wary of ceding to 
state governments the authority they had traditionally exercised. One 
practitioner explained, “One of the strengths of Head Start . . . is its local 
autonomy, and in some instances that very strength becomes an impedi-
ment to collaboration and coordination, because local programs do not 
have to do that if they choose not to.”47 Many Head Start supporters viewed 
collaboration as undesirable.
In addition, Head Start and other early childhood programs some-
times viewed one another as competitors for scarce resources and staff. In 
the early 2000s, there was a concerted effort to increase the number of 
college graduates in Head Start classrooms. Supporters of more- stringent 
degree and certification requirements, including the Children’s Defense 
Fund, the National Association for the Education of Young Children, and 
the National Institute for Early Education Research,48 said that such re-
quirements would “dramatically improve cognitive development, lan-
guage, prereading, and premathematical skills in our young children as 
well as their social skills and emotional well- being.”49 Skeptics worried 
that individuals with bachelor’s degrees and specialized training in early 
childhood would move to public school kindergartens where they could 
earn approximately twice as much50 and receive benefits that private Head 
Start providers typically could not afford.51 One member of Congress 
asked, “How is Head Start going to compete? . . . As you get to those eco-
nomically competitive requirements, it is going to be more difficult for 
Head Start groups who are running the programs.”52 Without more- 
effective coordination, additional funding for Head Start, or another solu-
tion, critics worried that raising the educational credentials of Head Start 
staffers would have negative consequences.
The debate over program integration came to a head with the intro-
duction of the School Readiness Act of 2003, which would have reautho-
rized Head Start for five years. Bill supporters argued that the legislation 
built on the “astounding success” of the program,53 but Head Start sup-
porters were troubled by its attempt at program integration. The main tar-
get of their ire was Title II, which allowed states “that have exhibited a 
substantial dedication to early childhood education and care” to partici-
pate in a statewide demonstration program.54 Advocates of this provision 
claimed that it would better integrate preschool programs with Head Start 
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and address the problematic patchwork nature of early childhood policy. 
Representative Michael Castle (R- DE), chair of the House Subcommittee 
on Education Reform, noted, “By coordinating efforts to recruit children, 
developing state guidelines for care, aligning school readiness standards 
with K– 12 goals, and other activities, a state can leverage resources to 
spend funding more efficiently and also serve additional children better.”55 
Similarly, the deputy executive director of the Council of Chief State 
School Officers wrote that a unified statewide effort would assure “greater 
consistency among programs and the cost benefit of a statewide system.”56 
In sum, supporters claimed that the statewide demonstration project 
would increase the coherence of the existing system and improve program 
quality.
The Head Start community and its congressional allies, in contrast, 
viewed Title II as a block grant proposal that would water down or possi-
bly dismantle Head Start. Representative Lynn Woolsey (D- CA) argued 
that the standards for state participation in the demonstration program 
were too weak, characterizing Title II as “one huge super waiver of current 
Head Start law that will weaken and eventually . . . kill Head Start.”57 Crit-
ics worried that the legislative language did too little to guarantee that 
participating states would preserve the quality standards and comprehen-
sive services that made Head Start successful. One witness explained, 
“There are no guarantees, no requirements for performance standards, no 
enforcement mechanisms, and no specific minimum standards about 
classroom size, teacher- student ratio or teacher education.”58 Critics found 
the absence of such language very troubling.
One potential solution was to require that states meet existing perfor-
mance requirements in order to receive block grant money. Critics re-
sponded that such a requirement would render Title II unnecessary. If the 
goal of the measure was to build on the successes of Head Start, they ar-
gued, why include the block grant proposal? Opponents of the School 
Readiness Act also worried about how states would use their newfound 
authority. Their primary concern was financial. Sending unrestricted 
block grants to the states during an economic crisis made it possible that 
cash- strapped states would use the funds to address their broader fiscal 
problems. Critics feared that the quality and comprehensive services of 
Head Start would be diluted simply because the states could not afford to 
maintain them.
Supporters of the School Readiness Act denied that it would weaken 
Head Start. Castle explained, “[T]his should not be taken as a threat or . . . 
as something which is going to be necessarily detrimental to Head Start. It 
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is an effort to improve Head Start, and I would hope we would all look at 
it from that point of view.”59 The accusation that the bill would lead to the 
dismantling of Head Start, defenders claimed, was not consistent with its 
substance or congressional intent. They pointed out that many states ad-
ministered early learning standards exceeding those of Head Start, sug-
gesting that Title II “would entrust states to raise the bar for early child-
hood programs and develop cohesive, rational systems serving their 
youngest learners.”60 Supporters and opponents of the School Readiness 
Act viewed it through divergent lenses, and the measure became em-
broiled in partisan politics. The House eventually passed the bill by a 217– 
216 vote. All 203 Democrats voted against it and were joined by twelve 
Republicans and one Independent. The proposal died in the Senate, which 
took no action on it.
The debate over Title II illustrates the difficulty of reforming the frag-
mented and decentralized system of early childhood policy. Most observ-
ers agreed that better coordination among existing programs was desir-
able, yet the defenders of individual programs were suspicious of change 
and jealously guarded their prerogatives. Proponents of the School Readi-
ness Act recognized the need to engage Congress, the executive branch, 
the states, and “the many other stakeholders in the Head Start program.”61 
Their effort to do so was unsuccessful.
In fact, the dispute over the bill generated a minicontroversy about the 
political activities of the National Head Start Association (NHSA), which 
opposed Title II. On May 8, 2003, the associate commissioner of the Head 
Start Bureau sent a letter to all Head Start programs warning them that 
their “political activities are governed and, in many ways, restricted or 
limited by Federal law.” The letter claimed that an advocacy group, pre-
sumably the NHSA, was encouraging programs “to use Head Start pro-
gram funds and/or staff in a manner that is in direct violation of the laws 
that govern your political activities.”62 The executive director of the NHSA 
responded that the letter’s legal references and “vague accusation of im-
propriety have had the effect of chilling the exercise of free speech expres-
sion by Head Start programs and their representatives.”63 This heated ex-
change suggests that both sides recognized the political significance of 
policy feedback. The mobilization of Head Start supporters like the NHSA 
represented a hurdle to policy change and helped preserve the status quo.
After the demise of the School Readiness Act, Congress worked on the 
reauthorization of Head Start for another four years. Program coordina-
tion and the removal of barriers to such coordination remained a central 
issue. In 2005, Castle said, “Head Start should be working toward integrat-
170 | Early Start
ing services with other school readiness programs and not competing 
against them.”64 His revised proposal, which would have given the states 
more authority over Head Start, did not gain enactment.65 President Bush 
finally signed a Head Start reauthorization measure into law on December 
12, 2007. It increased spending for Head Start, expanded eligibility for en-
rollment, eliminated the controversial standardized test that had been 
given twice a year to all four- and five- year- old enrollees, and set more- 
stringent educational credential requirements for Head Start teachers.66 
These changes, while important, left the basic structure of Head Start in-
tact. They did not fundamentally alter the relationship between the pro-
gram and other early childhood initiatives.
The Obama Administration and Early Childhood Programs
In 2007, Representative Mazie Hirono (D- HI) introduced the Providing 
Resources Early for Kids (PRE- K) Act. She called it a “federal/state part-
nership to provide better preschool opportunities for our country’s chil-
dren.”67 Such language would have been unthinkable in the early 1970s, 
when members of the early childhood policy community wanted to by-
pass the states completely and often succeeded in doing so. The PRE- K 
Act directed the secretary of education to award matching grants to states 
to enhance state- funded preschool programs. The grants would be 
awarded through a competitive process and could be used to increase the 
qualifications of and benefits provided to program staff, decrease class 
sizes and improve teacher- student ratios, provide comprehensive services, 
and extend program hours per day and weeks per year.
On June 25, 2008, the House Committee on Education and Labor ap-
proved the PRE- K Act by a resounding 31– 11 margin. Like so many other 
congressional initiatives, however, it did not become law. Even though 
120 members of the House had signed on as cosponsors, the committee 
vote proved to be the final action taken by that chamber on the pro-
posal.68 Supporters of a more expansive role for the national government 
in early childhood policy were unable, once again, to achieve their pri-
mary objective.
The presidential election of 2008, however, led many advocates to be-
lieve they were on the verge of a major policy breakthrough. After Barack 
Obama’s victory, they were “atremble with anticipation over [his] espousal 
of early childhood education.”69 The new president had campaigned on a 
comprehensive platform for early childhood. During the campaign, he 
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pledged to establish a Presidential Early Learning Council to coordinate 
federal, state, and local policies; to quadruple financing for Early Head 
Start; to provide challenge grants for states to use for early childhood pro-
grams; and to expand home visiting programs for low- income mothers. 
These initiatives remained a high priority for the administration despite 
the recession, and opposition to them seemed to be less intense than it had 
been in the past.70 Three years later, however, some advocates expressed 
disappointment. Acknowledging that the Obama administration had 
launched several relevant initiatives, they wanted it to make early child-
hood an even higher priority.71
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), popularly 
known as the “stimulus,” included several provisions with implications for 
early childhood programs. It provided a total of $13 billion in supplemen-
tal funding for Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
Both Congress, in its conference report on the legislation, and the Obama 
administration, in departmental guidance issued after its passage, encour-
aged local education agencies to consider using these funds for early 
childhood programs.72 The ARRA also included $39.5 billion in state fiscal 
stabilization funds to support educational programs. The funds supported 
early childhood, elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education, 
with the goals of providing fiscal relief and boosting student performance. 
Departmental guidance mentioned the expansion of early childhood pro-
grams and the modernization of early childhood facilities as potential 
uses for these funds.73 Head Start and Early Head Start received an addi-
tional $1 billion and $1.1 billion respectively for program expansion or en-
hancement, and the ARRA also included preschool- related supplemental 
funding to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
These provisions of the ARRA did not launch any groundbreaking ini-
tiatives. They simply worked through state governments and local educa-
tion agencies to provide a boost for existing early childhood programs. 
Some observers nevertheless viewed this infusion of funds as an opportu-
nity to promote program coordination. A report by the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures explained that the legislation enabled states “to 
work with additional providers and explore new partnerships to expand 
services, support providers in meeting Early Head Start standards, or im-
prove quality.”74 It encouraged state officials to leverage ARRA funds to 
build partnerships with school districts and other service providers. This 
recommendation implicitly acknowledged the diverse array of stakehold-
ers in early childhood policy and suggested that program coordination 
remained a central concern.
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As part of the ARRA, the Obama administration also launched a com-
petitive grant program entitled Race to the Top. The program featured two 
grant phases that awarded a total of $4.35 billion in education funding to 
“reward states that are creating conditions for education innovation and 
reform; achieving significant improvement in student outcomes, . . . ; and 
implementing ambitious plans in four core education reform areas.”75 The 
core reform areas included standards and assessments, data systems, great 
teachers and leaders, and turning around the lowest performing schools. 
Race to the Top drew a great deal of interest from state officials. Forty 
states and the District of Columbia submitted applications for the first 
phase of the program, and Delaware and Tennessee were each awarded a 
grant. In August 2010, an additional ten winners were announced in the 
second phase of the program.
One section of the Race to the Top application was entitled “Innova-
tions for Improving Early Learning Outcomes.” States were encouraged to 
include practices, strategies, or programs that would promote school 
readiness among at- risk children by improving the quality of their early 
childhood experiences. This section was an invitational priority, meaning 
states were encouraged to complete it, but it had no effect on how the ap-
plications were scored. Even though it was not a part of the grading struc-
ture, most state applications incorporated early childhood education poli-
cies and practices.76 The applications included initiatives to develop early 
learning standards, align the standards with those for the later grades, and 
incorporate early education information into longitudinal data systems. 
Many states mentioned increasing enrollment in or funding for early 
childhood programs as a way to improve their education systems.77 Some 
states also included plans to strengthen professional development.
Program coordination was not a common topic. The District of Co-
lumbia proposed “blending Head Start funds and local resources to pro-
vide comprehensive programming for all children and their families [as 
part of an effort to] build a more seamless early childhood program.”78 
Although few applications included that sort of structural reform, advo-
cates recognized that several constituencies would be affected by the 
changes the states proposed. One report urged early childhood advocates 
to consider how their initiatives would affect the prerogatives of existing 
stakeholders. It noted that a memorandum of understanding in California 
provided that prekindergarten quality and expansion efforts would be an 
allowable district- level expense if the state won a grant award. Other ad-
vocates should follow that example, it concluded, and “consider meeting 
with local education leaders including teachers unions and school district 
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superintendents to solicit their buy- in.”79 The fragmented terrain of early 
childhood policy made such calculations a practical necessity.
The peripheral role of early childhood education in the Race to the Top 
program troubled some advocates. In 2011, it was granted a central place 
in a $500 million round of the contest entitled the Race to the Top– Early 
Learning Challenge (RTT- ELC). The goal of RTT- ELC, which was de-
scribed as “the administration’s signature early learning reform initia-
tive”80 and a “historical opportunity to support early learning,”81 was to 
support quality enhancements for programs serving high- need children. 
The competition focused on “improving development standards and as-
sessment, program standards, tiered rating and improvement systems, 
and early childhood educators.”82 Reprising earlier debates about the role 
of cognitive development in early childhood programs, critics noted that 
the initiative did not say “anything about giving children time to creatively 
explore and learn through play.”83 RTT- ELC nonetheless generated a great 
deal of interest, as thirty- seven states and territories submitted proposals.
State leaders reacted favorably to the administration’s early learning 
initiative. They believed that it represented an opportunity to build on 
many of the initiatives profiled in chapter 8 of this book. A letter from 
several leaders of the National Conference of State Legislatures asked the 
administration to “use federal funding to expand and supplement existing 
programs” and to “leave eligibility decisions regarding who is served in 
early education programs to the states.”84 Increased funding and auton-
omy are common themes when state officials lobby the national govern-
ment, yet the letter’s tone and content illustrates an important long- term 
shift in the politics of early childhood policy. Significant state- level activ-
ity is a defining feature of the contemporary debate, whereas the states 
were less powerful stakeholders in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In December 2011, the White House announced that nine states would 
receive awards through the grant competition. The RTT- ELC provided 
financial support for state efforts to “increase access to high- quality pro-
grams for children from low- income families, providing more children 
from birth to age five with a strong foundation they need for success in 
school and beyond.”85 The grants were important to state officials grap-
pling with a challenging fiscal environment. Like the other early child-
hood initiatives adopted during the first three years of the Obama ad-
ministration, however, they left the basic structure of early childhood 
policy intact. Advocates welcomed increased funding for early childhood 
initiatives but continued to lament a lack of coordination among existing 
programs.
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Conclusion: The Limited Impact of Increased 
Congressional Activity
Over the past two decades, members of Congress have held hearings on 
school readiness, public- private partnerships, program quality and effec-
tiveness, preschool access, and cognitive development. In short, there has 
been no shortage of congressional activity. This assortment of hearings, 
however, has produced minimal policy change. Most congressional initia-
tives have failed to gain enactment, and new programs like Early Head 
Start essentially built on what already existed. More- innovative program-
matic shifts have been stymied repeatedly. The initiatives of the Obama 
administration made more money available for early childhood programs 
but did not alter the fragmentation and coordination issues that many 
observers view as the main weakness of the status quo.
The political terrain on which these recent congressional battles have 
been fought, however, differs from that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Earlier generations of reformers operated on something approaching a ta-
bula rasa. When they debated the appropriate role of the national govern-
ment in early childhood policy, there were few entrenched programs and 
constituencies whose concerns needed to be addressed. By the 1990s, sev-
eral constituencies viewed themselves as having a stake in this policy 
arena and jurisdictional turf to defend. Major policy change required the 
accommodation of state and local officials, Head Start supporters, and 
various educational associations who viewed new programs as threats to 
their authority and their budgets. Nixon’s veto and the venue shopping 
and other reactions it spurred had created a dense thicket of interests and 
actors through which any reform proposal would have to pass. Even when 
there was broad agreement about the desirability of change, this fragmen-
tation limited reformers’ political prospects. The administrative and po-
litical hurdles to major policy shifts were simply too great.
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During the last two decades, many states have expanded access to and 
increased public spending on preschool education. Some recent initiatives 
built on the publicly funded programs that were established during the 
1970s, while other states created new programs. One source of heightened 
state- level activity in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the absence of 
policy action at the national level and reformers’ effort to find a more fa-
vorable institutional venue (Bushouse 2009, 8), but the venue shopping of 
the contemporary period was not a recapitulation of what occurred in the 
1970s. Increased enrollment in such government programs as Head Start 
and in private- sector programs meant that many service providers had a 
strong stake in the status quo. Policy change required accommodating or 
at least addressing the concerns of these stakeholders. Some states pro-
vided favorable terrain for reformers, while others did not due to the rela-
tive political strength of these invested constituencies. This chapter com-
bines secondary evidence, case studies of developments in individual 
states, and an original quantitative analysis of preschool funding decisions 
in all fifty states to illustrate how the existing slate of service providers af-
fected early childhood policymaking.
In keeping with a primary theme of this book, the existing policy rep-
ertoire constrained reformers’ options. Most of the state- level policy shifts 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s built on or combined existing public and 
private programs. Accommodating multiple providers was necessary both 
politically and logistically. It was a political necessity because the early 
childhood policy community consisted of constituencies who disagreed 
with one another about the purpose of preschool, teacher certification re-
quirements, program eligibility, and other fundamental issues. Teachers 
unions, Head Start supporters, private service providers, and other groups 
advanced competing visions of the future. Some of them viewed expanded 
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public programs as a threat to their survival and lobbied against any pro-
posed changes. As a result, major policy shifts often necessitated granting 
these groups a continued role in providing early childhood services. Ac-
commodating multiple providers was a logistical necessity because pro-
gram growth required additional facilities and personnel and a supporting 
infrastructure. The policy changes of recent years have consequently fur-
thered, not mitigated, the fragmentation of early childhood policy in the 
United States.
The New Politics of Early Childhood Education
In 1999, the Education Commission of the States asked over three hun-
dred attendees at its annual meeting to identify the most important educa-
tion issues facing their state. Early childhood ranked tenth, mentioned by 
only 37 of the 388 respondents to the survey.1 Things changed very rapidly, 
however. Governor Jeanne Shaheen (D- NH) made early care and educa-
tion the focus of her term as chair of the ECS in 2000– 2001, and the orga-
nization launched a two- year initiative entitled Early Learning: Improving 
Results for Young Children. The initiative emphasized two aspects of early 
childhood policy that the ECS believed had received insufficient attention. 
It sought to engage the business community as a full partner, portraying 
early learning as an investment in the development of the future work-
force, and to establish systematic connections between early learning and 
elementary education.2 Each of these goals testified to the increasingly 
dense array of stakeholders in this policy arena.
The political tactics of the Early Learning initiative resonated with 
those the ECS pursued in the early 1970s. The organization hoped to have 
a national impact, but it initially planned “to bring the national dialogue 
home to 20 or so states . . . by sponsoring workshops designed to jump- 
start or accelerate state- level strategy development on early learning.”3 
This venue shopping would become more targeted over time, as the ECS 
hoped to “establish and maintain a longer- term collaborative relationship 
with three to five states committed to carrying out an ambitious early care 
and learning agenda.”4 Within a year, the initiative had engaged twenty 
states through regional workshops and state- specific technical assistance, 
and it had plans to offer workshops to representatives from all fifty states 
within months.5 Thus the Early Learning initiative illustrates both the in-
creased salience of early childhood policy and the significance of venue 
shopping in facilitating policy change.
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The profile of early childhood policy continued to rise in the early 
2000s. One sign of its increased prominence was the frequency with 
which governors mentioned it in their State of the State addresses. For 
example, sixteen of the forty- four governors who had given their ad-
dresses by March 17, 2003, talked about early learning issues. Democrat 
Janet Napolitano of Arizona said, “The more we learn about the impor-
tance of early childhood learning, the more obvious it is that voluntary 
all- day kindergarten and universal pre- K should be standard offerings in 
our schools.” Democrat Jennifer Granholm of Michigan cited brain devel-
opment research as she advanced a program called Great Start to increase 
learning in the years from birth to age five. Democratic governors were 
especially enthusiastic, but the issue’s appeal crossed party lines. For ex-
ample, Republican Mark Sanford of South Carolina described teacher 
quality and early childhood education as high- priority areas and prom-
ised to ensure that they received an infusion of public funds.6 Various ini-
tiatives launched by officeholders and national organizations produced 
state- level activity, leading some scholars to identify the emergence of a 
preschool “movement” by the middle of the decade (Fuller 2007, 5; Kirp 
2007, 100).
In terms of its membership and leadership, the contemporary pre-
school movement bears a superficial resemblance to the child develop-
ment movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Bruce Fuller (2007, 5) 
describes it as “led by earnest elites who work from within foundation of-
fices, state governments, and universities.” There is an element of truth in 
this portrayal. The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Pew Chari-
table Trusts, and the Schott Foundation for Public Education have actively 
promoted universal preschool,7 and policy entrepreneurs in state govern-
ment have been indispensable to the policy changes of the past decade. 
Many academic research centers are active in early childhood policy. For 
example, the National Institute for Early Education Research at Rutgers 
University publishes research and an annual report card on state preschool 
programs.
Preschool supporters consciously sought to expand the breadth of 
their coalition, however. As a result, the contemporary preschool move-
ment includes several constituencies who previously had not been very 
involved in early childhood policy. Multiple analysts credit the Pew Char-
itable Trusts with developing this strategy. The foundation recognized that 
its campaign would achieve minimal results unless it was supported by 
children’s advocacy groups and “unanticipated sources” (Kirp 2007, 161). It 
therefore cultivated support in the business and law enforcement com-
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munities as well as the media, engaging such organizations as the Com-
mittee for Economic Development, Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, and the 
Education Writers Association. Pew “successfully expanded the range of 
actors advocating for universal preschool” (Bushouse 2009, 116). The in-
clusion of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids was especially savvy. The organiza-
tion “predicated its support on statistics showing that children of low eco-
nomic circumstances who attend pre- K are less likely than peers to become 
delinquents and engage in antisocial behavior” (Maeroff 2006, 214). As a 
result, the universal preschool movement has been called “a big- tent coali-
tion [that] includes politicians and pedagogues, philanthropists, pediatri-
cians, and police chiefs” (Kirp 2007, 3).
The main rhetorical claims of the contemporary preschool movement 
match those of earlier periods. In the early 2000s, supporters of increased 
public investment cited recent trends in the labor market and the resultant 
need for early childhood services. They profiled scientific research that 
seemed to imply that environmental influences in the early years affected 
long- term cognitive development. They advanced arguments about 
“school readiness” and educational equity, justifying their position on 
both moral and cost- effectiveness grounds. Their arguments resonated 
with those of their predecessors. Despite this rhetorical overlap, however, 
the tone of the debate shifted in a subtle yet crucial way. The debate of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s had been about “child development,” an um-
brella term incorporating educational, nutritional, and other family ser-
vices. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus had been on child care 
and its availability. The debate of the early 2000s, in contrast, emphasized 
the provision of educational services for young children.8
Supporters hoped that an educational frame would lead to greater pub-
lic support. Policymakers and advocacy groups used such terms as early 
childhood education and care, early learning and care, or educare to empha-
size cognitive development.9 This rhetorical shift was crucial in the United 
States, where child care is often viewed as a social welfare issue or a parental 
responsibility, while education usually connotes a public role and public 
responsibility (L. White 2004). Surveys suggested that the public viewed 
early childhood education more positively than child care, leading one 
scholar to conclude that “promoting early childhood care and education as 
part of comprehensive education reform efforts is a promising approach” 
(Beatty 2001, 181). Preschool supporters therefore separated policy for 
preschool- aged children from policy for infants and toddlers. This split en-
abled reformers to align preschool with education and to frame it as a pro-
gram worthy of public investment (Bushouse 2009, 155– 56).
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Reframing early childhood education was not only important in shift-
ing public attitudes. It also affected policymakers’ views. Like the public, 
policymakers perceived a “big difference between prekindergarten and 
child care” (Kirp 2007, 137). The former was regarded as preparing young 
children to succeed in school, and the latter was regarded as not really 
preparing infants and toddlers for anything. This distinction was not 
novel. It resonated with the early twentieth- century divide between day 
nurseries and nursery schools. What differed about the rhetorical shift of 
the early 2000s was that proponents of increased public investment in 
early childhood programs generally coalesced around a single issue frame.
Changes in national education policy reinforced the appeal of an edu-
cation frame. Passage of the No Child Left Behind Act was especially sig-
nificant even though those involved in the education and care of young 
children disagreed about its implications. Some early learning profession-
als viewed NCLB’s emphasis on annual assessments with concern. They 
questioned whether it was possible or desirable to assess preschoolers’ 
progress and worried about “the trickle down of inappropriate testing of 
young children.”10 In their opinion, assessments promoted an emphasis on 
academic achievement at the expense of other developmental goals. Stan-
dards should therefore “include all of the dimensions of children’s devel-
opment that contribute to their well- being as well as their academic suc-
cess” (Stipek 2006, 463). They argued that school readiness was best 
viewed as a multidimensional concept incorporating “language and cog-
nition, social and emotional development, general knowledge, and skill 
development. [It should] be considered as a process that occurs over time 
and is not complete by the first day of kindergarten.”11
Other practitioners, in contrast, viewed NCLB as an opportunity for 
expanded public support. By tying federal funding to school performance 
and focusing on educational quality, the legislation “put pressure on state 
legislatures to ensure that children entering primary school are ‘ready to 
learn’ so . . . their test scores do not drag down the school and affect school 
funding” (L. White 2004, 672). They argued that NCLB reinforced the fo-
cus on school readiness that had been part of the debate over early child-
hood policy since the late 1980s. In addition, some of them claimed that 
assessments would be useful for “identifying atypical patterns of develop-
ment that warrant closer scrutiny by educators and parents, determining 
whether children are learning the content and skills that their district and 
school have set as goals, and ensuring that the education institution is re-
sponsible for its responsibilities.”12 While the early childhood policy com-
munity coalesced around an educational frame in its push for program 
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expansion, early childhood specialists and elementary school educators 
disagreed about the implications of NCLB.
Program cost continued to affect the possibility of major reform. Uni-
versal, high- quality programs were costly, and state governments faced sig-
nificant budget constraints. Many preschool supporters argued that all 
children needed opportunities to learn, but most state programs were nar-
rowly targeted because universal programs were out of reach financially. 
For example, California’s State Preschool Program enrolled three- and 
four- year- olds living in families at or below 60– 65 percent of the state me-
dian income. Four- year- olds who met the Head Start income eligibility 
standards could participate in Delaware’s Early Childhood Assistance Pro-
gram. The Kentucky Preschool Program was available to four- year- olds 
who were eligible for free lunch and to all disabled three- and four- year- 
olds. Seventy percent of the funds for Early Childhood Projects in Ne-
braska were targeted to serve children eligible for Head Start, those in 
families with incomes less than 150 percent of the federal poverty line, 
those born premature or with a low birth weight, and those whose primary 
language was something other than English.13 Funding concerns affected 
eligibility and quality provisions and represented one of policymakers’ “key 
challenges” at both the national and state level (Clifford et al. 2005, 141).
Despite the aforementioned similarities between the universal pre-
school movement and its predecessors, the debates of the early 2000s oc-
curred on distinct political terrain. The universe of actors who perceived 
themselves as having a stake in early childhood policy had changed con-
siderably over the years. The debate over universal preschool was not sim-
ply a reprise of what had occurred previously. New interest groups and 
organizations became involved, as has already been discussed, and the 
positions advanced by some long- term participants shifted in important 
ways. These political changes represent the state- level heritage of Nixon’s 
veto and the by- product of the reactions and counterreactions it pro-
duced. This policy feedback facilitated the development of programs that 
accommodated multiple providers, adjusting to, rather than addressing, 
the fragmentation that characterized this policy sector.
Fragmentation, Coordination, and the Politics of Early 
Childhood Education
By the early 2000s, early childhood policy in the United States had taken 
on its two most distinctive characteristics. The private sector was a cru-
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cial provider of services, and public- sector activity was highly decentral-
ized. Commentators, practitioners, and advocates often described these 
attributes of the existing system as shortcomings. Preschool education 
consisted of “a hodgepodge of providers offering uneven services for 
young children and having no connection to the public education system 
that children enter at age 5 or 6.”14 One analysis concluded that the “ele-
ments of a system are in place, but the pieces are not designed to fit to-
gether in a cohesive way.”15 Another described the status quo as a “patch-
work of diverse programs, each with its own infrastructure and no 
overarching policy framework encompassing a whole system of care and 
education.”16 A complex conglomeration of providers and funding 
streams existed.
Many reformers argued that the status quo was unacceptable because 
many American children lacked access to high- quality early childhood 
programs. They recognized, however, that policy change would require 
the mobilization of a wide range of constituencies. One report concluded, 
“Filling the gaps and building a high- quality system of early care and edu-
cation require the attention, investment, and action of many people— 
parents and families, business leaders and philanthropists, teachers and 
preachers, senior citizens and students, media and policymakers.”17 Those 
who hoped to establish a cohesive system rather than “sprinkling more 
unconnected programs on the landscape” realized that they needed sub-
stantial commitments from the business, political, philanthropic, and 
faith communities.18 The inherent difficulty of merging these constituen-
cies into a cohesive coalition was exacerbated by the fact that they lacked 
a formal, common language to describe their objectives.19 Diverse terms 
like preschool, prekindergarten, nursery school, and early care and educa-
tion suggested agreement that early childhood programs should feature 
educational content, but they hinted at more politically significant divi-
sions among potential supporters.
The unsystematic creation and growth of early childhood programs 
since the 1970s meant that even though reformers agreed on the need for 
policy change, many of them had a stake in a particular element of the 
status quo. As a result, it was difficult for them to work together, because 
they had distinct bureaucratic and programmatic turf to defend. In other 
words, policy feedback represented a critical obstacle to policy change, 
because it produced constituencies who mobilized to defend specific pro-
grams. When state officials sought to merge existing initiatives into a sin-
gle program, they often found that “turf battles and different funding 
sources impede[d] those efforts” (Cohen 2001, 275). Those who agreed 
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that change was desirable advanced different goals and sometimes found 
themselves in opposition to one another.
The status of Head Start is illustrative. One report on early childhood 
policy described a “striking disconnect between Head Start, the more gen-
eral world of early care and learning, and the K– 12 education system.”20 
Another report noted that such states as Mississippi, Wyoming, and North 
Dakota lacked state- funded preschool programs but had high enrollments 
in Head Start and programs for children with disabilities. It seemed to 
imply the existence of a “crowding out” effect, at least in certain states. For 
example, it juxtaposed Mississippi and New York. In the former, 35.9 per-
cent of the state’s three- and four- year- olds attended a preschool program 
funded by Head Start or the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 
In New York, a state with a large state preschool program, 35.2 percent of 
the state’s three- and four- year- olds attended a state or federal prekinder-
garten program.21 This comparison seemed to suggest that a large Head 
Start program substituted for a large state preschool program.
The relationship between Head Start and the “more general world of 
early care and learning” was one of many tensions within the early child-
hood community. Proponents continued to debate the appropriate role of 
the public school system. Some warned that “early care and education can-
not be constructed as a simple extension of K– 12 learning.”22 They claimed 
that children under the age of five had developmental needs that would not 
be well served by the public schools and charged that teachers unions were 
more interested in generating jobs for their members than in providing 
preschool services. In 2004, for example, the California Teachers Associa-
tion helped draft a ballot initiative that would have generated $1.5 billion 
for preschool. It did not consult other preschool operators in the state, so 
the measure was “widely perceived as a full- employment act for the teach-
ers’ union” (Kirp 2007, 211). Eventually the union withdrew its proposal.
The diverse and cross- cutting cleavages involved in early childhood 
policy led one analysis to conclude, “While nearly every level of govern-
ment and sector of society has a stake in improving early care and learn-
ing, the responsibilities are so fragmented that no single actor holds 
enough of the levers for change to get it done.”23 The range of interests 
with a stake in the existing “nonsystem” was an obstacle to governance 
reform. Constituencies that nominally shared the same objectives re-
garded reform warily when it seemed likely to move the status quo in a 
direction that did not suit their interests. Reform advocates recognized 
that they faced significant hurdles and called for the “transcendence of 
selfish interests in the higher pursuit of a more integrated system.”24 Policy 
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change required the mobilization of diverse constituencies. Their identi-
ties and the prospects for reform “var[ied] from state to state according to 
the history and political will of each.”25 Despite these formidable obstacles, 
the early 2000s were a period of significant reform. The most dramatic 
changes took place in states where officials developed programs that ac-
commodated multiple providers and came to terms with this legacy of 
fragmentation.
Overcoming the Obstacles to Reform
Historically, statewide early childhood programs targeted children who 
were of low socioeconomic status or who were otherwise considered to be 
“at risk.” Beginning in the 1990s, however, states like Georgia and Okla-
homa developed programs that allowed children from middle- and upper- 
income families to receive a free preschool education. Given the historical 
trajectory of early childhood policy in the United States, the adoption of 
universal preschool represented a noteworthy shift (Barnett and Hustedt 
2003, 54). Many scholars closely examined these state- level episodes of 
policy change, attempting to understand how the political barriers that 
had frustrated past reform efforts had been surmounted (Bushouse 2009; 
Fuller 2007; Kirp 2007; Maeroff 2006; E. Rose 2010). Their case studies 
suggest that divisions within the early education policy community were a 
hurdle that could be cleared by designing programs that accommodated 
multiple providers. Most state- level initiatives built on or combined exist-
ing public and private programs.
Incorporating multiple service providers into the expanded state pre-
school programs was a logistical necessity, because rapid expansion neces-
sitated additional classroom space and teachers and the existence of a sup-
porting infrastructure. Space and personnel constraints in public facilities 
meant that partnerships with the private sector were the only way that 
many states could meet their enrollment objectives. Every state subsidiz-
ing preschool therefore included such providers as day care centers, li-
censed family child care homes, faith- based agencies, and private schools. 
The exact mix varied from state to state, but according to the National 
Center for Education Statistics, nearly 30 percent of the institutions oper-
ating state preschool programs were not affiliated with the public school 
system as of 2002.26 Relying on this spectrum of providers led to concerns 
about uneven program quality and sparked controversy about the impor-
tance of teachers’ educational credentials.
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The rapid expansion of Georgia’s ambitious preschool program illus-
trates the internal tensions among the early childhood community. The 
program’s origins dated to the gubernatorial campaign of Democrat Zell 
Miller. Miller pledged to create a lottery for education and proposed ear-
marking some of the funds it generated to preschool. After his election, 
the idea was endorsed by the state legislature and a citizen referendum. 
The referendum campaign focused on the lottery itself, with preschool 
receiving “virtually no attention” (Bushouse 2009, 29).
The Georgia program served nine thousand at- risk children when it 
opened its doors in September 1993. The number of enrollees doubled in 
its second year, and forty- five thousand children were signed up in its 
third year. A key change occurred during its fourth year of operation. All 
four- year- olds in the state were eligible for enrollment, and sixty thousand 
of them were signed up to enroll. The rapid expansion of the program 
spurred the state to incorporate both public and private providers in order 
to find adequate facilities and qualified teachers. Logistical challenges 
meant that “the state needed [private providers] to make the experiment 
of universal prekindergarten work” (E. Rose 2010, 107). In 1996– 97, over 
half of its enrollees attended publicly funded private programs, even some 
based in churches.27
Incorporating multiple service providers was also a political necessity. 
After the referendum passed, various groups expressed concerns about 
how the preschool program would be implemented. The program sparked 
numerous battles “among a narrow set of actors, mainly within the child 
care industry” (Bushouse 2009, 67). For- profit preschool providers wanted 
to ensure their place in the expanded program, and Head Start providers 
worried that the state planned to take over Head Start. The fears of the lat-
ter group existed because many of the local coordinating councils for the 
state program, which initially focused on at- risk children, did not involve 
Head Start in program planning. The program guidelines were subse-
quently modified so that coordinating councils were advised to include 
Head Start representatives.28 The implementation of universal preschool 
in Georgia required both strong gubernatorial support and a willingness 
to accommodate existing stakeholders.
The development of Oklahoma’s universal preschool program provides 
similar lessons about the political necessity of accommodating multiple 
providers. In contrast to Georgia, where universal preschool was linked to 
a high- profile gubernatorial campaign and a lottery referendum, universal 
preschool “quietly emerged” in Oklahoma through a complex series of 
incremental changes (Bushouse 2009, 47). In 1980, the state legislature 
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funded a small pilot program. A decade later, a technical change in the 
school finance formula enabled local school districts to be reimbursed for 
educating four- year- olds (Kirp 2007, 181). In 1998, legislation creating a 
universal preschool program was signed into law without significant con-
troversy or media coverage. The program accommodated established pre-
school service providers, including Head Start operators and faith- based 
programs (Finn 2009).
Head Start supporters in Oklahoma viewed the expansion of public 
preschool as a threat. Two factors contributed to winning their support in 
1998. First, the architect of the proposal convinced Head Start leaders that 
expanding the preschool program would increase revenues to Head Start, 
because its centers would be eligible for public funding if they established 
“collaborative” relations with their local school districts. This legislative 
language allowed Head Start to “create partnerships with the public 
schools, either to run preschool classrooms or to offer wrap- around pro-
grams for children attending a half- day class within an elementary school” 
(Fuller 2007, 111). Second, the revised school finance formula had led 
many districts to place four- year- olds in kindergarten, a trend that the 
Head Start community viewed with alarm. It was hoped that expanding 
the public preschool program would end or at least limit this practice 
(Bushouse 2009, 43). Once these concerns were addressed, the expansion 
of the state preschool program did not face any significant opposition. 
Framed as an incremental shift and buttressed by national praise and fa-
vorable evaluations (Gormley and Phillips 2005; Gormley, Phillips, and 
Gayer 2008), the Oklahoma program boasts “a stable institutional struc-
ture and a cohesive policy image. It has attained a policy monopoly with 
no challengers on the horizon” (Bushouse 2009, 86).
The uneasy relationship between Head Start and public preschool pro-
grams was also evident in West Virginia. When universal preschool legis-
lation gained enactment in 2002, it constituted only four pages of a fifty- 
one- page bill and was the handiwork of a small inner circle of legislators 
and political appointees. Its main opposition came from the state’s House 
Education Committee chairman, who feared that state funding would dis-
place federal Head Start funding for preschool services. That competitive 
dynamic had emerged when one of the poorest counties in the state began 
to offer preschool but failed to coordinate with Head Start. The West Vir-
ginia bill required public schools to collaborate with county Head Start 
agencies in order to address this concern (Bushouse 2009, 48).
In Tennessee, legislation with the potential to establish universal pre-
school was adopted in 2005, only after the concerns of the Head Start 
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community were addressed. The original bill required all preschool pro-
grams to comply with the standards of the State Board of Education, in-
cluding a requirement that each classroom have a certified teacher. Head 
Start operators feared that their programs would not be able to participate 
in the state program, because Head Start does not require a certified 
teacher. Their concerns were addressed in a meeting between Head Start 
representatives and the State Board of Education. The final legislation 
placed a strong emphasis on collaboration, even though it did not man-
date it (Bushouse 2009, 127– 33). The tension between Head Start and pub-
lic programs is often due to concerns about enrollment and funding, but 
developments in Tennessee highlight that integrating Head Start into state 
programs is generally difficult due to the extensive federal standards that 
regulate program governance, performance, and accountability. In some 
cases, these regulations must be modified or waived to enable Head Start 
centers to enter contracts with state programs (Barnett and Hustedt 2003, 
56– 57).
The relationship between Head Start and state preschool programs is 
only one manifestation of the policy feedback that characterizes early 
childhood policy. Head Start supporters are one of many stakeholders in-
terested in maintaining the status quo or directing policy change in a par-
ticular direction. Such service providers as nonprofits, churches, for- profit 
firms, and local schools are also inclined to view proposed changes and one 
another suspiciously. In Texas, for example, “the public schools, Head Start 
centers, and child care centers viewed one another with disdain” (Kirp 
2007, 198). Head Start leaders and for- profit child care providers feared the 
expansionist tendencies of the public schools and “were antagonistic to an 
expansion of state prekindergarten because it threatened their survival” 
(Kirp 2007, 206). In Texas, policy reform was possible only after state poli-
cymakers offered something of value to each of these constituencies.
Developments in California illustrate a similar dynamic. Tensions be-
tween teachers unions and other preschool providers are another obstacle 
to developing a cohesive coalition. Bruce Fuller (2007, 10) describes a June 
2002 conference call during which participants discussed the wide- 
ranging groups that already served three- and four- year- olds in Los Ange-
les. They agreed that coalescing around a single model of service provision 
would be challenging because “this patchwork quilt of child care organiza-
tions would be difficult to move in any one direction.”
The organizational pluralism that characterizes early childhood pro-
grams represents an obstacle to policy change. Tensions exist even in 
states where advocacy groups have a better working relationship. In Illi-
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nois, organizations including Voices for Illinois Children, the Ounce of 
Prevention Fund, and Illinois Action for Children, which typically join 
forces to lobby, fight in private over the appropriate policy approaches and 
political strategies to pursue (Kirp 2007, 21).
Tensions among service providers also affected initiative campaigns. 
In 2002, Florida voters amended the state constitution to guarantee high- 
quality prekindergarten for every four- year- old in the state. The operators 
of for- profit preschools and faith- based schools feared that the initiative 
would drive them out of business but were reassured by promises that any 
prekindergarten, public or private, that satisfied state standards would be 
able to participate. Critics viewed the reassurances as obstacles to genuine 
reform and a more cohesive system, but they demonstrate the political 
necessity of accommodating existing stakeholders. They also suggest that 
“this powerful lobby will seek to protect private providers and incorporate 
them into any system of universal prekindergarten” (Maeroff 2006, 40). 
This resistance continued during implementation, leading one analyst to 
describe the program as “a classic example of how a diffuse majority, those 
who voted for the constitutional amendment, lost out to a concentrated 
and determined minority, the operators of private and faith- based pre-
schools” (Kirp 2007, 188). Private and faith- based service providers enroll 
most four- year- olds, and the regulations governing the Florida program 
largely reflect their preferences.
In summary, program expansion typically reflected the logistical and 
political necessity of accommodating multiple service providers. Most of 
the changes described in this section of this chapter sought “to build on 
and combine existing private and public programs into a more coordi-
nated system with consistent standards” (Barnett and Hustedt 2003, 56). A 
May 2006 report described state officials as “grappling with the challenges 
of accommodating existing programs and services while at the same time 
maintaining some uniformity of quality, outcomes, and coordination 
across programs.”29 This effort also reflected a growing consensus that 
such coordination would lead to more- effective programs. Dozens of 
states established governance bodies designed to give greater priority to 
children and family issues and to improve program operations.30
These programmatic benefits were exceeded, however, by the political 
benefits of incorporating multiple service providers. In many states, re-
formers faced opposition from stakeholders who believed their survival 
was at risk. They responded by emphasizing public access to programs 
(rather than the direct provision of services) and by encouraging partici-
pation by public and private preschools, because the “existence of a large 
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lobby group for private preschools [left] little space for a unilateral ap-
proach” (Beatty 2001, 182). In many states, policy change became possible 
only when the concerns of Head Start centers, faith- based preschools, and 
other providers were addressed. Incorporating multiple providers also of-
fered rhetorical benefits. Supporters could then plausibly claim that they 
were not offering a “big government” solution that usurped parental rights 
and responsibilities.31
Policy Feedback and Preschool Funding at the State Level
The developments profiled in the previous section of this chapter suggest 
that accommodating the preferences of existing providers, including Head 
Start, is often a prerequisite for major policy change. It is insufficient, how-
ever, to examine only states in which the creation of a universal program 
or the expansion of an existing program occurred. Only by examining 
both successful and unsuccessful attempts to change the status quo is it 
possible to isolate the political sources of early childhood policy. This sec-
tion describes a quantitative analysis of contemporary preschool educa-
tion across all fifty states. Its goal is to extend and reassess existing case 
study research. By examining all fifty states, including many where major 
policy change did not occur, its systematic analysis acts as a tentative va-
lidity check on the conclusions drawn in the preceding section.32
Turning to the state level offers the added benefit of providing a largely 
untapped venue in which to assess the impact of policy feedback. Most 
studies of policy development examine national politics. This focus is un-
derstandable given the scope of national programs like Social Security, yet 
it means that scholars must be cautious about developing broad general-
izations about the policymaking process. The underlying similarity and 
manageable variation of the American states makes them a propitious 
venue in which to evaluate hypotheses about policymaking (Gray 2008; 
Mooney 2001). State- level analysis can assess the conditions under which 
the conclusions drawn from national studies “travel” to other venues, 
thereby producing more- robust generalizations. The quantitative analysis 
presented in this section therefore represents a robustness check accom-
panying the historical evidence presented elsewhere in this book. It simul-
taneously evaluates the impact of policy feedback and several other politi-
cal and economic factors on early childhood policy.33
The outcomes of interest are whether and how states fund preschool 
education. During the 2006– 7 school year, forty- one states dedicated pub-
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lic funds to preschool (Rigby 2007). These state- funded programs come in 
three basic forms. States may fund freestanding preschool programs, sup-
plement Head Start, or combine the two approaches. In 2006– 7, thirty 
states funded freestanding programs, Oregon dedicated all of its preschool 
spending to a Head Start supplement, and ten states used a combined ap-
proach.34 Nine states did not dedicate public funds to preschool.
The long- standing tension between Head Start supporters and other 
members of the early childhood policy community suggests that interest 
group politics might affect the category into which a state falls. If Head 
Start supporters feel threatened by a freestanding preschool program, they 
may press state officials not to create one. As a result, states with a strong 
Head Start community may be especially likely not to fund preschool edu-
cation. The first outcome on which the analysis focuses is therefore a di-
chotomous variable indicating whether a state does not dedicate any pub-
lic funds to preschool. A positive relationship between the strength of the 
Head Start community and this outcome is expected. The second outcome 
examined is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state dedicates 
all of its public preschool spending to a freestanding program. A negative 
relationship between the strength of the Head Start community and this 
outcome is expected.35
The strength of the Head Start community is the key factor in the anal-
ysis that follows. The proxy used to assess its strength is the percentage of 
preschool attendees in the state who are enrolled in Head Start.36 This 
proxy captures the potential strength of the Head Start community be-
cause it emphasizes its size. State Head Start organizations possess diver-
gent views on many issues, and the political effectiveness of their leaders 
also varies. The chief limitation of the proxy employed here is that it does 
not account for these important differences. Its main advantage, however, 
is that it offers an objective measure of Head Start’s reach relative to other 
early childhood programs. The Head Start percentage ranges from a low 
of 9.2 percent in New Hampshire and New Jersey to a high of 65.3 percent 
in Mississippi. Based on the historical episodes and case study evidence 
profiled in this book, states in which a relatively high percentage of pre-
school enrollees are enrolled in Head Start are likely not to fund preschool 
education and unlikely to dedicate all preschool spending to a freestand-
ing state program. Head Start supporters are often reluctant to support the 
creation or expansion of state- funded preschool programs, and state offi-
cials will presumably be more attentive to their preferences when they 
represent a larger proportion of existing stakeholders.
Many state characteristics might affect decisions about preschool 
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funding. One potential demographic influence is the age profile of the 
population. The issue might resonate more strongly in states with a rela-
tively high proportion of young children, where policymakers might per-
ceive a greater need for publicly funded programs. The logic of this rela-
tionship is analogous to the idea that policy adoption is driven by 
underlying societal conditions or needs (Nice 1994). The analysis that fol-
lows therefore includes the proportion of the state population that is un-
der five years old.37 States with a younger population base might face 
stronger demand for preschool services and therefore be especially likely 
to fund them.38
State wealth also has the potential to affect preschool funding deci-
sions. Its potential impact is related to both the population served by Head 
Start and the general impact of state wealth on policymaking. Most Head 
Start enrollees live in low- income families, though the correlation be-
tween income and enrollment is imperfect, because Head Start does not 
reach the entire eligible population. Including a proxy for state wealth 
therefore ensures that a significant relationship between the strength of 
the Head Start community and preschool funding decisions is not due to 
states’ socioeconomic profiles. In addition, wealthy states may have more 
resources to devote to preschool, while less wealthy states may be reluc-
tant to use their scarcer resources for that purpose. Political scientists have 
long noted a general relationship between wealth and policy outcomes 
(Dye 1966; Tweedie 1994; Walker 1969).39
Other demographic factors might affect preschool spending decisions. 
Formal education levels might affect societal attitudes toward preschool 
and the willingness to fund it. Individuals with higher levels of formal 
education might be more sympathetic to public spending on education in 
general and on preschool education in particular, leading to a positive re-
lationship between state education levels and preschool spending. The 
analysis that follows uses the percentage of the state population with a 
high school diploma or higher as its proxy for state education levels.40 An-
other potential influence is racial diversity. Scholars have linked racial het-
erogeneity to policy choices (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001) 
and educational outcomes at the state level (Hero and Tolbert 1996). They 
have found that states with larger minority populations tend to implement 
less generous policies. The analysis that follows uses the percentage of the 
state population identified as non- Hispanic white as a proxy for homoge-
neity and, based on prior research, expects a positive relationship between 
population homogeneity and preschool funding.41
Preschool funding decisions might also be influenced by the state po-
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litical environment. Party control of government institutions (Roh and 
Haider- Markel 2003; Spill, Licari, and Ray 2001) and the ideological envi-
ronment (Berry et al. 1998; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) have been 
linked to various public policies. Democrats tend to be more enthusiastic 
than Republicans about publicly funded preschool. Democratic control of 
the governorship or state legislature might therefore make it more likely 
that a state will devote public funds to preschool, while Republican con-
trol might make such funding less likely. The analysis that follows there-
fore includes a dichotomous variable that indicates whether Democrats 
exercise unified party control of state government.42 The potential rela-
tionship between preschool funding and ideology is based on similar 
logic. Conservatives generally prefer to reduce the scope of government 
activity, while liberals typically support its expansion. Many conservatives 
characterize publicly funded preschool as an undesirable intrusion on pa-
rental autonomy. States in which residents hold relatively liberal political 
views might be more likely to dedicate public funds to preschool. The 
analysis therefore includes an annual estimate of citizen liberalism (Berry 
et al. 1998). Both Democratic control and citizen liberalism are expected 
to have a positive effect on preschool funding.
To evaluate the aforementioned relationships, the following analysis 
examines five years of cross- sectional data on state preschool spending 
from 2001 to 2005 (Rigby 2007). The unit of analysis is a state- year. The 
outcomes of interest, whether a state chose not to dedicate funds to pre-
school and whether a state funded only a freestanding state program, are 
examined in two separate models. Each model includes the variables de-
scribed in this section and indicator variables for each year of the analysis. 
Both dependent variables are dichotomous, so standard logistic regres-
sion methods are used to evaluate the determinants of preschool funding.
Why do some states not dedicate public funds to preschool? Table 2 
displays the results of a logistic regression model examining this deci-
sion.43 As expected, the division within the early childhood policy com-
munity seems influential. The size of the Head Start community has a sig-
nificant positive effect on the likelihood that a state will not allocate public 
funds to preschool. When other independent variables are fixed at their 
central values, moving from a state with a small Head Start community 
(12.95 percent of total preschool enrollment) to a state with a large one 
(35.30 percent) increases the likelihood that it will not fund preschool, by 
12.72 percentage points. In combination with the evidence presented 
throughout this book, this result suggests that some Head Start supporters 
perceive other publicly funded preschool programs as a potential threat. 
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State officials appear to respond to their preferences when they represent 
a large proportion of those with a stake in preschool.
The decision not to fund preschool also seems to be influenced by 
other factors. As predicted, there is a significant negative relationship be-
tween state wealth and this decision. Wealthy states are more likely to al-
locate public funds to preschool.44 When other independent variables are 
fixed at their central values, moving from a wealthy state to a poor one 
decreases the likelihood that it will fund preschool, by 12.57 percentage 
points. Resource availability appears to facilitate preschool funding. Citi-
zen ideology has the expected effect. Liberal states are more likely to ded-
icate public funds to preschool. When other independent variables are 
fixed at their central values, moving from a liberal state to a conservative 
one decreases the likelihood that it will offer publicly funded preschool, by 
6.53 percentage points. The presence of unified Democratic government 
also appears to increase the likelihood that it will fund preschool educa-
tion, but this relationship does not achieve conventional levels of statisti-
cal significance.45
Table 3 displays the results of a model examining the decision to devote 
all public preschool funds to a freestanding state program. The division 
within the early childhood policy community has the expected impact. 
TABLE 2. Determinants of the Decision Not to Fund Preschool Education
Variable First Difference Confidence Interval
Head Start Enrollment (+) 12.72** [3.12, 30.31]
Population under Five (−) 0.71 [−5.26, 7.88]
Per Capita Income (−) −12.57* [−31.53, −2.02]
Education Level (−) 15.20** [4.54, 33.01]
Population Homogeneity (−) 2.71 [−4.82, 14.40]
Democratic Government (−) −3.15 [−9.05, −0.14]
Citizen Ideology (−) −6.53** [−17.21, −1.17]
2002 −0.49 [−6.42, 6.15]
2003 0.88 [−6.13, 8.33]
2004 5.61 [−3.13, 18.47]
2005 4.82 [−3.26, 16.13]
Number of observations 250
Log likelihood −65.368
Chi- square 98.79
Prob. chi- square 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.430
Note: Expected directions in parentheses. All tests of statistical significance are two- tailed.
*Significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level.
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The size of the Head Start community has a significant negative effect. 
When other independent variables are fixed at their central values, mov-
ing from a state with a small Head Start community to a state with a large 
one reduces the likelihood that a state will fund only a freestanding pre-
school program, by 43.25 percentage points. Like the analogous result in 
table 2, this finding seems to imply that some Head Start supporters feel 
threatened by freestanding preschool programs and that their political 
strength affects whether state officials respond to their preferences. As an-
ticipated, interest group politics seems to influence state decisions about 
whether and how to fund preschool.
The performance of the other variables examined in the model is dis-
appointing. As expected, unified Democratic government makes it more 
likely that a state will fund only a freestanding program. When other in-
dependent variables are fixed at their central values, moving from a state 
without unified Democratic control to a state with it increases the proba-
bility that the state will fund only a freestanding preschool program, by 
24.50 percentage points. Citizen ideology also has the anticipated effect. 
Liberal states are more likely to fund only a freestanding program, but this 
relationship does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance.46
TABLE 3. Determinants of the Decision to Fund Only a Freestanding  
Preschool Program
Variable First Difference Confidence Interval
Head Start Enrollment (−) −43.25** [−61.90, −23.32]
Population under Five (+) −5.48 [−25.95, 15.49]
Per Capita Income (+) −15.47 [−39.27, 7.32]
Education Level (+) −50.21** [−65.52, −32.60]
Population Homogeneity (+) −3.97 [−21.87, 15.08]
Democratic Government (+) 24.50* [2.18, 43.45]
Citizen Ideology (+) 3.23 [−17.16, 21.65]
2002 4.57 [−17.20, 27.60]
2003 −0.34 [−22.67, 22.61]
2004 21.82 [−0.68, 43.31]
2005 24.48* [2.87, 46.09]
Number of observations 250
Log likelihood −132.611
Chi- square 75.55
Prob. chi- square 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.222
Note: Expected directions in parentheses. All tests of statistical significance are two- tailed.
*Significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level.
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The results presented in this section suggest that the size of the Head 
Start community may influence whether and how states fund preschool 
education.47 A large Head Start presence seems to make it more likely that 
a state will not fund preschool education and seems to decrease the likeli-
hood that it will only fund a freestanding public program. The chief limi-
tation of the preceding analysis is that it cannot identify the precise mech-
anisms through which the Head Start community affects preschool 
funding. Its impact may be due to supporters’ political activity, worries 
about the financial implications of policy change for Head Start, or a feel-
ing among state political leaders that large Head Start enrollments obviate 
the need for state activity. Additional case study research comparing suc-
cessful and unsuccessful attempts at major policy change would add 
greater depth to the results presented here, and they might illuminate the 
impact of factors like inertia and individual leadership that are not ad-
dressed in the preceding analysis. Furthermore, Head Start is a national 
funding stream and a disparate, intensely local collection of programs. It 
is important to recognize that Head Start supporters may have blocked the 
growth of other preschool programs in some states but not others.48
Despite its limitations, the preceding analysis supports one of this 
book’s key assertions. The impact of the Head Start community is consis-
tent with the concept of policy feedback. Supporters of policy change of-
ten must overcome the opposition of constituencies who benefit from the 
status quo, and the clout of program beneficiaries can constrain the op-
tions that policymakers possess. Existing policies affect the possibilities 
for future policymaking by shaping the identities, interests, and incentives 
of key actors (Skocpol 1992). The mobilization of existing stakeholders has 
been an obstacle to comprehensive change in such areas as retirement se-
curity and health care (Campbell 2003; Hacker 2002; Mayes 2004; Walker 
1991), and a similar dynamic seems to have affected the state- level impact 
of the contemporary preschool movement.
State Programs and the “Great Recession”
The preceding analysis examined a period of extensive state government 
activity in early childhood policy. In 2005 and 2006, thirty- one states in-
creased preschool funding by a total of more than one billion dollars, Illi-
nois and West Virginia endorsed programs to make preschool available to 
all children whose parents want it, and several states established task 
forces to examine the issue. A strong economy in South Carolina, for ex-
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ample, made possible a project that distributed $23.7 million in new fund-
ing to schools, child care centers, Head Start, and faith- based providers.49 
Shortly thereafter, however, the economic context changed dramatically 
and effectively removed major programmatic expansions from the politi-
cal agenda. Beginning in 2007, the United States entered a recession that 
“caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record.”50 Increased de-
mand for public programs accompanied these revenue declines, as resi-
dents lost jobs, income, and health insurance. States had experienced re-
cessions in the early 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s, but the recession 
of the late 2000s was unusually severe. Sluggish economic growth and 
high unemployment persisted well after its official conclusion in June 
2009, and state officials continued to face major fiscal challenges into 
2012.51
Unlike the national government, virtually all states are required to bal-
ance their operating budgets every year or biennium. Plunging revenues 
and the increased need for government services opened sizable budget 
gaps that state officials were forced to close. The combined shortfalls for 
2009 through 2012 totaled more than $530 billion.52 States met this chal-
lenge by drawing down the record reserves they had accumulated heading 
into the recession,53 using the roughly $140 billion in funds provided by 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and adopting a combina-
tion of tax increases and spending cuts. The spending cuts affected nearly 
every domain of state government activity, including early childhood edu-
cation. Arizona eliminated preschool services for 4,328 children and fund-
ing for schools to provide additional support for disadvantaged children 
from preschool to third grade. Massachusetts reduced spending on early 
intervention services for children with special needs by 16 percent. Rhode 
Island reduced the number of children served by Head Start and similar 
services.54
Ongoing fiscal challenges slowed but did not stop state- level activity in 
early childhood policy. During the 2008– 9 school year, the percentage of 
three- and four- year- olds enrolled in state prekindergarten programs rose 
in twenty- nine states and fell in nine states. Total funding rose, albeit at a 
slower pace than in previous years, and state funding per child declined in 
twenty- four of thirty- eight states, after adjusting for inflation (Barnett et 
al. 2009, 4). According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
the number of bills on early care and education fell from 2008 to 2009, but 
“a number of states protected investments in young children and avoided 
cuts to early childhood programs; some states even increased their com-
mitment.”55 Alaska and Rhode Island, two states that previously did not 
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have publicly funded prekindergarten programs, provided new appropri-
ations to pilot programs.56 Even so, some observers worried that the re-
duced pace of change foretold more- dramatic shifts as state budgets more 
fully bore the brunt of the recession. Acknowledging that it would be in-
appropriate to read too much into a one- year dip in real spending, they 
nevertheless speculated that “given states’ budgetary problems this could 
be the start of a new downward trend that will erode the value of these 
programs and turn them into ineffective, cheap substitutes for real educa-
tion” (Barnett et al. 2009, 13).
States continued to cope with difficult economic conditions in 2010 
and 2011. Their actions drew mixed reviews. One sanguine report con-
cluded that fiscal challenges had not kept state governments from finding 
“innovative ways to increase availability and even create new programs 
aimed at improving the accessibility and quality of early childhood ser-
vices.”57 A handful of states enacted legislation to address student readi-
ness and assessment standards and to expand access to existing facilities, 
while Minnesota and Washington expanded state- funded programs for 
educationally at- risk children.58 Other observers highlighted what they 
viewed as more- troubling trends. One study concluded, “The grim fiscal 
climate makes dramatic program expansions unlikely and impractical in 
the near term.”59 Due to the recession, total enrollment in state prekinder-
garten programs barely increased, total spending by the states decreased, 
and spending per child declined in inflation- adjusted dollars during the 
2009– 10 school year. The slow economic recovery and the exhaustion of 
federal stimulus funds caused some observers to speculate that these 
trends would have a significant negative impact on the quality of state 
programs over the longer term. They concluded, “Funding levels in some 
of the states have fallen so low as to bring into question the effectiveness of 
their programs by any reasonable standard” (Barnett et al. 2010, 10).
As state officials grappled with a challenging fiscal environment, they 
also sought to coordinate existing programs more effectively through the 
creation of early childhood advisory councils. The goal of this administra-
tive reform was “to guide investments and ensure that resources are used 
efficiently and toward the greatest effect.”60 National legislation spurred 
and facilitated state activity. The 2007 Head Start reauthorization man-
dated the creation of the councils and required them to identify opportu-
nities for and barriers to coordination among extant national and state 
programs. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided one 
hundred million dollars in grants to states to establish the councils. The 
need for better coordination “across early childhood programs” was “an 
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underlying thread in all state early childhood advisory councils’ applica-
tions for federal funding.”61 The councils built on existing state initiatives 
and drew their membership from public agencies and private stakeholders 
in the business, philanthropic, and other communities.
Responding to contemporary fiscal challenges requires striking a bal-
ance among several competing priorities. In addition to allocating public 
funds, state policymakers must also determine the eligibility require-
ments, curricular standards, personnel credentials, and classroom regula-
tions that govern state- funded programs. Such decisions are substantively 
significant because they determine who gains access to the programs and 
what type of services they will receive. In an era of resource scarcity, pre-
school advocates must carefully consider how changes will affect the ef-
fectiveness or quality of public programs. Despite general agreement 
about the deficient quality of existing programs (Barnett and Hustedt 
2003; Henry, Gordon, and Rickman 2006), different constituencies within 
the early childhood community offer competing prescriptions for im-
provement.
The conflict over teacher certification requirements is illustrative. In 
recent years, many organizations and politicians have recommended that 
all preschool teachers hold a bachelor’s degree with specialization in early 
childhood education. They argue that highly credentialed caregivers pro-
duce stronger academic performance and “yield significant improvements 
in program effectiveness for all children, especially those from low- income 
families.”62 Representatives of Head Start and other community- based 
programs tend to be less enthusiastic. The Improving Head Start for 
School Readiness Act, signed into law by President George W. Bush in 
December 2007, established new educational goals for Head Start teach-
ers. Many program administrators expressed misgivings about this 
change, arguing that additional funds would be necessary to provide “tu-
ition and book scholarships, provide release time and substitute teachers 
while teaching staff were in school, and increase compensation once cre-
dentials were earned.”63 The National Head Start Association character-
ized it as an “unfunded mandate” that failed to recognize the fiscal realities 
involved in hiring, training, and retraining teachers with advanced de-
grees.64
The fiscal impact of higher certification requirements does not end 
once a degree has been earned. Many Head Start centers find it “impossi-
ble to keep highly qualified teachers because there are better opportunities 
in the public schools.”65 One study found that Head Start directors and 
private program providers feared that teachers took positions in their pro-
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grams “only as stepping stones to more lucrative jobs in the public schools” 
(Barnett and Hustedt 2003, 56). Many Head Start leaders and private- 
sector providers fear that more- stringent certification requirements will 
exacerbate this competition for personnel. The acquisition of more formal 
education may even lead staffers to seek employment outside the early 
childhood field, which has historically offered very low wages.66 Although 
these concerns are not new, they resonate especially strongly in an era of 
resource scarcity. Whereas some members of the early childhood policy 
community favor higher credentials as a way to promote program quality, 
others worry about their considerable financial implications.
Fiscal challenges also threaten to exacerbate the ongoing controversy 
surrounding program eligibility. The contemporary debate invokes both 
the long- standing question of the age at which children should begin their 
formal education and the question of whether public programs should be 
targeted or universal. The universal preschool movement has gained mo-
mentum since the 1990s and has received considerable popular and schol-
arly attention (Bushouse 2009; Fuller 2007; Kirp 2007; E. Rose 2010). Uni-
versal programs are expensive, however, and program cost is a serious 
concern in an era of limited resources. In addition, some critics have ques-
tioned whether universal programs are responsive to the needs of all par-
ents, especially if they are run by the public schools. Such programs may 
not appeal to parents who prefer less institutional forms of care, and they 
may be inappropriate for parents with unusual work schedules (Fuller 
2007, 16). The claim that early childhood initiatives must accommodate 
parental preferences is also not new, but the contemporary policy land-
scape, with more American children enrolled in a diverse array of public- 
and private- sector programs, highlights one of reformers’ central chal-
lenges: programmatic diversity represents a political obstacle for those 
who hope to construct a more collaborative and less fragmented system.67
Conclusion: Early Childhood Policy at a Crossroads
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, supporters of increased public invest-
ment in child development believed that they were living through a criti-
cal moment. Contemporary supporters view themselves as being in a 
similar situation, and their rhetoric bears a striking resemblance to the 
proclamations of Harold Howe II and Albert Quie with which this book 
began. In 2002, Georgia governor Roy Barnes echoed Howe’s optimism by 
predicting “that within ten years early childhood will be as accepted (and 
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be state funded) as kindergarten is today.”68 In contrast, David Kirp (2007, 
266) channeled Quie’s wariness with his assessment that the preschool 
movement “has arrived at a crossroads. Even as more states are offering 
preschool, more children are enrolling, and more public dollars are being 
spent, the quality of instruction remains mixed and the amount of money 
being spent on each child has declined.” Their contrasting perspectives 
hint at a potential tension between improved preschool access and better 
program quality.
Other observers approach the future with a combination of optimism 
and wariness. One survey of the contemporary landscape concludes, 
“Eventually, public school will begin for most children at age three or four. 
[Prekindergarten], in many ways, is at a crossroads, caught between early 
child care programs, Head Start, and schools” (Clifford et al. 2005, 141). Its 
abrupt shift from confidence to wariness is noteworthy, and its observa-
tion about competing constituencies resonates with the evidence pre-
sented in this chapter. Existing policy arrangements, rather than being the 
foundation on which reforms can build, sometimes represent an obstacle 
to policy change. Stakeholders like teachers unions, Head Start support-
ers, private- sector providers, and others endorse expanded access to early 
childhood programs but offer distinct visions of how best to accomplish 
that goal. Moving the fragmented system of early childhood policy in a 
single direction is both a political and a logistical challenge. Regardless of 
whether reformers focus their attention on the national level or the fifty 
states, they confront a policy landscape that is significantly more compli-
cated than the one their predecessors faced four decades ago. The accu-
mulated policy choices of the intervening years privileged a diverse array 
of stakeholders, and accommodating their preferences is often a prerequi-
site for major policy change.
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Conclusion: The Future of Preschool Politics
In a November 2011 interview, House minority leader Nancy Pelosi (D- 
CA) was asked what her legislative goals would be if the Democrats were 
to retake control of the House of Representatives. The former Speaker of 
the House answered that her top priority would be to push for compre-
hensive change in early childhood policy. Describing how she struggled to 
find reliable care for her children, she spoke approvingly of the Compre-
hensive Child Development Act that President Richard Nixon vetoed in 
1971. She observed, “One of the great pieces of unfinished business is high- 
quality child care; I wonder why we just can’t do it.”1
Many preschool advocates shared Pelosi’s goals but not her optimism. 
At the end of 2011, the Pew Charitable Trusts ended its ten- year commit-
ment to a campaign for high- quality, voluntary prekindergarten for all 
three- and four- year- olds. In a final report outlining its “Pre- K– 12 vision” 
for the future of public education, the foundation noted that major reform 
would require collaboration among diverse stakeholders. Effective col-
laboration, it argued, “will demand more than merely cooperating better. 
At every stage of implementation, these stakeholders must be willing to 
change how they think, talk and operate, especially with respect to en-
trenched systems and long- held maxims about early childhood, pre- k and 
public education.”2 A December 2011 column by the executive director of 
the Minnesota Early Learning Foundation touched on similar themes. 
Describing the barriers to major policy change, it noted that “change is 
popular in the abstract, controversial when it hits home. . . . We saw change 
quickly become controversial when reform requires adults with a stake in 
the failed status quo to do things differently.”3
The developments profiled in this book illustrate the many challenges 
involved in early childhood policymaking. Beginning in the late 1960s, 
both comprehensive bills to create a permanent national framework for 
the universal provision of preschool services and incremental proposals to 
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shift the status quo in a more modest direction have foundered on the 
shoals of the legislative process. The most famous proposal, the Compre-
hensive Child Development Act cited by Pelosi, cleared both congressio-
nal chambers only to be vetoed and denounced in extraordinarily harsh 
terms by the president. It is tempting to read this congressional history as 
a story of repeated rejection and policy stasis.
Interpreting the evolution of early childhood policy in this manner, 
however, underestimates the dramatic political and policy shifts that have 
occurred even in the absence of landmark national legislation. Some of 
these changes are rhetorical. Legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
focused on child development and sought to provide a wide range of ser-
vices to young children and their families. In recent years, the focus at 
both the national level and in the states has turned to educational pro-
grams and cognitive development, with terms like school readiness and 
prekindergarten moving to the fore. Similarly, supporters of increased 
public investment have responded to concerns about the cost of high- 
quality preschool services by describing it as an investment that will pay 
for itself over the long term.
More important for the purposes of this book, the politics of early 
childhood policy in the early twenty- first century differ profoundly from 
those of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, significant state- level 
activity is a defining feature of the current debate. The emergence of state 
governments as powerful stakeholders is illustrative of broader changes in 
the interest group universe. Other stakeholders, including Head Start sup-
porters, educational associations, and private- sector service providers, are 
more active and influential than they used to be. Their involvement, iron-
ically, has splintered the coalition supporting major policy change. Di-
verse stakeholders have endorsed additional government intervention, 
but they often disagree on its form. This political complexity is a by- 
product of the programmatic fragmentation that is a central feature of 
American early childhood policy, and it has contributed to the mainte-
nance of a status quo that many observers find problematic.
Policy Development and Preschool Politics
Early childhood education in the United States differs from that of other 
countries along two key dimensions. First, the private sector plays an un-
usually large role in service provision. This pattern resonates with other 
policy arenas and is a defining feature of the American welfare state (Gott-
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schalk 2000; Hacker 2002; Howard 1997). It is important because public- 
and private- sector programs tend to serve different constituencies. Eco-
nomically secure families tend to rely on the private sector for preschool 
services, while most government- administered programs are targeted on 
such specific subgroups as children from low- income families. The second 
distinctive attribute of early childhood education in the United States is its 
public- sector decentralization. Government programs are administered 
by numerous executive agencies at the national, state, and local levels. In 
recent years, the uneasy relationship between these diverse programs and 
funding streams has received substantial attention. Many observers cite 
insufficient coordination as one of the primary deficiencies of the contem-
porary system. This book has sought not to assess the merits or demerits 
of what presently exists but, rather, to explain how and why preschool 
education in the United States came to take on its distinctive form.
Isolating the political origins of the contemporary American system 
requires a developmental approach that treats policymaking as a long- 
term causal chain. The present system developed gradually. Its origins can 
be traced to the temporally distant events of the early 1970s, when several 
efforts to establish a national framework fell short. Nixon’s veto of the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act was a critical juncture, because it 
set in motion a series of reactions and counterreactions that produced the 
present fragmentation of the contemporary system. The absence of a com-
prehensive national policy facilitated the growth of nonprofit and for- 
profit programs in the private sector. In addition, supporters of expansive 
governmental initiatives, largely stymied at the national level, sought a 
more favorable institutional venue for their campaign. Their successful 
venue shopping led to substantial policy activity in the states as well as to 
the expansion of Head Start and the Child and Dependent Care Tax 
Credit. The long- term political consequences of their successes were pro-
found. Various constituencies mobilized to defend their stake in existing 
arrangements, and their successful lobbying made it more difficult for the 
national government to adopt a more coherent approach to preschool ser-
vice delivery. As existing programs and the constituencies defending them 
grew more entrenched, preschool education evolved into a fragmented 
and decentralized system.
This evolution offers broader lessons for the study of public policy. It 
illustrates how the existing policy repertoire can affect the positions that 
interest groups take and the strategies they employ. Preschool advocates 
adjusted to changes in their social, institutional, and political environ-
ment. Constituencies who agreed that additional government involve-
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ment was desirable differed on the specific form that it should take, and 
this disagreement led them to work at cross- purposes. The broad coalition 
that came together in the early 1970s to support child development legisla-
tion eventually disintegrated, torn apart by a combination of political 
frustration and disagreements over the details of various legislative pro-
posals. State and local officials and Head Start supporters viewed many 
recent initiatives as threats to their existing prerogatives and budgets. 
Their shifting positions are instructive in terms of both explaining the 
contemporary fragmentation of American preschool education and illus-
trating the complex interplay between public policy and interest group 
activity.
Consider, for example, the evolving role of state governments. A key 
controversy during the congressional debates of the early 1970s concerned 
prime sponsorship and administrative responsibility. Many state officials 
expressed frustration with the Comprehensive Child Development Act, 
believing that the vetoed bill bypassed the states and privileged local gov-
ernments and community organizations. Motivated by an interest in early 
childhood and a desire to protect state prerogatives against national en-
croachment, they devoted more attention to the issue. At the same time, 
preschool advocates viewed the states as an increasingly viable venue for 
policymaking on child development. As a result, the early to mid- 1970s 
were a period of significant activity at the state level. The number and the 
size of state early childhood programs grew, and the states became more 
involved in the education and care of young children. For example, officials 
in many states created offices of child development, a bureaucratic reform 
designed to improve the administration of early childhood programs.
The state- level reforms of the early to mid- 1970s were not broad in 
reach, but they nonetheless had significant short- and long- term political 
consequences. In the short term, they contributed to the increased asser-
tiveness of state officials during congressional debates about early child-
hood policy. As Congress considered the Child and Family Services Act of 
1975 and the Child Care Act of 1979, state officials were more assertive 
about protecting their prerogatives. They urged their congressional coun-
terparts to support the efforts that were already underway at the state 
level. The Child Care Act granted the states significant administrative dis-
cretion, assuming that they would serve as prime sponsors. While it would 
be a mistake to attribute this shift solely to state officials’ lobbying efforts, 
it is important to acknowledge their mobilization and increasing asser-
tiveness. By the time Congress returned to early childhood policy in the 
late 1980s, state officials were viewed as crucial stakeholders. Prior to in-
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troducing Smart Start in 1988, for example, Senator Edward Kennedy (D- 
MA) convened a bipartisan panel of governors who provided suggestions 
about how best to achieve the goal of universal preschool access. This con-
sultative process represented a sea change from the debates of the early 
1970s.
The states have played a central role in early childhood policy over the 
past two decades. State lawmakers consistently appear before Congress to 
protect their policymaking prerogatives and to lobby for increased finan-
cial support, and the states represent an institutional venue in which cru-
cial policy decisions are made. Many congressional initiatives, including 
the PRE- K Act and the Race to the Top– Early Learning Challenge contest 
profiled in chapter 7, limit the national government’s role to agenda set-
ting and financial support. In contrast, they tend to view program devel-
opment as a task best left to state officials and service providers. The early 
2000s have been a period of widespread state- level activity, during which 
state lawmakers have enacted new programs and expanded access to and 
increased spending on existing programs.4 The universal preschool move-
ment is perhaps the most visible manifestation of this heightened state 
prominence.
Thus the evolution of early childhood policy in the United States high-
lights a dimension of federalism that is often overlooked. The fragmenta-
tion of political authority among national and subnational governments is 
often described as a constitutional hurdle to the adoption of expansive 
social policies (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Robertson 1989). This 
one- dimensional portrayal of federalism and its impact overlooks how the 
institutional fragmentation of the American political system provides re-
formers with several avenues through which they can achieve their goals. 
Thwarted in one institutional arena, they can pursue their objectives in 
another setting. Such venue shopping is a common element of American 
politics (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993), and it helped shape the con-
temporary preschool system. When the states emerged as an important 
locus of policymaking activity, the scale of their efforts was less important 
than the fact that their very existence created a new set of stakeholders. 
The dynamics described in this book suggest that scholars should devote 
more attention to the role of subnational units as autonomous actors in 
federal systems (Pierson 1995). Successful venue shopping at the state level 
can have significant long- term political consequences (Orloff 1988). Schol-
ars of American social policy must be more attentive to the complex and 
ongoing interplay between the national government and the fifty states.
The long- term impact of federalism may vary across policy areas due 
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to the structure of existing programs and their political appeal. Programs 
that offer the states considerable discretion might facilitate the mobiliza-
tion of state officials, while those constraining subnational authority might 
limit it. The varying administrative role of state governments across pro-
grams like Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families therefore represents an analytical opportunity to 
examine and refine the argument advanced in this book. Furthermore, the 
popularity of existing programs might influence whether state officials 
will mobilize to defend their prerogatives. If a program is viewed as a po-
litical liability because of the financial burden it imposes or the social con-
struction of its target populations (Schneider and Ingram 1993), state of-
ficials might be willing to cede administrative control to Congress. Future 
research on the long- term impact of federalism and venue shopping 
should seek to identify the conditions that are most likely to generate feed-
back effects.
The political evolution of Head Start, a targeted national program that 
serves disadvantaged young children and their families, also illustrates 
how policy feedback contributed to the fragmentation of American pre-
school education. Established as part of the War on Poverty in 1965, Head 
Start maintained a tenuous existence during its early years but was placed 
on surer footing during the 1970s (Vinovskis 2005; Zigler and Muenchow 
1992). It is a comprehensive program that provides educational and other 
services. Head Start parents value the decision- making authority the pro-
gram allows them to exercise and the job opportunities it provides. Recent 
survey evidence suggests that recipients view Head Start as effective (Met-
tler and Stonecash 2008). Experience with the program also seems to in-
crease political participation (Schneider and Sidney 2009; Soss 1999). The 
existence of Head Start spurred the creation of the National Head Start 
Association in 1973, which has been an outspoken and active defender of 
the program for the past four decades.
Ironically, the mobilization of Head Start supporters contributed to the 
fragmentation of the early education policy community. They generally 
favored the expansion of publicly funded programs but viewed major 
changes as potential threats to their prerogatives and their budgets. Ten-
sions between Head Start supporters and other advocates were evident in 
the 1970s, when a California official described Head Start teachers as an 
obstacle to an early childhood bill and when the Child Care Act of 1979 
sought to accommodate the Head Start community by avoiding any direct 
conflict with the program. By the late 1980s, Head Start supporters often 
viewed new early childhood programs as substitutes for, rather than com-
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plements to, their favored program. At a congressional hearing in 1988, for 
example, the president of the National Head Start Association openly ex-
pressed her fear that a new national program would compete with Head 
Start for funding. The case study evidence and quantitative analysis pre-
sented in chapter 8 of this book suggest that Head Start also generated 
policy feedback at the state level. Accommodating the concerns of the 
Head Start community was often a prerequisite for major reforms.
The shifting positions of state governments and Head Start supporters 
illustrate how the mobilization of those who benefit from existing policy 
arrangements can constrain policymakers’ options. This feedback dy-
namic helps explain why contemporary discussions of early childhood 
policy tend to emphasize the potential costs of programmatic fragmenta-
tion and the potential benefits of coordination. Promoting collaboration 
among different stakeholders is a challenge, but there have been some 
noteworthy successes (Gormley, Phillips, and Gayer 2008). Accommodat-
ing existing stakeholders seems to be a logistical and political necessity for 
major policy change. It is a logistical necessity because program expansion 
requires additional facilities, personnel, and supporting infrastructure. It 
is a political necessity because the early childhood policy community in-
cludes diverse constituencies who disagree about many basic questions, 
and some of these groups view the expansion of public programs as a 
threat to their survival. Reform often requires concessions that grant these 
groups an ongoing role in service provision. As a result, most of the major 
policy changes of recent years accommodate existing providers. This ap-
proach, however, furthers, rather than mitigates, the fragmentation of the 
contemporary preschool system.
In summary, the present structure of American early childhood educa-
tion can be traced to the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, several 
efforts to establish a permanent national framework were defeated, and 
reform advocates engaged in venue shopping. Their successes resulted in 
a mélange of public- sector programs at the national and state levels. Those 
who benefited from these programs mobilized to defend their preroga-
tives. Their mobilization, in combination with the growth of the private 
sector that was fostered in part by expansions of the Child and Dependent 
Care Tax Credit, reshaped the political terrain on which subsequent dis-
cussions of early childhood policy took place. Although many observers 
expressed reservations about the status quo, major policy change was usu-
ally controversial, because it offended the mobilized groups who benefited 
from existing arrangements.
With its emphasis on critical junctures, venue shopping, and policy 
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feedback, the present analysis applies concepts that have been developed 
in other contexts to a largely unexamined but substantively important do-
main. This endeavor represents the sort of “test case” without which schol-
arly literatures are inadequately integrated and fail to advance. It is an es-
pecially valuable enterprise because recent research on American social 
policy has been criticized for a lack of integration (Hacker 2005). The evi-
dence presented in this book suggests that the central concepts of the 
policy development approach may be applicable to a wide range of policy 
arenas.
Indeed, future research on social policymaking should incorporate 
education programs more systematically. Scholars of American and com-
parative politics have devoted relatively limited attention to this topic.5 As 
a result, most existing research on education policy consists of program 
analyses that offer valuable insights about how policies function but that 
produce static portraits of phenomena that are constantly in motion 
(Sroufe 1995, 79). Furthermore, program variation across different educa-
tion levels provides an analytical opportunity to assess hypotheses about 
the policymaking process. The enactment and implementation of No 
Child Left Behind, for example, has shed light on the impact of federalism 
and various institutional and ideological changes (Manna 2006; McGuinn 
2006). Efforts to impose NCLB- like accountability mechanisms on higher 
education were decisively rebuffed, however (Lowry 2009). In addition, 
the role of the private sector is more pronounced in early childhood edu-
cation than it is in elementary and secondary education. For a variety of 
reasons, education policy represents fertile terrain for scholars who wish 
to develop generalizations about the politics of American social policy. 
Additional research is likely to prove both substantively and theoretically 
illuminating.
Finally, subnational policymaking merits a more prominent place in 
the study of policy development. In addition to illuminating the impact of 
federalism, turning to the state level provides a virtually untapped venue 
in which to assess the applicability of key concepts of the developmental 
approach. Most existing studies concentrate on the national level,6 an un-
derstandable focus, but one that presents several challenges in terms of 
developing generalizations. One can overcome these challenges using the 
underlying similarity and manageable variation offered by the fifty states 
to evaluate hypotheses about policymaking. During an era in which state 
governments are a central locus of policymaking activity, there are both 
substantive and analytical reasons why scholars of social policy should be 
more attentive to state politics.7 Analyses of state- level developments will 
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allow scholars to make more- confident generalizations about social poli-
cymaking.
In sum, the argument and analytical approach advanced in this book 
suggest three avenues for future research. First, scholars must acknowl-
edge the multiple dimensions of federalism, devoting particular attention 
to the role of subnational units as autonomous actors in a federal system. 
Federalism provides opportunities for venue shopping that can have sig-
nificant short- and long- term political implications. State governments 
are not only the source of crucial policy decisions. They also lobby the 
national government, acting to protect their policymaking authority. Sec-
ond, scholars must expand their frame of reference to include a wider 
range of program areas. Retirement security and health care policy un-
doubtedly merit the attention they have received, but the concepts devel-
oped and generalizations made in studies of those two program areas 
might not be applicable to other domains. Additional “test cases” of the 
sort offered by this book would be valuable. Third, scholars would be well 
served to turn their attention to the American states. The subnational level 
represents a favorable venue for assessing the validity and limitations of 
concepts like policy feedback, and it offers an opportunity to conduct his-
torical and quantitative analyses of policy choices. Examining temporal 
and spatial variation at the state level will enable scholars to refine their 
knowledge about the dynamics of the policymaking process.
The Future of Preschool Politics
Almost four decades after Nixon’s landmark veto, former vice president 
Walter Mondale (D- MN) reflected on its implications and on whether 
supporters could have done anything to produce a different outcome. He 
explained, “I have often wondered if we had put in place the same controls 
but operated it through the public school system if it would have had more 
support.”8 Such a tactical shift may have been beneficial, but it also may 
have dampened the enthusiasm of advocates who preferred the Head Start 
model and were wary of giving too much authority to state governments 
or the public school system. When Albert Shanker of the American Fed-
eration of Teachers described early childhood education as a job for the 
public schools in September 1974, those constituencies viewed his pro-
posal as a power grab. Even if Mondale and his congressional allies had 
overcome these intramural disagreements within the early childhood 
policy community, the presence of Richard Nixon in the White House 
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made the enactment of comprehensive child development legislation un-
likely.
Over time, the obstacles confronting potential reformers grew more 
difficult to surmount. The evolving positions and political activities of 
state governments and Head Start representatives in the public sector, in 
combination with a growing number and range of service providers in the 
private sector, meant that more actors perceived themselves as stakehold-
ers. Anyone wishing to alter the status quo had to grapple with this grow-
ing organizational density. The difficulty of this task was apparent by the 
late 1970s: “If you put your hand on Head Start, for example, you’d find a 
lot of people who knew exactly what it meant to them and what sort of 
budget they expected from Washington” (Mondale 2010, 270). The Head 
Start community was one of many constituencies whose mobilization af-
fected subsequent political debates over early childhood policy. Many of 
these constituencies opposed proposals to alter existing arrangements. 
Though they expressed fealty to the general objective of increased public- 
sector investment, they worried that policy changes would affect their ad-
ministrative prerogatives and their financial support.
What do the dynamics described in this book portend for the future of 
preschool education in the United States? Major policy change is always a 
difficult undertaking in the institutionally fragmented American political 
system, and it becomes even more challenging when the interests and po-
litical influence of existing stakeholders are taken into account. Even so, 
one should not interpret the preceding analysis to mean that the present 
system is frozen in place. One of the striking developments of the last two 
decades is the extent of policy change in states like Georgia and Okla-
homa. These episodes suggest that substantial shifts are most likely to oc-
cur when reformers accommodate existing stakeholders in the public and 
private sectors. Contemporary reformers seem to be cognizant of this dy-
namic, and they often assert that new programs will not cause anyone who 
is satisfied with the preschool services their children receive to lose access 
to them.
In conclusion, the fragmented and decentralized preschool system that 
exists in the contemporary United States is the legacy of Nixon’s veto of 
the Comprehensive Child Development Act and the reactions it sparked 
across several institutional venues. This historical legacy limits reformers’ 
alternatives, because “policy options are always constrained by the lega-
cies of existing policy, politics, and administration, and our choices today 
are burdened by our past” (Orloff 1988, 80). Some of the possibilities that 
existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s are unlikely today, a point that can 
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be illustrated by returning to the prediction made by Harold Howe II, as 
commissioner of education, in 1968. Howe predicted that publicly pro-
vided preschool education would eventually be universal for four- year- 
olds in the United States. Since that time, the number and proportion of 
children enrolled in preschool has grown significantly. However, the pri-
vate sector has long played and continues to play a crucial role in provid-
ing preschool services. A universal public system is unlikely to develop in 
the United States, where the complementary roles played by the public 
and private sectors are likely to be defining features of preschool politics 
for the foreseeable future.
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A Note on Archival Sources
One of the archival sources on which the preceding analysis relies is a col-
lection of interviews housed at the National Library of Medicine in 
Bethesda, Maryland. The relevant notes incorporate only the names of the 
interviewer and the interviewee, the date of the interview, and the page 
number from which the relevant quotation is drawn. The full citation for 
this source follows:
Leona Baumgartner and Milton J. E. Senn. Transcripts and Tapes of Inter-
views on the Child Development Movement. NLM ID: 2935107R. National 
Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD.
The analysis also relies on archival material housed at several other insti-
tutions:
the Association for Childhood Education International (ACEI), Spe-
cial Collections, University of Maryland Libraries, in College Park, 
Maryland (shortened to “ACEI Archives” in the notes);
the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center in Nor-
man, Oklahoma (shortened to “Carl Albert Center” in the notes);
the Education Commission of the States in Denver, Colorado (short-
ened to “ECS Archives” in the notes);
the Minnesota Historical Society in Saint Paul, Minnesota;
the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, 
Maryland (shortened to “National Archives” in the notes); and
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